






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# VINDICATION OF LUTHER

AGAINST

HIS RECENT ENGLISH ASSAILANTS.

SECOND EDITION,

REPRINTED AND ENLARGED FROM THE NOTES TO

*THE MISSION OF THE COMFORTER.*

BY JULIUS CHARLES HARE, M.A.,

RECTOR OF HERSTMONCEUX,

ARCHDEACON OF LEWES, CHAPLAIN IN ORDINARY TO THE QUEEN.

LONDON:

JOHN W. PARKER AND SON, WEST STRAND.

1855.



## ADVERTISEMENT.

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THIS Essay, which appeared in its original form as a Note to the Sermons on the *Mission of the Comforter*, was re-written, enlarged and revised with great care by the Author as far as page 288. He left in MS. the Note A, and a few pages containing the heads of the Notes which he had intended to write.

The pages between 288 and the end of the text are reprinted from the former Edition.

It has been thought best to publish the imperfect Notes, as they contain references which are of value. To insert the passages which the author intended to quote would scarcely in any case be possible; for he might have introduced a line where an Editor would transcribe a page or *vice versá*. In some instances, as the reader will perceive, the references are

too general even to warrant a guess as to the special points of which he had wished to take notice. It has been thought safer therefore to publish them just as they are, in the belief that some students will be able to make use of them. They will, at least, show with what care Archdeacon Hare arranged his materials, and how many authorities he thought it his duty to consult before he ventured to make any assertions affecting the characters of men or the facts of History.



## VINDICATION OF LUTHER.

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IMPARTIALITY is an attribute which, men have ever felt, they cannot claim for themselves with regard to their contemporaries, to whom they are united, or from whom they are severed, by manifold relations of action and feeling and opinion: but they have been only the more ready in ascribing it to posterity, far readier than we have any warrant for doing in the bygone experience of the world. When death has withdrawn a person from our immediate contact, all the prejudices and prepossessions attach to him, it would seem to be supposed, must die away; and he rises above the mists and vapours of the earth into the clear, cold sky, where people see him as he is. Yet there are divers causes and motives which retard the formation of such a right judgment, it may be for centuries. When a man has taken a leading part in the conflicts of his age, it will often happen that, as those conflicts may themselves be prolonged from generation to generation, the feelings with which he was regarded during his life, will cluster around him after his death. In fact, if his name chances to be exalted into the symbol of a party, his postumous reputation may become far more unlike his real character, than that which he bore in his lifetime; as we see in the

case of so many among the most renowned of the ancient patriots. Nor is it to be wondered at if the Romans, even in the Augustan age, were incapable of doing justice to Hannibal. For how many are there in these days who have ever bethought themselves that they are under a grave moral obligation of doing justice to Cromwell?

Now perhaps there is no one in the whole history of the world, against whom such a host of implacable prejudices and antipathies have been permanently arrayed, as against Luther. For the contest in which he engaged, is the most momentous ever waged by a single man: it had been secretly preparing for centuries; and its issue is still pending. Even in our days the dark, terrible power, which Luther assailed and cast down, has been lifting itself up in renewed vigour: Dagon has been set up again in the very presence of the ark of God; and all they who are fighting for Dagon, who are upholding the cause attacked by Luther, cannot possibly be just to Luther, whose whole life and character, his heart and soul and mind, are identified and one with his great work, in a manner very different from what we see in other men. Melanchthon, for instance, may easily be conceived apart from the Reformation, as an eminent divine, living in other ages of the Church, as the friend of Augustin, or the companion of Fenelon. Even Calvin may be separated in thought from the age of the Reformation, and may be set among the Schoolmen, or in the Council-chamber of Hildebrand or of Innocent, or at the Synod of Dort, or among Cromwell's chaplains. Hence it is easier to form an independent, candid judgment on their characters. But Luther, apart from the Reformation, would cease to be Luther. His work was not something external to him, like Saturn's ring, on which he shone, and within which he revolved: it was

his own very self, that grew out of him, while he grew out of his work. Wherefore they who do not rightly estimate and feel thankful for the Reformation, cannot rightly understand Luther, or attain to that insight into his heart and spirit, which is never granted except to love.

It is not merely that the Romanists, and such persons as cling to the Romish notion of the Church and of the Priesthood, must needs feel a strong repugnance to Luther. Even among those who profess a high admiration for what they deem the principles and purpose of the Reformation, many are scarcely less incapable of appreciating him. They who espouse the negative side of the Reformation, but reject its positive side,—they who regard it as the first act in the emancipation of the human mind from all authority, as the prelude to that ideal elysium in which everybody is to do as he pleases, and to think as he chooses,—can feel no sympathy with Luther's strong positive faith; and being unable to discern the unity of his character, as it manifests itself when we look at it from its living centre, they complain of a jarring inconsistency between his denials and his assertions. The very intensity of Luther's convictions, the vehemence with which he contended for them, cannot but seem utterly extravagant to those who do not participate in them, or feel what questions of weal or woe, of life or death, for the whole race of man were at stake. There are many moreover, to whom that vehemence in itself is repulsive, persons who like the spectacle of rhetorical or scholastic exercises, better than the strife and tug of the forum, who look complacently on the summer lightning, but shrink from the flash and thunderbolt of the real storm. These people,—and they are numerous in an age when literature has diluted men's

hearts, and brought them to conceive that the main end of life is to furnish matter for speculation,—will find amusement and take pleasure in Erasmus, but are startled and shockt by Luther (A).

Besides, as St Paul himself was *slanderosly reported* to be a preacher of Antinomian doctrines, a like accusation has been brought age after age against all such preachers as have been most earnest in proclaiming those highths and depths of Christian truth, which it was St Paul's special mission to write on the hearts and consciences of mankind. For these doctrines are still, as ever, a stumbling-block to the Jew, and foolishness to the Greek,—a stumbling-block to the man of action, and foolishness to the man of speculation. The whole tribe of the children of this world,—they who are accustomed to act, and who like to see the results of their actions, deeming that this is man's business upon earth, and that by this everything is to be effected,—and they on the other hand whose main concern is to heap up a pile, greater or less, of knowledge, who dote upon knowledge, and regard it as man's highest province, without the conviction of any intimate relation between knowledge and action,—the mere moralist, the dreamer and talker about human virtue, he who fancies that man has the springs of all power and goodness in himself, and he who looks upon him as a machine to be set and kept a going by continual impulses from without,—he who has no worthier notion of heaven than as an incentive and reward of abstinence from vice, and who values religion as a make-weight to turn the scale in the otherwise wavering balance of good and evil,—all these persons, as their minds are forclosed against the reception, and even against the intelligent apprehension of spiritual religion, and as they have no

conception of Faith except as an act of the understanding, are surprised and offended when they are told that Faith is the ground of our justification. *How can it matter*, they say, *what a man thinks or believes, provided he lives an honest, virtuous life*. If they can modify the proposition by slipping in *works*, and asserting that we are to be justified *by faith and works* conjointly, they may perhaps assent to it: for then Faith dwindles into an evanescent quantity; and Works come forward as the Babel by which man is to mount into heaven. But when Works are any way excluded, when a person is strenuous in preaching with St Paul, that *man is not justified by the works of the law, but by faith in Jesus Christ*, — when this doctrine is inculcated with the earnest reiteration which is requisite, not only on account of its primary vital importance, but also of its repugnance to human pride and self-sufficiency, he is sure to be charged with depreciating morality and making void the Law, by those who have lowered the key of religion, in order to bring it into accord with the voice of their own hearts and of the world: and it will be very difficult to convince them that the doctrine of Justification by Faith, when rightly taught, does not make void, but, as St Paul says (Rom. iii. 31), *establishes the Law*. Hence it is not to be wondered at that Luther, as he was sent to reproclaim St Paul's doctrine, which had been distorted for century after century by manifold sophistications, and which practically was almost forgotten and set aside, and often grossly outraged, by the teaching of the fallen Church, should have been assailed by similar reproaches. The oblivion into which that doctrine had fallen, the mass of corruptions whereby it was overlaid and hidden, imprest him with the necessity of setting it forth continually in its naked power:

and though he also followed his great master and prototype in continually enforcing every moral duty, not indeed as the ground of justification, but as its fruit and evidence, yet, as this did not save St Paul from such *slandorous reports*, neither did it avail to save Luther.

For all these and other reasons, it is no way surprising that Luther should have been the object of various censures and invectives from divers quarters, in the present state of the English literary and religious mind. For though it may be hoped that we have risen above the dreary shallowness of Hume, who, in introducing his account of the Reformation, lays it down, that an establishd Church is a political benefit, because it "bribes the indolence" and checks the activity of its ministers, our philosophy and literature are still far from being sufficiently impregnated with the idea of Christianity, to recognise the real worth and dignity of the Reformation. Moreover, since that disastrous cloud has come over the religious mind of England, which leads so many of our divines to decry the Reformation and its authors, the most unfounded charges against Luther have found acceptance with many, who catch them up with a parrot-like volubility in repeating ugly words. Therefore, seeing that Luther's character is so closely connected with that of the Reformation,—a fact attested by the very virulence with which the enemies of the Reformation have always set themselves to revile him,—to those who love the Reformation, it must needs seem desirable that Luther's name should be cleared from all unmerited stigmas. To do this, so far as I am acquainted with those which have been cast upon him of late years in England, is the object of the present work.

The best vindication of Luther is indeed that supplied by his own works,—by the volumes which he sent forth during thirty years, at one period almost like flights of birds, in assertion of God's truth, and to destroy the strongholds of falsehood,—and still more by that which he was enabled in God's strength to write on the page of history, and on the hearts of his countrymen, and of so large a portion of Christ's Church. Hence the most satisfactory apology for him is his life, the fullest and most faithful record of it. Such apologies we find in several books written of late years, both of English growth, and exotics which have been naturalized. It is the intense interest of Luther's character that has given such wide popularity in England to D'Aubigné's *History of the Reformation*, notwithstanding the great vices of its style and manner. A lively portrait of the same character is presented in Mr Hazlitt's translation of Michelet's work. Ranke's admirable history too,<sup>1</sup> which gives a noble picture of the great Reformer, has been rendered into English by a pen, which, while it preserves the masculine strength of its originals, invests them with a feminine grace and clearness. Among our own divines, Dean Waddington has found himself compelled, like D'Aubigné, to turn his *History of the Reformation* into a life of the chief agent in it, which he has executed diligently and affectionately. Of the present work the object is of a lower order, to correct certain misrepresentations which have become current concerning specific points in Luther's life and doctrine. In the course of it I shall have to discuss several questions at greater length than would be consistent with a history or biography; and some of these questions will perhaps be found to be of no slight or merely temporary interest.

REPLY TO MR HALLAM'S REMARKS  
ON LUTHER.

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MR HALLAM, in his *Introduction to the Literature of Europe*, speaks of Luther in three passages,—Part I. chap. iv. §§ 54—61, chap. vi. § 4, and § 26. In none of these passages are his observations of much importance. Indeed, his subject being the history of Literature, though it does not exclude Theology, yet it does not lead him into any profound or laborious investigation of theological questions, or even of the development of Theology as a science: still less is it a history of Religion. Nor does he appear to possess much acquaintance with German literature of any period, an acquaintance very rare among persons of his immediate standing, who for the most part deemed that modern literature consisted of three provinces, Italian, French, and English, whence an occasional excursion might be made into the Spanish peninsula on the one side, and into the sandy plains of Germany on the other. Hence it might be thought that there is little need of entering into a serious examination of Mr Hallam's remarks on Luther, though the main tenour of them is very unfavorable; unless his reputation for learning, accuracy, judgement, and impartiality gave weight to his testimony; whereby young readers, as I have known to happen in some instances, are induced to suppose that Luther's merits must have been greatly overrated, seeing that this learned and impartial critic finds so little good, and so much evil



in him. Mr Hallam's learning indeed, as I have already hinted, and consequently his accuracy do not embrace this region of knowledge: and while the soundest judgement needs a cognisance of the subject matter on which it is to be exercised, it is perpetually seen, that impartiality, in its mere negativeness, is a sorry qualification for forming an estimate of intellectual or moral grandeur. For what would befall a person who set himself to frame a judgement on Shakspeare, boasting that he could do so with perfect impartiality? He who understands Shakspeare must admire and love him; and unless we admire and love him, we cannot possibly understand him. Nor is it otherwise with the Reformation and its worthies, on which subject Mr Hallam tells us (chap. iv. § 54), he can speak with impartiality. Even in such matters, both heat and cold are better than Laodicean lukewarmness.

In all the three passages cited, in which Mr Hallam speaks of Luther, he charges him with Antinomianism, though without bringing forward one tittle of direct proof, one single expression of Luther's, as a warrant for his censure (B); while there is little else in any of the passages, except the old complaint that Luther was violent and coarse and dogmatical, with an admission however that "his soul was penetrated with a fervent piety, and his integrity as well as purity of life are unquestioned." Hence the reader,—if he has that confidence in his author, which Mr Hallam in the main fully deserves,—will of course think that there must be the strongest evidence of Luther's demoralizing doctrines; since they are so prominently offensive to such an impartial critic, that they prevent his recognising anything else in a writer, in whom one should have thought, from what he is said to have effected, there must needs have been some remarkable

and eminent qualities. But, when we look for this evidence, we are baffled. After a strong expression of censure, in chap. iv. § 59, Mr Hallam merely refers us to the first volume of Luther's works "*passim*," and then, in the next note, adds, "I am unwilling to give these pages too theological a cast by proving this statement, as I have the means of doing, by extracts from Luther's own early writings. Whoever has read the writings of Luther up to the year 1520 inclusive, must find it impossible to contradict my assertion." In a subsequent passage (chap. vi. § 30), Mr Hallam says, "Even the Coryphaei of the Reformation are probably more quoted than read;—and it may not be invidious to surmise that Luther and Melanchthon serve little other purpose, at least in England, than to give an occasional air of erudition to a theological paragraph, or to supply its margin with a reference that few readers will verify." Is this a lurking consciousness betraying itself? At least one may guess that our divines are not the only persons who stick such feathers into their plumes; although they who have discovered that few readers verify references, may take the safer course of omitting them altogether.

Here however at all events the reader, if, having been accustomed to hear Luther's name held up to veneration and love, he has been shocked at learning that the man whom he had been taught to revere as the great preacher of righteousness, of the true righteousness, the offspring of faith, was in fact a preacher of unrighteousness, is enabled to breathe more freely. He remembers that the publication of the Theses against Indulgences took place on the eve of All Saints in 1517,—that the burning of the Pope's Bull, which was the decisive act of separation from the Papal Church, was on the 10th of December 1520; he looks into the first volume of Luther's Latin

works, to which Mr Hallam refers; he finds that it contains nothing prior to the year 1518, except three collections of scholastic Theses, including those against Tetzels; and knowing how unsafe it is to frame conclusions concerning a man's doctrines from propositions of this kind, —which are ever wont to take a startling and paradoxical shape, as well from the naked brevity with which they must be asserted, as from the polemical purpose for which they are promulgated,—he further calls to mind that Luther went on writing and preaching with a copiousness almost unparalleled till four days before his death, on the 18th of February 1546. Hence he comforts himself with the reflexion, that, whatever extravagances there may have been in Luther's earlier writings, when he first caught sight of the truth, through the power of which he delivered the Church from the stifling superincumbent darkness, the mists, which had gathered round that truth at its first rising above his horizon, soon cleared away, and he no longer ran into the same excesses; which thus would merely betoken that, in the violence of the struggle to deliver his own mind, and that of the Church, from the crushing bondage of the Romish errors, he sometimes overstrained himself, and overstept the mark in the opposite direction.

It is true, the chapter in which this note occurs, treats expressly of the period from 1500 to 1520. But one can hardly suppose that this is the only, or the chief reason why the limitation with regard to Luther's writings is introduced. Indeed, though the charge of Antinomianism is renewed in both the passages in the sixth chapter, several expressions imply that Mr Hallam supposes Luther's later writings to be less erroneous and mischievous than the earlier. Doubtless it is strange that a historian of literature should determine his estimate of one, whom

his position and influence, if nothing else, mark out among the foremost of mankind, by the writings of his first three years; which in such case must have been very immature and crude; and which at any rate were merely so many steps in the gradual emancipation of his mind, as he burst one chain of error after another; while the riper works of twenty-five years of unwearied, devoted labour are scarcely noticed. Yet his writings, taken as a whole, are the first great utterance of the most momentous crisis the human mind has had to go through since the original reception of Christianity, a crisis by which the whole region of thought from that time forward has been more and more modified, both in the way of detriment and of expansion. Such a proceeding is much as if one were to pronounce judgement on Shakspeare from his *Pericles* and *Titus Andronicus*.

An explanation however of this, and of much more, seems to be afforded by the first sentences in Mr Hallam's remarks on Luther. "It would not be just, probably, to give Bossuet credit in every part of that powerful delineation of Luther's theological tenets, with which he begins the *History of the Variations of Protestant Churches*. Nothing, perhaps, in polemical eloquence is so splendid as this chapter. The eagle of Meaux is there truly seen, lordly of form, fierce of eye, terrible in his beak and claws. But he is too determined a partisan to be trusted by those who seek the truth without regard to persons and denominations. His quotations from Luther are short, and in French: I have failed in several attempts to verify the references." Mr Hallam, who here and elsewhere expresses such fervent admiration for Bossuet's eloquence, says of Luther's Latin works, "their intemperance, their coarseness, their inelegance, their scurrility, their wild paradoxes, that menace the foundations of

religious morality, are not compensated, so far at least as my slight acquaintance with them extends, by much strength or acuteness, and still less by any impressive eloquence." To me, I own, in the face of this mild verdict, Luther, if we take the two masses of his writings, those in Latin, and those in his own tongue, — which display different characters of style, according to the persons and objects they are designed for, — in the highest qualities of eloquence, in the faculty of presenting grand truths, moral and spiritual ideas, clearly, vividly, in words which elevate and enlighten men's minds, and stir their hearts, and controll their wills, seems incomparably superior to Bossuet, almost as superior as Shakspeare to Racine, or as Ulswater to the Serpentine. In fact, when turning from one to the other, I have felt at times as if I were passing out of a gorgeous, crowded drawingroom, with its artificial lights and dizzying sounds, to run up a hill at sunrise. The wide and lasting effect which Luther's writings produced on his own nation, and on the world, is the best witness of their power (c).

I should not have toucht on this point, unless it were plain that Mr Hallam's judgement on Luther had been greatly swayed by the *Histoire des Variations*. It is somewhat strange to begin one's account of a man with saying that "*it would not be just, probably, to give credit in every part*" to what a determined, able, and not very scrupulous enemy says of him, writing with the express purpose of detecting all possible evil in him and his cause. In truth what could well be less just than this supererogatory candour? In no court of law would such an invective be attended to, except so far as it was borne out by the evidence adduced. Mr Hallam says he had failed in several attempts to verify the references: if he had succeeded, he would probably have found that the

passages cited are mostly misrepresented: how far the misrepresentation is wilful, I do not take upon myself to pronounce. Bossuet's mind was so uncongenial to Luther's, so artificial, so narrow, sharing in the national incapacity for seeing anything except through a French eyeglass,—his conception of Faith, as I have had occasion to remark elsewhere, was so meagre, so alien from Luther's,—and the shackles imposed upon him by his Church so disqualified him for judging fairly of its great enemy,—that we need not be surprised at any amount of misunderstanding in him, when he came forward as an advocate in such a cause. Still, however fiercely “the eagle of Meaux” may have desired to use his beak and claws, he might as well have pecked and clawed at Mount Ararat, as at him whom God was pleased to endow with a mountain of strength, when He ordained that he should rise for the support of the Church out of the Flood of darkness and corruption.

Here, as the assertion I have made concerning Bossuet's misrepresentations, should not be made unsupported by proofs, I will cite two or three examples, shewing how the quotations from Luther, which in his pages seem very reprehensible, become innocent when viewed along with the context in their original home. Nor shall these examples be culled out from the six books employed in the attack on Luther. They shall be taken from the first sections of that attack: thus they will better illustrate the manner in which it is carried on.

Bossuet begins by bringing forward the idle fiction, that Luther, in assailing the Indulgences, was influenced by the jealousy between the Augustinians and Dominicans. “*Qui ne sait la publication des Indulgences de Léon X, et la jalousie des Augustins contre les Jacobins qu'on leur avoit préférés en cette occasion? Qui ne sait que*

Luther, docteur Augustin, choisi pour maintenir l'honneur de son ordre, attaqua premièrement les abus que plusieurs faisoient des Indulgences" (§. vi). When a writer can retail such a flimsy falsehood, which the slightest examination of the facts shews to be utterly groundless, he betrays such a warp in his mind, such a proneness to believe evil, and such an ineptitude to discern truth, that he at once ceases to be a trustworthy witness; and one is bound to sift all his statements, and to examine their grounds (D).

Bossuet proceeds: "Mais il étoit trop ardent pour se renfermer dans ces bornes: des abus il passa bientôt à la chose même. Il avançoit par degrés, et encore qu'il allât toujours diminuant les Indulgences, et les réduisant presque à rien par la manière de les expliquer, dans le fond il faisoit semblant d'être d'accord avec ses adversaires, puisque, lorsqu'il mit ses propositions par écrit, il y en eut une couchée en ces termes: *si quelqu'un nie la vérité des Indulgences du Pape, qu'il soit anathème.*" Here it is insinuated, both that there was an inconsistency in Luther's views on Indulgences, and that the proposition concerning the Papal authority is at variance with the rest, and is introduced as a feint, to make believe that he agreed with his adversaries. But when we look at the Theses, all is clear and at one. The real efficacy of Indulgences is stated distinctly in Prop. 5: *Papa non vult nec potest ulla poenas remittere, praeter eas quas arbitrio vel suo vel Canonum imposuit*; and in Prop. 61: *Clarum est quod ad remissionem poenarum et casuum sola sufficit potestas Papae.* This papal authority Luther at that time had not a thought of questioning, as is plain from a number of passages in his earlier writings: and it is asserted in many of the Theses, though several of them seem to us like irony, as we look back at them with

a knowledge of all that followed. But there is no reason for doubting, on the contrary his whole conduct at that period proves, that he was thoroughly sincere, when he asserted, in that painful damnatory form which was so prevalent in his age (Prop. 71), *Contra veniarum apostolicarum veritatem qui loquitur, sit ille anathema et maledictus*. Yet in the very next proposition, as well as in the one just before, he asserts the necessity of preserving the Indulgences from abuse: *Qui vero contra libidinem ac licentiam verborum concionatoris veniarum curam agit, sit ille benedictus*. Again, in the 76th Proposition, he tries to obviate the possibility of a mistake as to their efficacy: *Dicimus contra, quod veniae papales nec minimum venialium peccatorum tollere possint, quoad culpam*. The whole is summed up briefly in the Letter which he sent with the Theses to the Archbishop of Magdeburg and Mayence: *Cum indulgentiae prorsus nihil boni conferant animabus ad salutem aut sanctitatem, sed tantummodo poenam externam, olim canonicè imponi solitam, auferant* (E).

Again, Luther, in his Sermon *De Poenitentia*, when contending against the doctrinal and practical perversions which prevailed with regard to confession and absolution, and made the efficacy of absolution depend on the full enumeration and express acknowledgement of every sin, urges the evil of thus continually raking about in the mire of our past lives,—the utter impossibility of drawing up anything like a complete enumeration of our sins,—the low conception of purity implied in the very notion that such an enumeration can be complete,—the snare for troubled consciences involved in thus making our confidence depend on our own acts, the inward act of contrition, and the outward act of confession,—and the absolute necessity of resting our hope and trust, not on anything in ourselves, or on any acts of our own, but on God's



free mercy and grace, manifested in Jesus Christ, and to be apprehended by faith. It is quite marvellous with what clearness he was enabled to discern these truths from the very first: for this Sermon was publisht in the beginning of 1518, while many Romish errors were still hanging about him. As the denial or the ignorance of these truths lies at the bottom of half the Romish corruptions, it is not surprising that Bossuet should prove himself scarcely capable of apprehending, much more of appreciating them. Accordingly his extracts from this Sermon are grossly misrepresented. For instance, Luther says, “Vide ne ullo modo te confidas absolvi propter tuam contritionem: sic enim super te et tua opera confides, id est, pessime praesumes. Sed propter verbum Christi, qui dixit Petro, *Quodcunque solveris super terram solutum erit et in coelis*. Hic, inquam, confide, si sacerdotis obtinueris solutionem, et crede fortiter te absolutum, et absolutus vere eris, quia illa non mentitur, quicquid sit de tua contritione.” That is, trust in God’s word, which is sure and perfect, and cannot deceive, however imperfect and fallible your own contrition may be. Bossuet, on the other hand, falsifies these words thus: “C’est pourquoy ce nouveau docteur disoit au pécheur, *Croyez fermement que vous êtes absous, et dès-là vous l’êtes, quoiqu’il puisse être de votre contrition; comme s’il eût dit, Vous n’avez pas besoin de vous mettre en peine si vous êtes penitent ou non*” (§ 9). Yet Luther had written excellently about penitence in the preceding two pages; and his first Thesis, publisht just before, is, *Dominus et Magister noster Jesus Christus, dicendo, Poenitentiam agite, etc. omnem vitam fidelium poenitentiam esse voluit.*

Just after the last extract from his Sermon, Luther continues: “Ideo multo magis tibi hic videndum

quomodo nihil huic fidei desit, quam caeteris omnibus. Imo esto, per impossibile, quod confessus non sit contritus, aut sacerdos non serio, sed joco absolvat, si tamen credat sese absolutum, verissime est absolutus: tanta res est fides, et tam potens verbum Christi. Damnabuntur itaque qui nolunt confidere sese absolutos, donec certi sint se satis contritos; et super arenam, non super petram, volunt domum conscientiae suae aedificare." Bossuet does not dispute any of the propositions here asserted, but consoles himself with distorting them. "Tout consiste, disoit-il toujours, à croire sans hésiter que vous êtes absous: d'où il concluoit, qu'il n'importoit pas que le prêtre vous baptizât, ou vous donnât l'absolution sérieusement, ou en se moquant." Luther says, that if the sacraments, administered with the right matter and form of words, are received with faith, they are efficacious; and putting an extreme case, "*per impossibile*," which he supports by examples out of Ecclesiastical History, he adds that, even if they are administered in jest, still they are efficacious, if received with faith: and this has ever been the doctrine of the Church, which has shrunk from the supposition that the efficacy of the sacraments is to depend on the state of mind of the person who administers them. Yet Bossuet has the audacity to transform this into an assertion, "*qu'il n'importoit pas que le prêtre vous baptizât, ou vous donnât l'absolution sérieusement, ou en se moquant.*"

Once more, Bossuet, in the 18th section, returning to the same Sermon, says, "Bien loin de s'efforcer, comme nous, à inspirer aux pécheurs la crainte des jugemens de Dieu, pour les exciter à la pénitence, Luther en étoit venu à cet excès de dire, que la contrition par laquelle on repasse ses ans écoulés dans l'amertume de son coeur, en pesant la grièveté de ses péchés,

*leur difformité, leur multitude, la béatitude perdue et la damnation méritée, ne faisoit que rendre les hommes plus hypocrites; comme si c'étoit une hypocrisie au pécheur, de commencer à se réveiller de son assoupissement."*

The words here put into Luther's mouth seem strangely absurd; and one is at a loss to guess what they can mean: but when we turn to his real words, we find a great truth nobly exprest, a truth, which, as well as the others asserted in the same Sermon, is deplorably lost sight of in these days, and through the oblivion of which many are slipping or rolling back blindfold into the quagmires and quicksands of Rome. "Contritio—duplici via paratur. Primo per discussionem, collectionem, detestationem peccatorum, qua quis, ut dicunt, recogitat annos suos in amaritudine animae suae, ponderando peccatorum gravitatem, damnum, foeditatem, multitudinem, deinde amissionem aeternae beatitudinis, ac aeternae damnationis acquisitionem, et alia quae possunt tristitiam et dolorem excitare spe satisfaciendi per opera bona. Haec autem contritio facit hypocritam,—(here Bossuet craftily breaks off the sentence in the middle, after having exaggerated *facit hypocritam* into *ne faisoit que rendre les hommes plus hypocrites*),—imo magis peccatorem, quia solum timore praecepti et dolore damni id facit. Et tales omnes,—si libere deberent, remoto praecepto et minis poenarum, confiteri, certe dicerent sibi non displicere eam vitam praeteritam, quam sic coguntur displicere confiteri: imo, quo magis timore poenae et dolore damni sic conteruntur, eo magis peccant, et afficiuntur suis peccatis, quae coguntur, non autem volunt odisse." Verily,—for on the strength of these examples we may make Mr Hallam's observation absolute,—“it would not be just to give Bossuet credit in every part of his delineation of Luther's tenets.”

But his perversions are not all wilful falsifications. The superficial theology and morality of Rome could never understand that deep consciousness of sin, as cleaving to our very best works, which drove Luther to seek comfort in the righteousness of another. The Mystics felt this; but in the common theology of Rome both sin and holiness lie in outward acts (F).

To return however to Mr Hallam: his unfavorable opinion of Luther is probably owing, one cannot say in what measure, to Bossuet's misrepresentations. Else it would be difficult to understand how an intelligent man, unblinded by prejudice, and having the least knowledge of the principles and history of Theology, or who had ever thoughtfully read over the Epistles to the Galatians and to the Romans, should have written in such a tone about the great leader of the Reformation. Perhaps too it may be attributable to Bossuet, that Mr Hallam, in the second passage in which he speaks of Luther (chap. vi. § 4), does not introduce him with reference to anything that he effected personally and immediately, but merely when speaking of the evils of the Reformation, especially of the fanaticism consequent on the rejection of the errors of the ancient system; to which fanaticism, he says, "in its worst shape, the Antinomian extravagances of Luther yielded too great encouragement."

Here we seem to have got something like a definite fact. For that which produces an effect must have a real existence; and we learn that, not only did Luther indulge in Antinomian extravagances, but these Antinomian extravagances "encouraged fanaticism," and that too "in its worst shape." Still one may recollect that the burning of Rome and numberless other crimes were ascribed to the early Christians, and that Socrates was

put to death for corrupting the morals of the young, and undermining the worship of the gods. The influx of any new momentous truth into the mind of a people, more especially when that truth is opposed to a mass of dominant falsehood, may easily excite commotions, nay, convulsions. When it mixes with irregular passions in the hearts of its recipients, fanaticism is a natural result. But in such cases it becomes a complicated question, to determine how far the guilt of such fanaticism is chargeable upon those who originally promulgated the truth. They may have been perfectly blameless: they may have been rash in proclaiming the truth needlessly to those who were not fitted to receive it: they may themselves have shared more or less in the delusion, and taken part in the excesses. Mr Hallam's next words infer that Luther's conduct can hardly have corresponded to this last supposition; and they incline one to presume that it would be described more correctly by the first. "Luther," he says, "was the first to repress the pretenses of the Anabaptists;" and he adds in a note, that Melanchthon "was a little staggered by the first Anabaptists," and said, "*Esse in eis spiritus quosdam multis argumentis apparet, sed de quibus judicare praeter Martinum nemo facile possit.*" This expression of Melanchthon's is itself a strong presumption in favour of Luther's clear-sightedness; and that testimony is confirmed by the promptness with which he acted. It is true, a candid man will be brought to perceive and acknowledge the erroneousness of his opinions, when he finds their mischief exemplified in practice: this however must needs be a work of time: our first impulse is to rejoice when we see our convictions carried out into action. But Luther, while his soul was possessed with the paramount importance of his favorite doctrine,

discerned its truth so distinctly, that he saw how it combined and harmonized with all other moral and spiritual truths, not trenching on or weakening any one of them, but on the contrary compacting and strengthening them all. Therefore, when Carlstadt and others were pushing that doctrine into mischievous extravagances, he came forward immediately with all the might of his spirit to repress their excesses (G).

Mr Hallam's quotation from Melancthon shews that he is referring to the disturbances which took place at Wittenberg during Luther's confinement in the Wartburg. A masterly account of these disturbances, of the causes which bred them, and of Luther's conduct on occasion of them, has lately been given by one of the first among living historians, Ranke, in his *History of Germany in the Age of the Reformation*; a book which, it may be hoped, will induce Mr Hallam to revise what he has said about Luther, and to give a portrait somewhat less unlike the original in a future edition. This History, written with a thorough knowledge of the facts, a clear insight into the principles and characters which shaped and controlled the events, and with a German love of truth, is of especial value in these days, when so many are prating ignorantly and with blind animosity against the Reformers and their work. If a person fancies that Mr Hallam's charge against Luther, of having yielded encouragement to the disturbances at Wittenberg by his Antinomian excesses, has so much as a pin-point to stand on, I would entreat him to read the first chapter in the third Book of Ranke's History. He will there see how impossible it was in such a state of things that disturbances should not occur, that men's minds should not run into excesses, that, when such a complication of inveterate prejudices was to be shaken, many

should not be rashly desirous of overthrowing the institutions connected with them. He will see how, when Luther, having been excommunicated by the Pope, and put under the ban of the Empire, was conveyed to the Wartburg, the more vehement of his followers, Carlstadt and others, as might be expected under such circumstances, pushed his doctrines to extremes, and tried to precipitate the abolition of many things, which he would have retained as indifferent, until in course of time they fell, through the extinction of the errors which had given birth to them. He will further see how the restoration of peace and order was owing to the exemplary wisdom, moderation, and heroic magnanimity of Luther; which were exerted during his whole life, no less for the preservation of what was good and wholesome, than for its purification from the corruptions wherewith it had been tainted. It is a grand picture. During Luther's absence confusion spreads in Wittenberg; the elements of disorder within attract other elements of disorder from without; Carlstadt and his associates are joined by fanatical pretenders to prophetic visions, who come to them from Zwickau; no one knows what to do. Melancthon, the Magistrates, the Elector and his ministers are at a loss what opinion to form, what measures to take: they can hardly make up their minds whether the movement is for evil or for good. But the tidings come to the ears of the poor monk in the Wartburg, who was lying there under the twofold ban of the Pope and the Empire. And what did the wild Antinomian do now? I will take the account of his conduct from Ranke.

“The movement which had begun could not lead to anything except open insurrection, to a revolution in the State for the sake of forming a new Christian

Republic: and then violence would have provoked violence; and good and evil would have been destroyed together. How much depended again upon Luther! These movements proceeded from the groundwork of his opinions, or attacht themselves thereto. If he approved of them, who was to set bounds to them? But if he opposed them, the question was, how would he be able to do so, or even to maintain his own cause? During all this time he was in the Wartburg.—His chief occupation there was translating the New Testament. He formed the design of giving the German nation a more correct Bible than the Latin Church had in the Vulgate. While he was strengthening his spirit more and more by this task, and only wisht to be at Wittenberg for the sake of completing so important a work with the help of his friends, he heard of the agitation and disturbances there. He was not a moment in doubt about their character. He says, Never in his life had anything pained him more deeply; that whatever other things had been done to grieve him, were nothing in comparison. With him it weighed not, what was said of the inspiration of the prophets from Zwickau, of their converse with God. He knew the mysterious depths of the spiritual world. Far different was his experience therein: he was penetrated with too lofty a conception of the Divine nature, to let himself be persuaded that God would appear to a creature, entrance him, and speak with him. ‘Would’st thou know,’ he writes to Melancthon, ‘the time and place and manner of Divine converse? hear: *As a lion He breaketh all my bones* (Isa. xxxv. 13); and, *I am cut off from before Thine eyes* (Psa. xxxviii. 22): *My soul is full of troubles; and my life draweth nigh to the grave* (Psa. lxxxviii. 3). Therefore does God speak through men, because we could not bear



it if He Himself spake to us.' He wishes his Prince joy of the cross that God has imposed on him, and says that not only must Annas and Caiaphas rage against the Gospel, but Judas also must be among the Apostles. He tells him that he himself is going thither. The Elector begged him not to do so yet; for that at present it would be of no good: he ought rather to prepare his answer for the next Diet, at which his cause, it might be hoped, would obtain a fair hearing. But Luther was no longer to be restrained by representations of this sort. Never had he been more firmly convinced that he had received the Gospel from heaven, that his faith would protect him. The occurrences at Wittenberg seemed to him a scandal which fell on him and on the Gospel. Thus he set off without caring for the Pope's or the Emperor's ban, while he entreated his Prince not to be anxious about him. He was in the most heroic mood.—On Friday, the 7th of March, he reacht Wittenberg:—on the Sunday he began to preach. He had to try whether the people would attend to him, whether he still had any influence, whether he could succeed in calming the commotion. Narrow and inconspicuous as was the stage he returned to, his enterprise was of moment in the history of the world. It was to be seen whether the doctrine which had shaped itself in his mind, without any act of his will, by an inward necessity, and which contained such germs for the future development of mankind, would be able to overcome those destructive elements, which were no less active in men's spirits, which had everywhere undermined and were shaking the ground of public life, and had here found their first vent. The question was, whether it would be possible to reform, without destroying, to prepare a way for the new development of the

human mind, without annihilating the results of all previous ones. Luther lookt at the matter as a pastor and preacher. He did not reject the changes which had been made, in and for themselves, nor the doctrine from which they had sprung. He took care not to wound the authors of the innovations personally, not to speak ill of them. He merely pronounced that they had proceeded too hastily, and had thereby occasioned offense to the weak, and had not kept the commandment of love. He allowed that there are customs which ought to be entirely abolisht ; for instance, private masses ; though even in regard to them all violence, all offense was to be avoided : but, as to most of the others, it was a matter of indifference to a Christian, whether they were observed or no. It was of no essential importance, whether people received the Lord's Supper in one kind or both, whether they preferred private or general confession, whether they staid in their convents or quitted them, whether they had pictures in the churches, observed the fasts, or not. To make laws concerning such things, to excite tumults, to give offense to weaker brethren, was more injurious than profitable, and militated against the commandment of love. The danger of the tumultuary innovations lay in this, that they were declared to be necessary, to be imperatively demanded by pure Christianity ; much in the same way as on the papal side every ecclesiastical ordinance had been asserted to be an inviolable emanation from the supreme idea, with which the whole of civil life had been brought into the closest connexion. It was an incalculable gain, to shew that Religion recognises a free region, which she does not require to rule over immediately, where she does not need to insist on regulating every particular. Luther did this with the mildness and indulgence of a father and

tutor, with the superiority of a further-seeing, more deeply grounded spirit. These sermons are among the most important he ever preached. They are at the same time orations, like those of Savonarola, not however meant to excite, to carry men along, but to restrain them on a destructive path, to calm and quell passions. How could the congregation withstand the wellknown voice, the convincing eloquence of conviction, by which they had first been led into the new regions of thought? The objections which in other cases are urged against such conduct, that a man is influenced by fear, by personal considerations, had no place here. Never had Luther appeared more heroic. He had defiance to the excommunication of the Pope, to the ban of the Emperor, in returning to his flock. His Prince had told him that he could not protect him; he had expressly disclaimed such protection: he plunged into the greatest personal danger, and that too, not, as others have done, to take the lead in a commotion, but to oppose it, not to overthrow, but to preserve. At his voice the uprore was hushed, the tumult subsided: quiet was restored: some of the most violently excited spokesmen were convinced, and joined him. The more moderate opinions contended for by Luther, and the civil power which had been delivered from a threatening danger, advanced a step nearer to each other.—Once again did the Zwickau prophets meet Luther. He warned them not to let themselves be blinded by the delusions of Satan. They answered that, in proof of their divine mission, they would tell him what he was thinking of at that moment. When he gave them leave, they said to him, that he was feeling a leaning toward them in his heart. Luther cried out, *God rebuke thee, Satan!* He afterward confessed that this was actually the case; but their hitting the truth he held to

be a sign of Satanic, not of divine powers. He dismissed them with a kind of challenge to their Spirit to meet his God. If we look apart from the rudeness of his expressions, there is a deep, sublime truth in this conflict between two opposite spirits, a destructive and a conservative one.—Hereupon things became quieter at Wittenberg. The mass was reestablished as far as possible:—nothing was omitted but the words which refer immediately to the idea of a sacrifice. In other respects a full freedom subsisted, an indefiniteness with regard to forms. Luther remained in his convent, and wore his Augustinian gown; but he did not object, if others went out into the world. The Lord's Supper was administered both in one and in both kinds. It made no difference, whether a person was content with the general absolution, or felt a desire for a particular one. Many questions were started concerning the limits between that which is to be rejected unconditionally, and that which may still be allowed. The maxim of Luther and Melancthon was, not to condemn anything, which had not an indisputable text of the Bible, what they called a thoroughly clear and explicit Scripture, against it. This is not to be regarded as indifference: on the contrary Religion drew back into her own immediate region, and devoted herself to those deep matters which especially belong to her. Hereby it became possible for them to develop and diffuse their doctrine, without engaging in a direct contest with the existing state of things, and without awakening those destructive powers, the first stirrings of which had just been so dangerous, by hasty innovations. Nay, the development of doctrine itself could not proceed without reference to these opponents on the other side. Luther saw already that it was hazardous to be continually preaching only of the power of faith: he already urged

that faith must manifest itself in good conduct, brotherly love, temperance, and order" (H).

This last sentence must not be interpreted as an admission that there had been any Antinomian tendency in Luther's previous preaching. It merely means that, in the sermons to the people, the neglected and almost forgotten doctrine of Justification by Faith had been urged too exclusively, even, it may be, by Luther himself, and more so by others; as was almost unavoidable, since this was the doctrine on which the whole conflict turned, and there had been a succession of struggles more or less immediately connected with it during the four preceding years. Besides, as this truth had been left out of sight, so that the unlearned had scarcely heard of it, there was a greater necessity for enforcing it strenuously and continually, both for its own sake, and in order to get rid of the numerous practical abuses which had grown up through its oblivion. But there is such an aversion to Luther in Mr Hallam's mind, that, whenever he finds reasons to convince him that Luther on any occasion acted with wisdom and moderation, he infers that his conduct previously must have been unwise and intemperate. The relinquishment of cherished errors may in others deserve commendation: in Luther the act, by which he is supposed to have relinquished such errors, serves in lieu of all other evidence of their existence. He is the first to repress the Anabaptists in 1522: it is plain he must have been their chief encourager before. He allows Melancthon in 1527 to express the doctrine of Justification in such a manner that it shall not seem to countenance immorality: does not this prove that he must have promoted licentiousness previously? Of course the argument is not stated in this bare form: but other argument or evidence is not to be found. Immediately after

saying that Luther was the first to repress the pretenses of the Anabaptists, Mr Hallam adds: "And when he saw the danger of general licentiousness, which he had unwarily promoted, he listened to the wiser counsels of Melanchthon, and permitted his early doctrine upon Justification to be so far modified, or mitigated in expression, that it ceased to give apparent countenance to immorality; though his differences with the Church of Rome, as to the very question from which he had started, thus became of less practical importance, and less tangible to ordinary minds than before."

Mr Hallam is speaking here of certain Instructions for the Visitation of the Saxon Churches, which were drawn up by Melanchthon, with Luther's approbation, in 1527: this year, he says, is "the era of what may be called the palinodia of early Lutheranism." Now the Confession of Augsburg was in like manner drawn up by Melanchthon, with Luther's full sanction, in 1530: the Schmalcald Articles were drawn up by Luther himself at the end of 1536. These are the deliberate confessional expositions of the Lutheran doctrine of Justification. Among Luther's private expositions of that doctrine, the most celebrated, and perhaps the richest, is in his later Commentary on the Galatians, published in 1536. But there is scarcely a writing of any sort, scarcely a sermon down to his death, in which this doctrine is not distinctly enunciated. Yet, if the year 1527 was "the era of the palinodia of early Lutheranism," one must suppose that the recantation or modification of doctrine which took place at that time, whatever it may have been, was permanent: for, if it was confined to a single paper drawn up by Melanchthon, how can it be said to constitute an era? Now can Mr Hallam mean, that the exposition of the doctrine of Justification in those confessional

books, and in all Luther's writings subsequent to 1527, is at variance with what he calls "early Lutheranism?" or that this doctrine is in any respect put in the background? What does he say then to the Schmalcald Articles? where St Paul's declaration (Rom. iii. 28), *Statuimus justificari hominem per fidem absque operibus legis*, is quoted, and it is added, in words which could only come from one pen, "de hoc articulo cedere, aut aliquid contra illum largiri aut permittere nemo piorum potest, etiamsi coelum et terra ac omnia corruant.—Et in hoc articulo sita sunt et consistunt omnia, quae contra Papam, diabolum, et universum mundum, in vita nostra docemus, testamur, et agimus." Does this belong to the later, mitigated, lukewarm fashion of Lutheranism? Or had Luther forgotten himself, and let the old man lift up his voice again? Or had he relapst into his former excesses? Again, what will Mr Hallam say to the hundred passages to the same effect in the second Commentary on the Galatians, in every page of which this doctrine is inculcated; as might be anticipated from the declaration in the Preface: "In corde meo iste unus regnat Articulus, Fides Christi: ex quo, per quem, et in quem, omnes meae diu noctuque fluunt et refluunt theologiae cogitationes." One person at all events was not aware of Luther's having made a recantation; and he was one who might have been expected to know something about it. Or again, can Mr Hallam mean that the differences between the doctrine of Justification so set forth in those confessional books and private writings, and that of the Church of Rome, are of little "practical importance," and not very "tangible to ordinary minds?" If by "ordinary minds" he means minds totally ignorant of theology, it is notorious that ignorance confounds all distinctions, and might even say, until it ceast to be

ignorance, and acquired some degree of intelligence, that the differences between the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems of the universe are of little practical importance, and not very tangible to ordinary minds. Else, were it not that theoretical differences are always softened by the blunting and reconciling powers of active life, there would certainly seem to be differences of great practical, as well as speculative importance between the Tridentine doctrine of Justification and that of the Lutheran Confessions, differences indeed which involve all the great practical as well as speculative controversies between the two Churches.

Besides, it should be carefully remembered that Luther's proclamation of the true doctrine of Justification was not in opposition to the Tridentine explanation, into which certain elements of truth were infused, derived from Luther's preaching, but to its total neglect, and to the continual gross violation of it implied in the whole practical system of the Church. Unless this be borne in mind, it is impossible to do justice to Luther. Men of letters, who amuse themselves now and then in the course of their studies with skimming over the surface of Theology, if they chance to light on the Romish doctrine of Justification as determined by the Council of Trent, and compare it with what they suppose to be the doctrine of the Reformed Churches, deem it an incontrovertible proof of the narrow bigotry and virulence fostered by Theology, that people should have squabbled and made a hubbub about such petty distinctions, while the nobler and more interesting discussions concerning questionable points of grammar and philology and chronology and topography have always been carried on with such edifying mildness from the days of Aristarchus down to those of Bentley and Hermann. On the other hand, many



young divines, whose imagination can take in and exult in the grand conception of an outward unity of the Church, while they are strangers to that deep consciousness of sin, which cannot find comfort in anything except the righteousness to be received by Faith, are apt to blame Luther and the other Reformers for having broken that unity, on account of what they may perhaps regard as little more than differences of terminology. They cannot understand the intense earnestness with which St Paul wrote to the Galatians, *Behold, I Paul say to you, that, if ye be circumcised, Christ will profit you nothing*; and therefore they cannot appreciate Luther's equally intense earnestness in the selfsame cause. Hence they throw the blame of the schism upon Luther; whereas they ought to throw it upon the usurping, tyrannical Church, which, instead of receiving the truth he was commissioned to teach, and falling down contritely, like Nineveh at the preaching of Jonah, excommunicated and expelled him, and thereby cast out the truth from her pale. In so doing, she shewed that she was wise in her generation: for, had this truth been once received livingly into her creed, it must have shivered the whole fabric of falsehood, which had been piled up around it, to atoms; wherefore she substituted a mock-sun for it at Trent. Hence it is of great moment to insist on the practical importance of these differences, however they may seem to be scarcely "tangible to ordinary minds (1)."

Here it strikes one as singular that Mr Hallam, though the differences between the definitive Lutheran and the Tridentine doctrine of Justification seem to him so unimportant and intangible, does yet perceive a wide and momentous difference between what he calls early and later Lutheranism, a difference which other men have hardly found out, but which to his mind is

so wide, that, while the former "promoted licentiousness," the latter "ceast to give apparent countenance to immorality,"—so wide that, taking up an expression applied by Erasmus to Luther in this same year, and probably with reference to the Instructions, he calls them "the palinodia of early Lutheranism." That Erasmus, in a letter written at the time, and apparently with little knowledge of the facts, should have used such an expression, is not surprising. His view of Luther's life and doctrine could not be other than narrow and partial. Being unable to dive with him into the depths of spiritual truth, he naturally assumed that to deny the meritoriousness of good works implied the disregard, if not the rejection, of them altogether. Thus, when he found Luther all at once insisting on their necessity, he might easily say, in the words quoted by Seckendorf, *Indies mitescit febris Lutherana, adeo ut ipse Lutherus de singulis propemodum scribat palinodiam*. But a historian in our days, when we have the whole of Luther's life spread out before us, and the great body of his writings exhibiting every shade of his opinions and every impulse of his feelings, ought to know that he retained his conviction with regard to the doctrine of Justification by Faith unshaken till the end of his life. In all his writings, from the moment when he first caught a lively perception of this primary truth, down to his last year, it is the animating principle of his whole teaching. Yet throughout he was no less anxious to inculcate every moral duty, than at the time when he approved of Melancthon's Instructions. Therefore, if in so doing he sang a palinodia, he must have gone on singing palinodes and antipalinodes and palinantipalinodes all his life, day by day, and hour by hour. But the fact is, the two strains are the strophe and the antistrophe

of the same grand spiritual hymn; and he does not give us the one without the other. In writing to the unlearned, he sets forth one phase of the great body of spiritual truth, that phase which was most needful and useful for them; as we see, above all, in his admirable Catechisms. In writing for the learned, as in the Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, he mainly sets forth another phase, that which was most urgently required to correct and enlighten the doctrinal system of the Church. But, though one side of the moon was illumined at one period of her revolution, and the other side at another, she was the same moon all the while, and ever and anon shone out in full-orbed splendour and beauty. Such has ever been the case with great minds. While lesser men see one side of the truth, or a particle of one side, their ampler view comprehends both sides, and discovers the bearings of each upon the other, their mutual limitation and interpenetration, and how each, when urged exclusively, swells out into a falsehood. For this expansive view however they have to pay a penalty, in that they are sure to be charged with inconsistency; as has been seen, for instance, in the great political philosophers of the last and the preceding generation, Coleridge and Burke.

Still, were it not for Mr Hallam's strong prejudice against Luther, he could hardly have failed in this case to recognise that there is no palinodia, no recantation, overt or covert, of any doctrine previously profest; since the grounds of the apparent discrepancy are so clearly explained by Seckendorf in a passage which he himself refers to (ii. p. 108). "It is more surprising that Erasmus should have been of opinion that Luther was singing a palinode, since there is not a single article in his Theses which can be shewn to have been changed in that

Visitation ; nor does it affect the doctrines themselves, that Luther uses one method and style in instructing the pastors of the common people, another in refuting his adversaries." In a previous part of the same chapter, Seckendorf had stated that the Instructions were drawn up by Melancthon, with the view, not of reforming the popish Pastors, but those who were already called by the name of Evangelical. "For there were some who, preaching of nothing but faith and the comfort arising from the forgiveness of sins, almost neglected the other part of doctrine concerning sanctification and good works, or who, adopting expressions of Luther's, with which he assailed the insolence of his opponents, or their Pharisaical opinion on the merit of works, mainly outward and ceremonial ones, introduced them inappropriately in their sermons to the common people, and thus imprudently weakened the desire of holiness. This disadvantage however is no objection to the truth of Luther's doctrine, any more than it is to St Paul's, to whom the same thing happened, when, on his preaching the fulness of grace, he was askt, *Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound.* Therefore Melancthon, by his preface, wisht to inculcate on the inconsiderate and indiscreet, that they should pay a diligent regard to the condition and proficiency of their hearers. Seeing that the great body of the common people, through the sloth or unfaithfulness of their priests before Luther began to preach, were kept in ignorance of religion, and merely urged to a servile observance of ceremonies, he prescribed the method that the pastors should begin their correction by preaching the Law, and terrifying consciences. For they who were so rude, as most of the common people were, that they did not recognise even enormous sins to be such, nor thought

of avoiding them, being accustomed to rely upon the outward expiations hitherto practised, by means of confession and ecclesiastical satisfactions, were now falling into a profane security, through the preaching of the remission of sins. Therefore it was necessary that in the first instance they should be led by the schooling of the Law to Christ, and to such a faith in Him as should be accompanied by an amendment of their personal conduct. Luther, on the other hand, in his writings, had disputed with the learned, who, being acquainted with the Law and with morality, sinned on the opposite side, and neglecting the only means of salvation, which is to be sought in a saving faith, had introduced a Pharisaical outward form and discipline. Now with these the Visitors had no concern, but, as I have said, with the common people, who were already in some measure instructed in Evangelical doctrine, and with the Pastors, of whom many were unlearned, and, in avoiding one fault, ran into the contrary. The same purpose was kept in view in the next chapter concerning the Decalogue, and in the third on Prayer, in order that the restoration of the preaching of the free remission of sins through Christ, and the withdrawal of the severe bondage of ecclesiastical rules, might not be followed by the overthrow of virtue and piety. Even the adversaries of Rome were offended by those expressions, that there is no merit in works. For, although they are most true and orthodox, they were too subtle for the rude multitude to understand and apply them rightly. Therefore it is recommended that these rude persons should be enjoined to follow after good works by the ordinary arguments, and without any question about merit: for such persons seldom conceive that there can be much merit in their works. Moreover Luther's

teaching had incurred no little odium from the Peasants War: therefore, in this little book, much stress is laid on the obedience of subjects to magistrates, which at another time and under other circumstances might have been superfluous. Another charge was pressing on the Lutheran cause, in consequence of the madness and errors of certain fanatics, who wanted to restore Judaism, and its civil laws. Others aimed at an exemption from tribute and tithes: others disapproved of the punishment of criminals, especially thieves. Much is said in answer to all these. As these things, and others which the careful reader will find on examining the Articles of Visitation, exhibit the moderation of Melancthon, so did Luther exhibit no less in this grave matter. He was not ignorant, but foresaw and foretold what judgement would be pronounced upon these Articles; and there were some expressions of Melancthon's which he could have improved: but he assented to the chief part, and submitted his own opinion to the judgement of others (j)."

Surely this is a very simple explanation of the differences, such as they are, between the Articles of Visitation, and Luther's polemical writings: it bears the stamp of truth; and the more we examine into the facts, the more we shall be convinced of its correctness. Yet Mr Hallam, who refers to the passage, and calls it "remarkable," seems to cite it in confirmation of his view that the Articles formed the palinodia of early Lutheranism. His judgement, which attaches such importance to an epigrammatic sentence of Erasmus, and to the "beak and claws" of "the eagle of Meaux," finds nothing to influence it in the investigations of such a laborious and conscientious seeker after truth as Seckendorf.

Here I will again introduce an extract from Ranke's admirable History. He knows what Luther was, what he did, what an inheritance of blessings he left to his country. He does not patch up his notion of Luther out of Erasmus and Bossuet and Audin, deeming that he may supply what is lacking by peeping into the first volume of his works *passim*. We have already learnt from him that, on occasion of the disturbances at Wittenberg five years before, Luther acted in the very same spirit which dictated the Instructions to the Saxon Churches. We here find him distinctly repelling the imputation of Luther's having recanted or compromised any of his doctrines, when he allowed these Instructions to be issued. At the same time he gives such a beautiful picture of the great Reformer's practical, Socratic wisdom and moderation, as is the best of all answers to the charge of Antinomianism. "In these Instructions the opposition to the Papacy, vigorously as the contest was elsewhere maintained against it, falls much into the background. The authors of them deemed that this did not belong to sermons address to the people: they exhorted the preachers not to revile the Pope or the bishops, none of whom could hear them: they fixt their attention wholly on the wants of the multitude, on the propagation of Evangelical doctrine among the common people. Herein they proceeded with the greatest indulgence toward everything establisht. They did not deem it necessary positively to forbid the Latin masses: they even thought they might allow the administration of the Eucharist under one kind, whenever any one from conscientious scruples was unwilling to relinquish the customary practice. Although they rejected the obligatoriness of auricular confession, inasmuch as it was not grounded on Scripture, they declared it to be wholesome that every one should confess

the sins wherewith he felt himself burthened, with regard to which he needed counsel. They did not even abolish all the festivals of the Saints, but merely required that they should not be invoked, even for their intercession. The idea which we have already often recognised, that only the unconditional religious importance, the indispensableness to salvation, ascribed to the institutions which had grown up in the previous centuries, was to be rejected, while the spiritual groundwork and territory of the Latin Church was not otherwise abandoned, manifests itself here again very distinctly. They merely sought to cast off the burthen of the innumerable traditions, and of the usurpations of the hierarchy, and to regain the pure contents of the Scriptures, of Divine Revelation. Whatever could subsist along with this was retained. They took care that the minds of the common folks should not be perplexed with the difficult controverted doctrines, especially those concerning good works and free will. Not that they receded in the least from the convictions they had once attained to, from the fundamental doctrine of Justification by Faith, from the struggle against the error of seeking salvation in the observance of human institutions, such as fasts, and the seven hours. On the contrary these propositions were restated with the utmost precision ; but at the same time they required repentance, penitence, and contrition, the forsaking of sin, a holy life. For thus much lay unquestionably in man's power, to flee from evil and to choose good. The impotence of the will consisted only in this, that it could not purify the heart, or bring forth any divine graces : these must be sought from God alone. The aim they set themselves was to lead men to inward religion, faith and love, and an innocent walk, honesty and good order. So far from departing in any respect from genuine Christianity, their



highest endeavour was to penetrate souls more and more deeply with its principles. It is in this that Luther seeks his chief glory, in applying the principles of the Gospel to common life. More especially did he deem himself bound to instruct the various classes of society, —the magistrates and those under authority, fathers and other members of families,—concerning their duties from a religious point of view. He displays an incomparable talent for popular teaching. He directs the parsons how they are to preach so as to edify the common people,—the schoolmasters how they are to instruct the young in their several stages, to combine secular knowledge with religion, to avoid all exaggeration, — the masters of families how they are to train their households in the fear of God. He draws up a series of texts to guide all in right living, the clergy and the laity, men and women, parents and children, servants and maids, young and old. He gives them a form for blessing and grace at table, for morning and evening prayer. He is the patriarch of the severe and devout domestic discipline and manners of the families in Northern Germany. How many countless millions of times has his hearty *Das walt Gott* (κ) reminded the citizen and the peasant, living in his dull work-day drudgery, of his relation to the Eternal! The Catechism which he published in the year 1529, of which he says, that, aged Doctor as he was, he himself prayed it, is equally childly and profound, clear and unfathomable, simple and sublime. Happy he who has fed his soul therewith, who cleaves firmly thereto! He possesses an imperishable comfort for every moment, the essence of truth which satisfies the wisest of the wise, in words so simple that a child can understand them."

Verily Luther is a strange sort of Antinomian. Yea, he belongs to that great Antinomian multitude, which

comprises the glorious company of the Apostles, and the goodly fellowship of the Prophets, and the noble army of Martyrs. Day by day he rose up to wield the sword of the Gospel, almost single-handed, against all the force and fraud of a corrupt and lying Church, which had cast its fetters over the mind, and breathed its rottenness into the heart of Christendom. Day by day too he turned from this grand conflict, to refresh himself by relieving the simplest and deepest wants of the poor and ignorant, by teaching them their duty to God and man, by explaining the mysteries of the Gospel to them in the plainest, homeliest speech, by telling them what they were to pray for, and by putting words into their mouths to pray with.

But we must examine the remainder of Mr Hallam's allegations, if such they can be called. They are chiefly contained in the Note last quoted. He there gives an extract from a letter of Melanchthon's, written in 1537 (Lib. VII. No. 1518, in Bretschneider's edition): "*Scis me quaedam minus horride dicere de predestinatione, de assensu voluntatis, de necessitate obedientiae nostrae, de peccato mortali. De his omnibus scio re ipsa Lutherum sentire eadem: sed ineruditi quaedam ejus φορτικώτερα dicta, cum non videant quo pertineant, nimium amant.*" On these words Mr Hallam observes, "I am not convinced that this apology for Luther is sufficient." One could wish that he had expressed himself more distinctly. Doubtless it is possible that Melanchthon, notwithstanding his acuteness and clearness of judgement, notwithstanding the singular intimacy which had subsisted for near nineteen years between him and Luther, the deep love which Luther felt for him, and the admiring and confiding affection with which from the beginning of their acquaintance till the very end of his life he treated him,

—notwithstanding too that the matters spoken of must have been the subject of continual conversations between them year after year, and had just been especially brought forward in their discussions on occasion of the signature of *the Apology for the Confession of Augsburg*, and of the drawing up of *the Schmalcald Articles*,—it is possible that, notwithstanding all these advantages enjoyed by Melanchthon for knowing Luther's mind, which was not apt to conceal its thoughts, he may have been mistaken about the extent of the agreement between Luther's opinions and his own; and Mr Hallam's familiarity with the writings of the two great brother Reformers may have enabled him to frame a correcter judgement on this point, than they themselves could. Still, when such testimony is to be contradicted, one might have expected that some sort of evidence would be adduced, some sort of argument, something more than the insinuation of a doubt. It might have been desirable also to learn, whether, as Melanchthon in this letter is speaking of Luther's opinions in 1537, Mr Hallam supposes the approximation, which according to his notion took place in 1527, had been followed by a separation, and that Luther had recanted his palinodia, and fallen back into his old extravagances. On all these questions however we are left in the dark, and have to grope out a way for ourselves.

In doing this I have been brought to the conclusion which I anticipated, that Melanchthon had very good warrant for what he said. He was not thinking of making any "apology for Luther." He is writing with reference to attacks that had been made upon himself by certain distorters of Luther's doctrine, because he had laid down that good works are requisite to Justification, not indeed as a *causa efficiens*, or *propter quam*, but as a *causa sine qua non*. This the Ultra-Lutherans denied. Some of

them went so far in Antinomianism as to assert generally that good works are hindrances to salvation: and they claimed to have Luther on their side in the main, as rejecting the necessity of good works as a ground of Justification. During these disputes Melanchthon wrote to his friend Dietrich: "Nec hostili animo videtur in nos esse Lutherus. Heri etiam admodum amanter de his controversiis mecum collocutus est." He then adds, in the words quoted by Mr Hallam, that Luther was of the same mind with him, though certain hasty and vehement expressions of Luther's had been made too much of by some who did not understand their bearing; that is, who did not perceive how they were aimed at the factitious, arbitrary good works inculcated as meritorious by the Church of Rome.

Now the very year before, in 1536, being desirous to obtain the precisest statement of Luther's views with regard to good works, Melanchthon had held an amicable argument with him on the subject: the report of it he published in 1552, as an appendix to his pamphlet against Osiander. Of course in substance it coincides entirely with the uniform doctrine which Luther taught throughout: but, as it states that doctrine distinctly and catechetically, and only occupies four octavo pages, it might enable Mr Hallam to do, what he says (chap. vi. § 26) he has "found impossible," namely, "to understand and to reconcile Luther's tenets concerning faith and works:" and it may further prove to him that he was talking loosely, when he stated, "I can only perceive, that, if there be any reservation in favour of works, not merely sophistical, of which I am hardly well convinced, it consists in distinctions too subtle for the people to apprehend." One is really confounded at meeting with such an assertion from the pen of a writer bearing a high

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character in literature. If Mr Hallam had never read five pages of Luther, his speaking thus might be accounted for: but then what becomes of his character as a critic and historian? Surely this sentence implies that he has tried to make out whether there is "any reservation in favour of works" in Luther's writings, that he has examined them carefully with this view, I will not say all, but some fair portion of them. Yet, if he has done so, the only solution for his blindness which I can discover, is in the German proverb about persons who can't see the wood for the trees.

In the discussion above referred to, Melancthon reminds Luther, "*Vos ipsi docetis quod justitia operum sit necessaria, et quidem coram Deo.—Ergo saltem est aliqua partialis causa nostra justitia.*" To which Luther replies: "*Necessaria est, sed non necessitate legali, seu coactionis, sed necessitate gratuita, seu consequentiae, seu immutabilitatis. Sicut sol necessario lucet, si est sol, et tamen lucet non ex lege, sed ex natura seu voluntate, ut sic dicam, immutabili, quia sic creatus est, ut luceat; sic justus creatura nova facit opera necessitate immutabili, non lege seu coactione.*" Again, "*Quia persona justa est, justa est perpetuo, et tam diu justa ex fide, quam diu fides manet.—Opera igitur fulgent radiis fidei, et propter fidem placent.—Nulla partialis causa accedit, quia fides semper est efficax, vel non est fides. Ideo quicquid opera sunt aut valent, hoc sunt et valent gloria et virtute fidei, quae est sol istorum radiorum inevitabiliter.—Nos dicimus fidem esse—donum Spiritus Sancti.—Donatum autem hoc donum facit personam novam perpetuo, quae persona tum facit opera nova: non e contra opera nova faciunt personam novam.—Nulla ergo justitia personalis debetur operibus coram Deo, licet accidentaliter glorificabunt personam praemiis certis. Sed personam non justificant.*

Omnes enim aequaliter justi sumus in uno Christo, omnes aequaliter dilecti et placentes secundum personam; tamen differt stella a stella per claritatem. Sed Deus non minus diligit stellam Saturni, quam Solem et Lunam (L)."

This would seem tolerably good testimony to convince Melanchthon that Luther did indeed concur with him substantially on the indispensableness of good works. Now this, as it was the great question agitated at Wittenberg, is likewise the one on which Mr Hallam lays stress; so that happily there is no need to enter into an examination of the other alledged differences between Melanchthon and Luther; an enquiry which would demand a good deal of labour, even after what has recently been done to elucidate it by Galle in his valuable *Essay on the Character of Melanchthon as a Theologian* (*Versuch einer Charakteristik Melanchthons als Theologen, und einer Entwickelung seines Lehrbegriffs*). If further evidence were wanted, we have the best that can be, Luther's own. For he came forward soon after Melanchthon's letter, to maintain the same cause in a disputation against Agricola, in defense of the Decalogue; and Melanchthon sends this disputation to Dietrich, "ut videat eum καὶ περὶ νόμου καὶ περὶ ὑπακοῆς illa diserte dicere, quae ego defendi, et propter quae plagas accipi ab indoctis:" Ed. Bretschn. Vol. iii. p. 427 (M).

It is not indeed to be expected that a writer, having to treat of so vast a theme as the Literature of Europe during two such momentous and copious centuries, should engage in a minute investigation of every fact he has to speak of. But at least he ought to have a thorough acquaintance with the great outlines of the country, and with its principal features, its chains of hills and vallies, its mountains and rivers, its cities and roads; and then he will be able to understand and arrange every piece of information he may pick up.

But if he starts without this previous knowledge, he is sure to be mazed at every turn: instead of being set right by a signpost, he will run his head against it, and, stunned thereby, will misread it: the very tendency of human nature to follow one's nose, as the phrase is, will soon lead him into a bog or a pit. Nor will general maxims in such a case be of profit. Valuable as they may be for arranging and digesting what we learn from observation and experience, they will not supersede these two main sources of knowledge, or enable us to do without them. Though we pump till our arms ache, if there is no water in the well, we can only bring up sand or mud. In lieu of any evidence to warrant him in rejecting Melanchthon's testimony, Mr Hallam merely says: "Words are of course to be explained, when ambiguous, by the context and scope of the argument. But when single detachd aphorisms, or even complete sentences in a paragraph, bear one obvious sense, I do not see that we can hold the writer absolved from the imputation of that meaning, because he may somewhere else have used a language inconsistent with it."

*Somewhere else!* The force of this argument rests on two assumptions. In the first place, he who takes upon him to condemn these aphorisms and sentences, should have a full apprehension of their meaning, in connexion with the language and opinions of their age, and with the circumstances which called them forth. For suppose that Luther attaches one meaning to the words *faith* and *good works*, and that his critic attaches another meaning to them, the critic is not likely to pronounce a right sentence on what Luther may say concerning *faith* and *good works*. Next, it is requisite to Mr Hallam's conclusion, that the language inconsistent with

the offensive sentences should only be used *somewhere else*. If the general spirit and tone of a writer's doctrine is Antinomian, he cannot claim to be acquitted on the plea that he has now and then, *somewhere else*, used language more conformable to ordinary notions of morality. But what if a writer can produce work after work written purposely to inculcate the primary moral duties? What if his writings, when an occasion offers, glow with animated exhortations to live the life of faith, and fulfill the offices of Christian love? Shall we condemn him in this case, even if it can be shewn that now and then, *somewhere else*, in the heat of a polemical argument against a monstrous and tyrannous error, an error which was overriding and trampling upon the hearts and consciences of Christendom, was stifling the central principle of the Gospel, and depriving it of its power to renew and to save, he has strained and overstated the opposite truth? I am not conceding that Luther has done so: Mr Hallam has not cited a single instance in proof that he has: but supposing that such instances can be produced, I would maintain that they are to be interpreted according to the general tenour of Luther's teaching, which shews a clearness and fulness of insight into the office and power of Faith, and its relation to good works, almost unexampled since the time of St Paul.

Moreover I would contend that common justice requires we should make the amplest allowance for occasional over-vehemence or hastiness of expression, when we consider, not merely the peculiarly impetuous tone of his mind, but all the circumstances of his condition,—the darkness out of which he had to work his way, with scarcely any help save that of God's word and Spirit,—the might of the error he had to fight against,



its deadening influence, the abominations it had given birth to, the number of enemies he had to encounter, and the almost superhuman rapidity and vigour with which he carried on his singlehanded warfare. From Ranke (B. iii. c. 3) we learn that 20 publications issued in the year 1518 from the press under Luther's name, 50 in 1519, 133 in 1520, in 1521, when he was interrupted by his journey to Worms and by his compulsory concealment, about 40, 130 in 1522, and 183 in 1523. This enumeration must doubtless include a number of reprints: but, with every reduction on that score, the energy which thus glorified God *by bringing forth much fruit*, is quite astonishing; more especially when we take into account that, among these annual shoals of books, several were of considerable bulk, such as the first *Commentary on the Galatians*, the *Expositions of the first twenty-two Psalms*, the *Postils* for half the Ecclesiastical year, the treatise *De Captivitate Babylonica Ecclesiae*, that *On the abuses of the Mass*, the *Address to the Christian Nobles of the German Nation*, the *Defense of all the Articles condemned by the Papal Bull*, and that, along with all these works, which would seem enough to exhaust the powers of a dozen stout men, οἷς ὄν βροτοὶ εἶσι, he translated and published the New Testament and half the Old during the same five years: when we remember too that during this whole period his mind was continually expanding, and that many of these writings were epochal acts in the history of the world, utterances of truths which History has signed and sealed and attested with the witness of ten generations,—what can we think of the spirit that would carp and cavil and scold at a few inconsiderate expressions? When the world's doombell tolls, it must shake the belfry. When the waters burst forth from their frostbound prison, the ice will crack, not without a

noise ; and they will probably splash over upon the banks.

That I may not subject myself to the retort, that I too have produced no evidence to establish the consistency of Luther's previous teaching and conduct with the Instructions for the Saxon Visitation, let me here observe that the fullest evidence of that consistency is afforded by his behaviour on occasion of the disturbances at Wittenberg, as represented most faithfully in the account quoted above from Ranke. In the Sermons preached at that time, which are beautiful models of paternal mildness and gentleness in reproofing error, as well as of paternal wisdom in correcting it, he says, *It is sad to think that I have so long been preaching to you, and that in almost all my little books I have done nothing but inculcate faith and love ; and yet no trace of love is to be seen in you.* This testimony he bears to himself with the same confidence with which St Paul avouches that he has declared the whole counsel of God ; and assuredly it will apply fully to all his homiletical writings. Throughout he preaches faith and love,—not good works as having any value, any merit in themselves, but faith and love, after the example of St Paul, in their living, inseparable unity, and their active energy, perpetually bringing forth good works to the glory of God. If this be Antinomianism, Luther is the chief of Antinomians, or only second to St Paul. At the same time his reverence for the moral Law, as declared in the Ten Commandments, has never been surpassed : and as it was his delight to teach the poor and simple, he made a number of attempts to set them forth in such a manner that they might be written on the hearts and minds of the people. Thus in 1520 he published *A short Form of the Ten Commandments, the Belief, and the Lord's Prayer*, with brief explanations for the people ; which

was followed in 1529 by his two admirable Catechisms. The same reverence for the moral Law induced him to publish a versified form of the Ten Commandments in a Hymnbook in 1524, and another briefer form in another Hymnbook in 1525, which begins with the following simple verse :

O man, wouldst thou live happily,  
 And dwell with God eternally,  
 The Ten Commandments thou must do :  
 For God our Lord will have it so.

Thus, and in similar ways, during the twenty-eight years of his apostleship, he was continually manifesting his deep, devout reverence for the moral Law in its simplicity and purity ; and one of his chief labours during the whole of that period was to instill a like reverence into the minds of the German people, especially of the poor and simple. This humble reverence he expresses with exquisite beauty in the Preface to his larger Catechism, when speaking of those who lookt down on the Catechism, and especially on the Commandments, as the rudiments, the milk for babes, which had been superseded by the higher doctrine of the Gospel. " I too am a doctor and preacher, nay, have as much learning and experience perhaps as any of those who feel this boldness and security ; yet I still do like a child whom one teaches its Catechism, and read and say over word for word every morning, and if I have time, the Ten Commandments, the Belief, the Lord's Prayer, Psalms, &c. And I am forced to read it daily besides, and to study it, and yet cannot get as perfect in it as I should wish to be, and must needs remain a child and scholar of the Catechism, ay, and am glad to be so."

Here I will insert the remarks which wind up the explanation of the Ten Commandments in Luther's larger

*Catechism.* Thousands of passages to the same effect may be found in his works, evincing that this is the uniform spirit of his teaching. But as the tenour of that teaching has been so grossly misunderstood and misrepresented, this extract may perhaps help some English readers, Mr Hallam among the rest, to understand what Luther's feelings and doctrines about the moral Law were, and what he meant when he seems to speak disparagingly of good works. "These are the Ten Commandments, a summary of Divine teaching as to what we must do, that our whole life may please God, and the true fountain and channel from which and along which whatever is truly a good work must spring and flow; so that, beside the Ten Commandments, no work or doing can be good or pleasing to God, however grand and splendid it may seem to the world. Let us see now what our great saints boast of their spiritual orders, and their grand, difficult works, which they have devised and piled up, while they let these drop; just as if these were much too mean, or already done with long ago. I trow, one must have all one's hands full enough to keep these, gentleness, patience, and love toward enemies, chastity, kindness, and what such things bring with them. But such works have no mark and show in the eyes of the world; for they are not strange and puffed out, tied to particular times, places, modes, and gestures, but common daily housework, such as any man may carry on toward his neighbour: therefore they have no dignity. But those others make one's eyes and ears gape, and help themselves out with great pomp, cost, and noble buildings, and deck themselves so that they glisten and shine all over. People burn incense; they sing and ring; they light torches and candles, so that one cannot hear or see anything else, except a priest standing in his golden

chasuble, or a layman lying all day on his knees in a church: this is counted a precious work, which no one can praise enough. But for a poor girl to wait upon a young child committed to her, and to tend it carefully, this is thought nothing of. Else what would monks and nuns go and seek in their cloisters. But think: is it not an accursed presumption in these desperate saints, that they take upon themselves to invent a higher and better life and condition than the Ten Commandments teach; giving out, as was just said, that these are a common life for common folks, but that theirs is for the holy and perfect? And they see not, so wretched and blind are they, that no man can mount so high as to keep one of the Ten Commandments as it ought to be kept; but that both the Belief and the Lord's Prayer must come to our aid,—that we may seek and pray for power to do this, and may receive it without intermission. Therefore their boasting comes just to this, as though I boasted and said I had not a penny to pay, but trusted I could pay ten shillings.

“ This I say and press, to the end that one may be rid of the sad abuse, which is so deeply rooted and still cleaves to everybody, and may accustom oneself in all conditions upon earth to look to this alone, and to busy oneself about this. For long will it be ere any one can fashion a doctrine or condition, which is comparable to the Ten Commandments; because they are so high that no one can reach them by human strength; and he who does reach them is a heavenly, angelic man, far above all the holiness of this world. Only take them up, and try yourself; use all your might and main; you will find so much to do, that you will not seek or care for any other work or holiness.—

“ Therefore it is not vainly commanded in the Old

Testament, that the Ten Commandments shall be written on all the walls and doorposts, nay, on the garments (Deut. vi. 7. 8). Not that they were to let the characters stand there, and to make a show of them, as the Jews did; but that we may have them continually before our eyes, and constantly in our thoughts, may follow them in all our deeds and conduct, and that every one may make it his daily exercise in all cases, business, and dealings, as though they were written in every place on which he looks, yea, wherever he goes or stands. Thus would people find occasion enough, both at home and with their neighbours, to fulfill the Ten Commandments, so that there would be no need of running after such occasions. From this we see again how highly these Ten Commandments are to be exalted and praised above all conditions, ordinances, and works, which any one can teach or follow. For here we may take our stand, and say, Let all the wise men and saints come forward, and try whether they can produce any work, except these Commandments, which God requires with such earnestness, and enjoins under His highest wrath and punishment, adding at the same time such a glorious promise, that He will pour out all good things and blessings upon us. Therefore are we to teach them above all other things, and to hold them dear and precious, as the highest treasure given to us by God."

It is to be hoped, even Mr Hallam will be convinced by this, and by the other evidence already adduced, that more can be urged in disproof of his charge imputing Antinomianism to Luther, than that "he *somewhere else* used a language inconsistent with it." If we forget what were the good works, which the teaching of the Church in those days exalted and enjoined, we may often stumble at what he says: but if we carry the distinction here set

forth along with us, all is clear and straight. This same distinction will help us in understanding the passages, whatever they may be, in Luther's *Tabletalk*, of which Mr Hallam speaks in the next sentences of the same Note. "If the *Colloquia Mensalia* are to be fully relied upon, Luther continued to talk in the same Antinomian strain as before, though he grew sometimes more cautious in writing. (*Sometimes more cautious in writing!* It is painful to see another instance of the manner in which people keep themselves from acknowledging and giving up a cherisht prejudice.) See chap. XII. of that work, and compare with the passages quoted by Milner, v. 517, from the second edition (in 1536) of his Commentary on the Galatians. It would be well to know if these occur in that of 1519."

On the *Tabletalk*, and its authority, I shall have to say something anon: but here again I must observe that one could have wisht for some more precise reference, than to a chapter which fills above twenty closely printed folio pages; so that there might have been means of judging what Mr Hallam understands by the Antinomianism with which he taxes Luther, and whether it is anything more than the Antinomianism which he might find in St Paul. This is the more desirable, inasmuch as Coleridge, than whom no Englishman was ever better qualified to give sentence on such a point, expressly declares, that this very twelfth Chapter of Luther's *Tabletalk, on the Law and the Gospel*, "contains the very marrow of divinity:" *Remains*, III. 401 (N).

Besides, in turning over the pages of this chapter I find one section headed, "*Why the preaching of the Law is necessary against the Antinomians*" (p. 207); and my eye lights on such passages as the following: "He that will be wise in the sight of God, let him begin to learn

the Ten Commandments and God's word" (p. 206): again, in p. 188, "Seeing that with all diligence we teach the Law, therefore by the very act itself we approve, that (as our adversaries falsely charge and accuse us) we do not reject the Law and the works thereof, but much rather we do confirm and erect the same, and do teach that we ought to do good works; and we also do affirm that the Law is very good and profitable" (p. 188): again, in p. 197, "Anno 1541, certain propositions were brought to Luther as he sat at dinner, importing that the Law might not be preached in the Church, because we are not justified thereby. At the sight whereof he was much moved to anger, and said, *Such seducers do come already among our people, while we yet live: what will be done when we are gone?* Let us (said he) give Philip Melanchthon the honour due to him: for he teacheth exceeding well and plainly of the right difference, use, and profit of the Law and Gospel: and I teach directly also the same, and have thoroughly handled that point in the Epistle to the Galatians.—He that taketh away the doctrine of the Law, doth rend and tear away *politiam et oconomiam*; and when the Law is cast out of the Church, then there is no more acknowledging of sins in the world." Here Luther again joins Melanchthon in maintaining that they agree; though Mr Hallam is loth to take their word even for this. Luther in this very twelfth chapter contends again and again most earnestly against the Antinomians: yet Mr Hallam says, referring to this chapter, that "he continued to talk in the same Antinomian strain as before, though he grew sometimes more cautious in writing." Why, even from this very chapter, to which Mr Hallam appeals, as shewing that Luther "continued to talk in an Antinomian strain," a score of passages might be cited, evincing such a singularly clear



perception of the true relation between the Law and the Gospel, and of the special office of the Law, that one may pronounce it to have been an impossibility for Luther to have talkt "in an Antinomian strain;" unless indeed he talkt so in his sleep, or unless the expressions belonged to a much earlier part of his life. If there are any expressions which sound like Antinomianism, we may feel sure, either that they have been misreported, or that we miss their meaning from not knowing the circumstances under which they were spoken.

In fact, though Mr Hallam, notwithstanding his researches to ascertain the nature and extent of Luther's Antinomianism, does not seem to have heard of it, Luther maintained a continuous struggle against Antinomianism for the last twenty years of his life. He had to approve himself the minister of God by the armour of righteousness on the right hand as well as on the left, fighting on the one side against the factitious righteousness and will-worship of Rome, on the other side against the unrighteousness of the Anabaptists and other Antinomians. Among his writings is a Tract specially entitled *Against the Antinomians*, publisht in 1539. He had been defending certain theses against them, as has already been stated, the year before. Throughout the second Commentary on the Galatians, he continually maintains the righteousness of faith against the Antinomian faith without righteousness, no less than against the Popish righteousness without faith; and in the Preface he says of his two bodies of opponents, with a characteristic image, *caudis sunt conjunctae istae vulpes, sed capitibus diversae*.

Mr Hallam seems to admit that the passages quoted by Milner from the second edition, as he terms it, of this Commentary, exhibit an unobjectionable phase of doctrine;

though here also he cannot refrain from paring down his concession by insinuating a doubt whether these passages occur in the edition of 1519. In a previous note (on chap. iv. § 59), he goes so far as to charge Milner with the "disingenuous trick of suppressing all passages in the early treatises of Luther, which display his Antinomian paradoxes in a strong light." This is another instance of a grave accusation, without a tittle of evidence to support it. Against such Antinomian criticism what reply can be made? Till Mr Hallam brings forward his proofs of Luther's errors, we may suspend our judgment; but thus much is plain, that, if they merely consist of occasional, partial over-statements, and do not colour the main streams of his doctrine, it was no way necessary, and hardly useful, that Milner, in a work like his, should take any notice of them. A far stranger procedure is it, that a historian of literature, in speaking of one of the first men in history, should spend three-fourths of the breath which he allows to him, in talking about the mud which stuck to his shoes, and the drops of sweat which ran down his cheeks, in consequence of his having to journey a long, hard way through the mire.

With regard to the Commentaries on the Galatians, the first extract cited by Milner, as "giving a beautiful and concise delineation of the order and method of practical Christianity," is expressly stated by him to be taken from the first edition. Perhaps it may be too much to expect from an English historian, that he should have taken the trouble to compare the two Commentaries, when Milner has not given the references: but if Mr Hallam had done so, even in a single instance, he would have found, what Milner himself was not aware of, that the Commentary on the Galatians published in 1536 is a totally different work from that published in 1519, being

thrice as long, and having few sentences, I believe, if any, in common. A second revised edition of the earlier Commentary was published in 1524: but that in 1536 is wholly different. As the Epistle to the Galatians afforded Luther such occasions for maintaining his prime doctrine, and this time against the two opposite perversions of it, he again delivered a course of lectures on that Epistle; which were taken down by some of his friends, and published with his consent and corrections (o). In this, as has already been observed, the contest against Antinomianism is very prominent, because Antinomianism had taken root and spread widely in the preceding fifteen years. On the other hand there was little Antinomianism when Luther published his first Commentary: hence, according to the practical bent of his mind, he devoted himself chiefly to combating that form of error which at the time was dominant in the Church. But there too his doctrine was in the main the same.

Here let me recur to an assertion of Mr Hallam's, which has already been quoted in p. 10: "whoever has read the writings of Luther up to the year 1820 inclusive, must find it impossible to contradict my assertion," of Luther's Antinomian paradoxes. Mr Hallam, I trust, has been driven from every other position; and he must not be allowed to keep his ground in this. In fact a more astoundingly rash assertion I have rarely met with. I open the first volume of Luther's Latin works at hazard, and my eyes fall on the following passage (p. 418. ed. Jen.), in the note on v. 14, *For all the Law is fulfilled in this one word, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself.* "This examination (of the nature of your love to your neighbour) will teach you what progress you have made in Christianity. Thus you will find out whom you love, and whom you do not

love, how much you have profited or fallen short. For if there be any one person toward whom you are not kindly affectioned, you are nothing, even though you work miracles. By this rule too you yourself, without the help of a master, may learn to distinguish between works and good works. You will then clearly perceive that it is better to wish well, to speak well, and to do well to your neighbour, and to make your whole life a service of your neighbour in love, as the Apostle says just before, than if you were to build all the churches in the world, and to amass the merits of all the monasteries, and to work the miracles of all the Saints, unless indeed you wrought them in the service of your neighbour. This is the doctrine which in these days they are not only ignorant of, but assail with the infinite host of their traditions. Their principle is this, that they never teach you to love any one except your immediate personal neighbour, while they squabble so about works, and distinguish their characters. Nor is less care necessary in understanding that very common distinction of the Law of Nature, the written Law, and the Law of the Gospel. For since the Apostle here says, that they all agree in one sum and substance, Love is certainly the end of every Law, as he tells Timothy, 1. i. 5. But Christ also (Matth. vii. 12) expressly declares that what they call the Law of Nature,—*All things which ye would that men should do to you, do ye also to them,*—is the same with the Law and the Prophets. Now, as He Himself teaches the Gospel, it is clear that these three Laws do not differ so much in their real purpose, as in the misunderstandings of their interpreters. Moreover this written Law, *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,* says exactly the same thing with the Law of Nature: *What ye wish that men should do to you,*—

for this is to love oneself,—*even so do to them*:—this is plainly to love others, as oneself. But what else does the whole Gospel teach? Therefore there is one Law, which has spread through all ages, known to all men, written on the hearts of all: nor does it leave any one excusable from the beginning to the end; although among the Jews ceremonies were added to it, and in other nations their own special laws, which did not bind the whole world,—an obligation peculiar to this, which the Spirit writes on the hearts of all, without intermission.”

This passage, on which, as I said, my eyes lighted by accident, stands in the midst of a work animated by the selfsame spirit, and published in the year 1519, the very middle of that period, of which Mr Hallam has the boldness to say, that “ whoever has read Luther’s writings belonging to it must find it impossible to contradict his assertion ” of Luther’s Antinomian extravagances. On the strength of this and the other passages which I have quoted, I will venture to rejoin that whoever has read these writings carefully, must contradict that assertion: on this point I am content to join issue with him.

Mr Hallam indeed says, that, “ in treating of an author so full of unlimited propositions as Luther, no positive proof as to his tenets can be refuted by the production of inconsistent passages.” This is an ingenious way of silencing all opposition. For what is poor Luther’s advocate to do? He cannot refute the charge brought against him by taking the evidence to pieces, and shewing its invalidity; for of evidence there is not a jot. At the same time he is told that he must not hope to refute it by proving a mental *alibi*; for that Luther is such a conjuror, he can be in a dozen places

at once. But, seriously speaking, if it can be proved, as the passage last quoted assuredly does prove, that Luther had fully and most clearly discerned the relation between Faith and the evangelical Law of Love, and had seen how this is the sum and principle of all positive laws, we may confidently assert that he cannot have been an Antinomian. Should passages having an opposite tendency be brought forward, I would contend, that, unless Luther can be shewn to have been either a madman or an idiot, we are bound to interpret them by the light which may be derived from the various passages cited above, and from the numberless others to the same effect strewn through every part of his writings. But further, I believe that, among the numerous works published by Luther during the three years marked out by Mr Hallam, there is hardly one, from which, if it affords us any glimpse of his opinions on morals, it might not be demonstrated that Luther was not an Antinomian. Indeed in some respects, during that period, when he was only gradually purifying himself from the Roman leaven, he may almost be thought to speak too much about good works.

To begin with the first page in the Jena edition of his Latin works, it is filled with certain propositions concerning the power of the will in the natural man. Here the third corollary to the first conclusion asserts that, though men without faith cannot do anything purely good, yet there is a difference between the chaste and the unchaste, the just and the unjust, so that they will not fall under the same punishment. The second conclusion asserts, *Homo, Dei gratia exclusa, praecepta ejus servare nequaquam potest*; thus recognising that there is a Divine Law, and that man is bound to observe it, though from the corruption of his nature he cannot,

without Divine grace. The third corollary to this conclusion may startle one at first sight: *Cum justitia fidelium sit in Deo abscondita, peccatum vero eorum manifestum in seipsis, verum est non nisi justos damnari, atque peccatores et meretrices salvari.* But the proposition here asserted is in fact the truth involved in the beautiful parable of the Pharisee and the Publican, coupled with the declaration that the life of the believer is hidden in God, so that of this he is unconscious, while he feels a deep consciousness of his sin. The assertion, *non nisi justos damnari*, is probably incorrectly expressed, and may have been meant to be equivalent to *justos non nisi damnari*, that they who count themselves righteous will be condemned. If not, every candid mind will make allowances for exaggerations in such apophthegmatically worded scholastic theses, which were the fashion of the age.

If we turn over the leaf, we find that the next two pages contain the noble letter which Luther sent along with his Theses to the Archbishop of Mayence. In this he urges as one main argument against the indulgences, that “*opera pietatis et caritatis sunt in infinitum meliora indulgentiis, et tamen—propter venias praedicandas illa tacent, cum tamen omnium episcoporum hoc sit officium primum et solum, ut populus evangelium discat et caritatem Christi.*” These last words seem from the context to mean *the duties of Christian love.*

Again, the very foremost in that grand body of Theses, which were the first act in the deliverance of the Church, —*Dominus et Magister noster Jesus Christus, dicendo Poenitentiam agite, etc. omnem vitam fidelium poenitentiam esse voluit,*—is of itself sufficient to disprove the charge of Antinomianism. For penitence implies that there must be a moral Law; and the continuance of penitence through

life manifests the deepest conviction of sin, that is, of the violation of the moral Law. Nay, the idea which runs through the whole series of Theses, is that of the dignity and sanctity of the moral Law. Or I may cite the 43d, and the next two Theses as exhibiting a state of thought and feeling utterly alien from Antinomianism. *Docendi sunt Christiani, quod dans pauperi aut mutuans egentibus, melius facit quam si venias redimeret: Quia per opus caritatis crescit caritas, et fit homo melior; sed per venias non fit melior, sed tantummodo a poena liberior.* — *Docendi sunt Christiani, quod qui videt egenum, et neglecto eo dat pro veniis, non indulgentias Papae, sed indignationem Dei sibi vindicat.* Again, the highest reverence for the Law pervades the ninety-nine Theses against the Scholastic Philosophy in 1517.

I might go on in like manner through one Treatise after another. But one more example will be sufficient to determine the value of Mr Hallam's statements concerning Luther. He says, as we have seen, that "whoever has read the writings of Luther up to the year 1520 inclusive, must find it impossible to contradict his assertion." Now, even after all the instances already produced of his singular rashness,—a rashness the more puzzling at first sight from its contrast with the calmness and deliberate-ness and caution which he aims at, but easily explicable to those who know how often caution out of season becomes rashness,—even after all we have hitherto met with, it fills one with amazement to find that, in the first volume of Luther's Latin works, containing those of 1517, 1518, 1519, with some belonging to the year 1520, above ninety folio pages are filled with a translation of a course of sermons which he had been preaching to the people on the Ten Commandments, even then, as throughout his life, one of his favorite themes, in which every



Commandment is fully expounded and urged both in its literal and in its widest spiritual sense. Moreover, a few pages after, we come to an Instruction for the Confession of sins according to the Ten Commandments.

In the text indeed to the Note which we have so long been examining, Mr Hallam, while speaking of divers things which he deems reprehensible in Luther, says (c. iv. § 59), "He fancied that to represent a future state as the motive of virtuous action, or as any way connected with human conduct, for better or worse, was derogatory to the free grace of God, and the omnipotent agency of the Spirit in converting the soul." This sentence, being unsupported by any reference, leaves us at a loss to make out what is the opinion here objected to. One might suppose it to be, what we find now and then exprest by Luther, especially in his earlier writings, when he was more under the influence of Tauler and other Mystics, that the reference to a future state, if it operates as a motive of our actions, either in the way of personal hope or fear, detracts from their purity and perfection, and is a witness of the corruption of our nature; for that, if we were not tainted with sin, we should act rightly from the mere love of Truth and Purity and Justice. I cannot feel confident that this is Mr Hallam's meaning: but it seems to be so; and this opinion we certainly do find in Luther, for instance in the sentences already quoted in p. 19, and again in the following beautiful passage from the same sermon *On Penitence*. "Proinde confessurus id potissimum et ante omnia tecum cogita, quid faceres, si non esset praeceptum confitendi, si nulla esset quadragesima, si nulli confiterentur, si nullus esset pudor, sed omnis omnium plenaque libertas. An etiam sic velles confiteri, conteri, poenitere? Quod si te non ita invenis, jam scito te non ex amore

justitiae, sed consuetudine et timore praecepti poenitere, atque malle sequi turbam, si omnibus liceret non poenitere. Si autem velles, etiamsi nullus poeniteret, confiteretur, contereretur, atque adeo si totus mundus aliter ageret, nec praecepti habita ratione, poenitere, sed amore novae vitae et melioris, jam vere poenites. Ecce hoc est, quod illi solent dicere, quod contritio in caritate facta facit remitti peccata." Yet, if this be Mr Hallam's meaning, one is puzzled to understand how he can deem that such an opinion is a reprehensible moral paradox, nay, as the context and note would seem to imply, that it savours of Antinomianism. Such an opinion might indicate a want of practical wisdom, if it led a person to reject all motives derivable from hope and fear, and to deny their utility and necessity in our frail, peccable state. But this Luther did not: on the contrary he continually urged such motives in their proper place. Nor did he imagine that man would ever in this life attain to a condition, in which those leadingstrings and crutches for our tottering virtue would no longer be needed (P). Just after the last quotation he adds: "si recte perpendas haec dicta, facile dices nullum hominem esse in mundo, qui hanc contritionem habeat, vel saltem paucissimos: et de me ipso confiteor similia omnino." This however he regarded as a proof of our inherent, inveterate, incurable sinfulness, of our continual need of forgiveness, and of the evil which clings to our very best acts, and abides with us in our very best estate. But I repeat, I cannot feel certain that this is what Mr Hallam refers to; and I should have past over his words altogether, unless I desired not to leave the slightest shadow of his censure on Luther's moral tenets unremoved, if it seemed possible to remove it.

In his remarks on the motives of the great Reformer

(c. iv. § 60), Mr Hallam is indeed quite justified in repudiating the notion, "that Luther was desirous of introducing a more rational system of religion; or, that he contended for freedom of enquiry, and the boundless privileges of individual judgement: or, that his zeal for learning and ancient philosophy led him to attack the ignorance of the monks, and the crafty policy of the Church, which withstood all liberal studies." One might regard these suggestions as a transfer of the thoughts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to the sixteenth, were it not that the sixteenth does exhibit something to a certain extent corresponding to them in the aims of Erasmus, and those of Reuchlin, Hutten, and their friends. But the writings of Erasmus and of his compeers would have been as unavailing to produce the Reformation, as it would be to light men for the labours of agriculture by carrying a dozen candles into the fields. A mightier spirit was needed for this work, one which drew its power from deeper sources of truth, human and divine.

Mr Hallam however proceeds: "Nor is there any foundation for imagining that Luther was concerned for the interests of literature. None had he himself, save theological; nor are there, as I apprehend, many allusions to profane studies, or any proof of his regard to them, in all his works. On the contrary, it is probable that both the principles of this great founder of the Reformation, and the natural tendency of so intense an application to theological controversy, checkt for a time the progress of philological and philosophical literature on this side of the Alps." These opinions are supported by some extracts from Erasmus, such as "*Ubicunque regnat Lutheranismus, ibi literarum est interitus.*" Now such a verdict on the part of Erasmus is comprehensible

enough. When the conflicts of the Reformation were raging, the momentous controversies concerning the pronunciation of Greek, and accent, and quantity, and etacism, and iotacism, sank into comparative neglect. Possibly too the study of ancient literature was not cultivated so diligently, at all events not so exclusively, as it might have been otherwise. But the intellectual work of the first half of the sixteenth century was of a higher order than that of cultivating the literature of antiquity. It was to bring forth the literature of modern Europe, at least to bring forth those great primordial thoughts, which have given its peculiar shape and character to modern literature, and to fashion the languages in which those thoughts were to find utterance. There had indeed been earlier throes of this great parturition. Chaucer was contemporary with our Wiclif, Dante with the struggles between the Guelfs and Ghibellines. Germany too had had an age of epic and lyric poetry in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. But that subjectiveness, reflectiveness, and analysis, that piercing introspectiveness, which has revealed the lowest depths of the human heart and spirit, for instance and above all in Shakspeare,—this, and the humour which, along with it, forms the distinctive characteristic of modern literature, have sprung in great part out of the Reformation; as also has our experimental science, and our subjective, self-examining philosophy. With regard to philology also, if the dilettante pursuit of it sustained a momentary check from the graver studies called forth by the Reformation, it is to be remembered that almost all the great masters in philology have arisen among Protestants. Indeed how could they arise, where a main part of religion consists in swallowing the words of the blind and of the false, without questioning their authority or their veracity? Mr Hallam too himself

observes in a Note, that "there were at the time, as well as afterward, more learned men on the side of the Reformation than on that of the Church."

So far however as Luther himself is concerned, Mr Hallam's observation, that "he had no literature, save theological, and that there are not many allusions to profane studies, or any proof of his regard to them, in all his works," strengthens the conclusion to which we are led by everything else he has said about Luther, that his acquaintance with the great Reformer and with his writings is exceedingly slight. It is notorious indeed that, some years before Luther entered upon his peculiar mission, he had in great measure abandoned profane studies, and given himself up with all his heart and soul and mind and strength to Theology. Nor was he at any time much of a Greek scholar: such scholarship was very rare in Germany among his contemporaries. But Melancthon, in his short Life of him, says that, while he was at school at Eisenach, "having a very vigorous intellect, especially fitted for eloquence, he rapidly surpass his schoolfellows both in the choice of words and in fluency; and in writing, both prose and verse, he excelled the other youths who were educated with him." He adds that, during Luther's stay at the University of Erfurt, "he read most of the remains of the ancient Latin writers, of Cicero, Virgil, Livy, and others. These he read, not like boys, merely picking out the words, but as teachers and representatives of human life. Hence he lookt closely at the plans and opinions of the writers; and having a strong and accurate memory, he distinctly retained most of what he read and heard." This statement is confirmed by the extraordinary fluency and *copia verborum* which Luther shewed all his life in lecturing offhand in Latin on the profoundest theological

questions: and though his taste was too pure, and his aim too straightforward, for him to deck out his pages with classical allusions, which would have been unintelligible to most of his hearers, or at least would have diverted their attention from the subject he wisht to press upon them, such allusions are not unfrequent in his writings, when they come in pertinently and serve to enforce what he is saying (q). A remarkable proof of the high value he set on the great Roman writers, is contained in a paper which he wrote at Eisleben two days before his death. Aurifaber, who was his companion at the time, has printed it in the first chapter of the *Tabletalk*. “Virgilium in Bucolicis nemo potest intelligere, nisi fuerit quinque annis Pastor. Virgilium in Georgicis nemo potest intelligere, nisi fuerit quinque annis Agricola. Ciceronem in Epistolis (sic praecipio) nemo integre intelligit, nisi viginti annis sit versatus in Republica aliqua insigni. Scripturas sanctas sciat se nemo degustasse satis, nisi centum annis cum Prophetis, ut Elia et Elisaeo, Joanne Baptista, Christo, et Apostolis, Ecclesias gubernarit.—We are beggars: hoc est verum.”

Moreover, if Mr Hallam could have brought himself to look into the Articles of Visitation spoken of above, for anything except to find matter of reproach against Luther, he would have seen that, in the German copy of them, which received Luther's express sanction, the latter Articles, which bear strong marks of his hand, are employed in sketching a plan of National Education, according to which the whole German people were to be educated in the knowledge of Latin Grammar and to read easy Latin authors. This plan is drawn up with great practical wisdom, bearing some marks indeed of its age, but far above anything that has ever been effected, or even attempted at all widely, in England down to this

day. It was in consequence of the deplorable ignorance, which he found prevailing among the people in the course of the Visitation, that Luther composed his two invaluable Catechisms. Even in 1520, when writing his grand *Letter to the Christian nobless of the German nation*, he had strongly urged the necessity of establishing schools, and of reforming the Universities. Again, in 1524, being at the time under the Ban of the Empire, he wrote an excellent Letter to the Magistrates of all the German towns, calling upon them to fulfill their duty of establishing and keeping up Christian Schools in all parts of Germany. In this Letter he urges the great importance of teaching the learned languages, Latin, Greek, and Hebrew, both with a view to the understanding of the Scriptures, and in order to train up persons qualified to discharge all civil and social duties, "in order that the men may be well fitted to govern the land and the people, and that the women may manage their house, and bring up their children and household."—"The children (he says), should not only learn languages and history, but singing also, and music, and mathematics." And he adds, "How sorry am I now, that I have not read more poets and histories, and that nobody taught me them!" This deep interest in the education of the people abode with Luther through life, and is continually express; nor did he ever shrink from exhorting and expostulating with the princes and nobles, to prevail on them to fulfill their sacred duty in this matter. Hence Karl Raumer, in his *History of Education* (*Geschichte der Paedagogik*, I. p. 137), says, "If Melancthon obtained the name of *Praeceptor Germaniae*, as a learned teacher of Germany, especially of the studious classes, Luther was the pastor of the people, who, with a love animated by the fervour of faith, watcht, prayed, laboured, that all his

dear Germans, high and low, might be prepared by godly discipline and sound instruction, for leading a life well-pleasing to God. He saw clearly that the Reformation could not be firmly established, except by the Christian nurture of the children, at home and at school (R)." This of itself is a sufficient proof that he was not an Antinomian.

It is now full time to take leave of Mr Hallam, the argument with whom has grown to a much greater length than I anticipated, and is certainly very disproportionate to his brief remarks upon Luther. Were it not for the adventitious force which those remarks acquire from his reputation for learning, judgement, and fairness, they might have been dismissed summarily: but when it appeared desirable that they should be refuted, their very vagueness and slightness, and the absence of any tangible fact, left no way of disproving them except that of proving the contrary (S). Hereby the prejudice, which, though utterly groundless, is by no means uncommon in these days, that Luther erred on the side of Antinomianism, will, I trust, have been dispelled; and we shall be able to come with free, open minds to the examination of the more definite charges brought against him by others. How indispensable this is to a right appreciation of particular sentences and propositions picked out from the writings of a man who expresses himself as strongly as Luther, we shall see exemplified in several cases anon. When a person, prepossessed with the notion that Luther was an Antinomian, lights upon some strong passage severed from the context, he welcomes it as a confirmation of his previous antipathy. On the other hand, he who is familiar with Luther's writings, with their tone and spirit, their singular practical sense and spiritual wisdom, if he falls in with one of these stones of offense, will not stumble, but will



suspend his judgement, trusting that what in its separation may seem as shocking as a hand or eye, when severed from its body, will be proved on examination in its original place to fit aptly into the great body of truth from which it has been torn. And after finding, as often as I have found, that this anticipation is thoroughly justified, one's confidence amounts to an assurance, which will not easily be shaken.

REPLY TO MR NEWMAN'S REMARKS  
ON LUTHER.

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WHATEVER confidence in Luther's spiritual wisdom may have been inspired by the contemplation of his life, or the study of his writings, it will often find occasion in these days to vindicate itself against the attacks which are continually made upon him and his cause. They have proceeded from more than one quarter, but chiefly, as might be expected, from that new School of Theology, which has set itself to depreciate and to counteract the work of the Reformation. By our modern Romanizers the mightiest enemy of the Romish corruptions is naturally regarded with dislike, with aversion, almost with hatred. His intense love of truth revolts those who dally with truth, and play tricks with it, until they cease to discern the distinction between truth and falsehood. His straightforwardness finds no sympathy among those who walk in crooked ways. His hunger and thirst after that which is spiritual, and his comparative indifference about outward forms, are mortal offenses to those with whom forms, institutions, rites, ordinances are the main thing, and almost everything. Hence the contest about Luther's character now has a peculiar interest and importance. It is a part of the great contest by which our Church is so dismally torn. The enemy, the traducer has endeavoured to get possession of him, and to cover him with ignominy: there is urgent need of some one to defend him from his assailants; and as no one else has come forward,

that I am aware of, I have felt bound to do what I can for him to whom I owe such a debt of gratitude and love as can never be paid.

In this, as in most of the other opinions which characterize our new School of Theology, the way was led by him who is the primary author of the schism now rending our Church. As the revival of the true scriptural doctrine of Justification was the first act and germ of the Reformation, so, wherever and whenever there has been a lapse Romeward, that doctrine has been impugned and undermined by a more or less overt assertion of human merit and of good works. Hence the discerning perceived from the first that there was a strong tendency toward the Church of Rome in Mr Newman's *Lectures on Justification*, even as there was in our Arminian divinity of the seventeenth century; although they hoped that the practical wisdom and godliness, which are ever indispensable to bridle in the runaway impetus of speculation, would now also, as then, preserve the devious thinker from following the impulses of his own morbid subtilty. In these *Lectures on Justification* the Lutheran doctrine is assailed with great ingenuity and logical acuteness: and in the course of the argument Luther himself is often spoken of, but on the whole with respect, or at least with that exemplary decorum which has ever marked Mr Newman's controversial writings, notwithstanding the continual provocations he has received.

In one place, at the close of the second Lecture, a comparison is instituted between Luther and Augustin, of course to Luther's disadvantage: but, if we bate the contrast between their doctrine on the point in question, which I cannot discuss here, the main defect urged against Luther is that he lived in the sixteenth century. For the comparison is wound up with this finely sounding, but

empty antithesis: "They (Luther and the other Reformers) have been founders of schools: St Augustin is a Father in the Holy Apostolic Church." Now, as the list of Fathers, so-called, closes with Bernard in the twelfth century, these words, if they mean anything, must mean that no theologian who has had the mishap of being born since the twelfth century, is to be regarded as comparable in spiritual and scriptural knowledge with those who came into the world previously, and were installed for whatsoever cause in the rank of Fathers. Yet in the Notes to the *Mission of the Comforter* I have often had occasion to point out how inferior even the chief among the Fathers were, in their understanding of Scripture, with regard to certain principal heads of Evangelical truth, to the great divines of the Reformation. Mr Newman himself too, and his disciples have found out, subsequently to the publication of his Lectures, that Theology did not come to an absolute standstill, or, in other words,—since abiding herein would be an impossibility,—enter upon a state of continual retrogression, at the end of the fourth century, or of the fifth, or at any other definite epoch, but that it advanced, at least in certain departments, beyond the Fathers in the age of the Schoolmen: and far greater and of higher moment was its stride forward at the Reformation. Indeed there is much truth, though perhaps not without some exaggeration of phrase, in what Coleridge says (*Remains* III. 276), with reference to Luther, Melancthon, and Calvin, that "the least of them was not inferior to St Augustin, and worth a brigade of the Cyprians, Firmilians, and the like."

Surely there is nothing surprising in this. The marvel, the contradiction to the whole course of history, would be if this were not the case; unless we suppose that the special illumination which was granted to

the Apostles, was bestowed on the chief teachers of Christianity down to the last of the Fathers, was then withdrawn, and has been withheld ever since. But for such a limitation and restriction of the gifts of the Spirit no ground can be discovered, either in Scripture, or in the nature of man: nor does the history of the Church present any facts to support it. On the contrary, in all periods of the world, the men of greatest intellectual power have ever borne the mark and stamp of their age: they have received, before they could give: if they have given much, they have received much previously: nor have they continued to give, unless they have likewise continued all the while to receive. Indeed this is the special characteristic and office of a great thinker, that in him some of the dominant thoughts and tendencies of his age are concentrated and embodied, and find their first utterance. Nor has it been otherwise in the history of the Church. Although Christianity, being in her essence above the relations of time and space, renders her devout votaries in a certain sense independent of them, with regard to their own personal spiritual life, yet, when they set themselves to teach or to act upon others, the variable elements of their nature, those which are necessarily moulded and modified by the moral and intellectual powers and agencies they are brought into contact with, come into play. Hence it is next to a moral impossibility, that men living in the decrepitude of the ancient world, under the relaxing and palsying influences of the Roman and Byzantine empires, when all intellectual and moral life was fast waning away, and the grand and stirring ideas and aims which had drawn forth the energies of the classical nations in their prime, had been superseded by rhetorical tumour and allegorical and grammatical trifling,

should have mounted to such a pitch of intellectual power, as to be beyond the reach of the noblest minds in the age when all the faculties of the new world were bursting into life, and when one region of power after another was laid open to man, and called him to rise up and take possession of it,—the whole circuit of the earth he lived in,—the infinitude and the sublimities of the universe in which it is comprised,—the world of Night surpassing that of Day, and swallowing it up in its unfathomable depths,—the classical nations rising out of their millennial sleep, with the beauty of their art and their poetry, and with their heroic glory; while the incipient knowledge of the newly discovered races tended along therewith to bring out self-consciousness, and to make self-knowledge more distinct,—and the Book of God, speaking in each man's native tongue, became indeed a living book, the Book of Man, revealing the inmost thoughts and purposes of his heart. Hereby more especially man was summoned from the merely objective and passive, or conventional and traditional contemplation of outward things, and of logical abstractions and generalizations, to look into the recesses within his own bosom, and to behold himself in his individuality, as separate from the world, and yet a part, nay, a counterpart of the world, a microcosm representing the laws and processes of the macrocosm. Nor should we omit to notice the stimulus afforded by the acquisition of such a mighty organ as the press, multiplying a man's voice a thousandfold, endowing him with a kind of ubiquity, and bringing him into contact with the hearts and minds of the whole body of his countrymen. One of the first acts of this subjective self-analysis, one of the first effects of man's perception of the entire difference between himself and the outward world, was the

discovery of the abyss of sin within himself, as wholly apart from any bad habits or vices contracted from outward influences, and which outward influences and outward acts, penances, expiatory offerings, mortifications, were unavailing to remove. The Mystics in the middle ages had a feeling of this; and herein lay the ground of their separation from the popular Theology of their time: but their feeling was itself a mystical one, incommunicable except to such as were initiated into the mysteries of divine contemplation. They did not teach how sin was to be overcome by those who tread the walks of common life. The open enunciation of these truths in a manner intelligible to all men, and the declaration of the only efficacious remedy for their inward disease, was the first utterance, the birthcry of the Reformation: and hereby, and by that deeper knowledge of human nature, which such a self-analysis, so long as it did not inveigle men into mistaking the processes of death for those of life, could not fail to produce, the Theology of the Reformation became profounder than that of earlier ages. It is a wonderful proof of the power of Christianity to expand and elevate the mind, in despite of the most unfavorable circumstances, that several of the Fathers, living as they did among the falling and fallen leaves of the old world, and so long before the first vernal germinating of the mind of the new world, should have been such great thinkers as they were: but it would have been an inversion and subversion of the order of Nature, if they who grew up in a state of things so much more propitious for the unfolding of high and deep thought, and who had the stores of Christian meditation and experience accumulated during so many centuries to profit by, had been doomed to be altogether inferior to them.

Thus there is no antecedent improbability that a

theologian in the sixteenth century should be quite as wise and as sound an expounder of scriptural truth, as one in the fourth or fifth. Though the earlier divines may have had certain special advantages, the advantages enjoyed by those in the later period were far greater and more important: and if they had peculiar temptations to lead them astray, so had the others. The epoch at which a man lives does not afford us a criterion for judging of the truth of what he says; except so far as his testimony may be appealed to concerning facts: in other respects the value of his writings must be determined on different grounds, by candid and intelligent criticism. Nor is such criticism less needful with regard to the Fathers than to any other body of writers.

This is not a merely historical question: it is of urgent practical moment at this day, deeply affecting the welfare of our Church. The blind admiration for the Fathers, the servile deference to their authority, have wrought much harm in former ages, and are no less mischievous now. In Coleridge's *Remains* we find several instances noted of the injury done to our divines of the seventeenth century by their exaggerated reverence for the Fathers: see Vol. III, pp. 103 (where he remarks that "Luther was too spiritual, of too heroic faith (τ), to be thus blinded by the declamations of the Fathers," 104, 117, 125, 149, 174, 175, 183, ("Let any competent judge read Hacket's life of Archbishop Williams, and then his Sermons, and so measure the stultifying, nugifying effect of a blind and uncritical study of the Fathers, and the exclusive prepossession in favour of their authority, in the minds of many of our Church dignitaries in the reign of Charles I."), 239, 270: Vol. IV. pp. 257, 310. An intelligent person familiar with these divines might multiply the instances a hundredfold;



nor would it be difficult to find numbers of similar ones in the writers of our days, who have been reviving the same "blind and uncritical study of the Fathers, and the exclusive prepossession in favour of their authority."

To those who study the Fathers critically and discerningly, they still yield grains of precious gold in abundance, as we see in the excellent exegetical writings of Mr Trench. But the superstitious and idolatrous are ever fond of displaying their doting, by picking out as the special objects of their complacency, not that which is really valuable,—other men might approve of that,—but that which in itself is worthless, nay, mawkishly silly, or wildly absurd. In truth there is a wisdom approaching to prophetic intuition in the following sentences of Coleridge's taken from his notes on Luther's *Tabletalk* (*Remains*, Vol. iv. p. 47). "I cannot conceive anything more likely, than that a young man of strong mind and active intellect, who has no fears, or suffers no fears of worldly prudence to cry, *Halt!* to him in his career of consequential logic, and who has been *innutritus et juratus* in the Grotio-Paleyan scheme of Christian evidence, and who has been taught by the men and books, which he has been bred up to regard as authority, to consider all inward experiences as fanatical delusions;—I say, I can scarcely conceive such a young man to make a serious study of the Fathers of the first four or five centuries without becoming either a Romanist or a Deist. Let him only read Petavius and the different Patristic and Ecclesiastico-Historical tracts of Semler, and have no better philosophy than that of Locke, no better theology than that of Arminius and Bishop Jeremy Taylor, and I should tremble for his belief. Yet why tremble for a belief which is the very antipode of Faith? Better for such a man to precipitate himself on to the

utmost goal: for then perhaps he may, in the repose of intellectual activity, feel the nothingness of his prize, or the wretchedness of it: and then perhaps the inward yearning after a religion may make him ask, *Have I not mistaken the road at the outset? Am I sure that the Reformers, Luther and the rest collectively, were fanatics?*"

How disastrously have these words been fulfilled, and are receiving fresh fulfilment every day! and with what exactitude is the training of some of our Patrolaters who are lapsing into Romanism, here described! The issue indeed, so far as we are at present acquainted with it, has been mainly in one direction, toward Rome. This is not because the Fathers of the first four or five centuries are favorable to the errors and corruptions of Rome. The contest on this point has been waged again and again; and the victory in the main has always been on our side. But the very habit of looking with prostrate minds to outward human authority, and that too authority so remote from the special wants and yearnings of our age, and incapable of speaking to us with that intelligent fellow-feeling which elicits the responsive activity of our own spirits,—to authority therefore which can only speak imperatively, except to the few whose understandings are mature enough to consult it critically, and to distinguish the true from the erroneous, the relevant from the irrelevant,—tends to breed an imbecile tone of judgement, which is incapable of standing alone, and will not be content with the helps wherewith God has supplied us, but craves restlessly for some absolute authority, whereby it may be enabled to walk in leading-strings all its life long. Such minds, when one prop after another gives way under them, as they find out that no Father can be appealed to as an absolute authority, least

of all on the particular questions which agitate our times the most, will try to save themselves from falling into Infidelity by catching desperately hold of Infallibility. And how long will this bear them up?

But, though Luther was not what is technically termed a *Father*, and could not be so from the period, when, for the good of mankind, it was ordained that he should be born, yet it has pleased God that he, above all other men since the days of the Apostles, should, in the truest and highest sense, be a Father in Christ's church, yea, the human father and nourisher of the spiritual life of millions of souls, for generation after generation. Three hundred years have rolled away since he was raised, through Christ's redeeming grace, from the militant Church into the triumphant; and throughout those three hundred years, and still at this day, it has been and is vouchsafed to him,—and so, God willing, shall it be for centuries to come,—that he should feed the children of half Germany with the milk of the Gospel by his Catechism,—that he should supply the poor and simple, yea, and all classes of his countrymen, with words wherewith to commend their souls to God, when they rise from their bed, and when they lie down in it,—that in his words they should invoke a blessing upon their daily meals, and offer up their thanks for them,—that with his stirring hymns they should kindle and pour out their devotion, both in the solemn assembly, and in the sanctuary of every family, — that by his German words, through the blessed fruit of his labours, they should daily and hourly strengthen and enlighten their hearts and souls and minds with that Book of Life, in which God's Mercy and Truth have met together, His Righteousness and Peace have kist each other, and are treasured up for the edification of mankind unto the end of the world.

If this is not to be a Father in Christ's Church, I know not what is. Nay, more: his spiritual children are not confined to his own country. The word of Truth, which he was sent to preach, has sounded from land to land, and was heard in our land also, coming as it did from the home of our forefathers, for the purification of the Church, and for the guiding of numberless souls away from a vain confidence in the works of the flesh to a living trust in their Saviour.

This is the man whom Mr Newman calls, not a Father, but the "founder of a school." He seems to have been pleased with his antithesis, with which he closes his elaborate comparison, and his lecture; yet a more thoroughly infelicitous one has seldom dropt from a pen. *The founder of a school*, forsooth! A teacher indeed he was, and a wise and faithful one, in that School of divine knowledge which is founded upon the Apostles and Prophets, our Lord Himself being the Head Cornerstone. This however is not the sense in which Mr Newman uses the expression. Were he to write now, he would choose a harder term, and one equally destitute of objective truth, but which would have the advantage of meaning something. Verily, in reading the remarks of English censors on Luther, one is tempted at times to fancy that the History of Germany must have been omitted from the course of their studies, and that they supposed they might pass it by, as they would that of Cochin China or Kamschatka: so singularly inappropriate are some of their observations, somewhat like the Idiot Boy's story, "The cocks did crow towhoo! towhoo! And the sun did shine so cold." If it has been Luther's fate that his name should be borne by a large branch of the Church, a large branch of the Church, even though it should be falsely deemed heretical or schismatical, is not a school. Seeing

too that the name was originally imposed on his followers by their adversaries,—seeing that it was a great trouble and grief to him, which he often expresses, to hear his name attacht to those who ought to bear no name save that of their crucified Lord (v),—seeing that from first to last his desire was ever to decrease, and that his beloved Master might increase,—the name may so far be accepted, as a testimony to all generations that Luther was the man of God, sent with the power and spirit of Elijah to cast down the altars of Baal, and to re-establish the true spiritual worship of the Father, in hearts reconciled to Him by the Incarnation and Sacrifice of His Only-begotten Son.

Here, though I must decline entering in this place into a discussion of Mr Newman's objections to Luther's view of Justification, which would carry me much too far, yet, since he states in a note on this comparison between Luther and Augustin (p. 66), that "It is but fair to Luther to say, that he indirectly renounced the extravagant parts of his doctrine at the end of life; that is, the distinctive parts," supporting the assertion by a reference to Dr Laurence's Bampton Lectures; and as this seems at variance with the argument maintained above (pp. 30-34), I will remark, that it was not Luther's practice, however such a practice may find favour in other eyes, to do things, least of all when of such importance, "indirectly." The marvel is, that any honest man should have deemed he was pleading an apology for Luther, which Mr Newman's words imply, when alledging that, after upholding a doctrine asserted to be immoral, openly and strenuously all his life, he retracted it "*indirectly*" in his last year, by a kind of deathbed confession. We shall see in a moment what sort of a retraction it would have been, one which nobody could have guest the drift

of. Other men may act thus, and think by so doing to save their own souls: had Luther meant to renounce any part of his doctrine on Justification, he would have done it openly and explicitly, or he would not have been Luther.

But the passage referred to in Dr Laurence's Lectures does not afford the slightest ground for Mr Newman's assertion (v). For in the first place Dr Laurence is not speaking of Luther's views on Justification, but on the Freedom of the Will. Indeed on Justification Dr Laurence seems to have concurred with Luther. Besides, even with regard to Free-will, the evidence cited by Dr Laurence is far from establishing his position. His sole argument is, that Luther spoke very disparagingly of his own works, in the Preface to the first Volume of the Latin Collection, published in 1545, the year before his death. The passage is beautiful and very characteristic: "I have long and earnestly resisted those who wish that my books, or rather the confused mass of my lucubrations should be published, both because I was unwilling that the labours of the ancients should be overwhelmed by my novelties, and that my readers should be hindered from reading them, and because now, through God's grace, there are a great number of methodical books,—among which Philip's *Common Places* excell,—whereby a divine and a bishop may be well and amply trained to be mighty in preaching the doctrine of godliness; more especially since the holy Bible itself may now be had in almost every language; while my books, as the disorderly course of events led, or rather compelled me, are themselves a sort of rude, undigested chaos, which I myself should now find it difficult to arrange. For these reasons I wish that all my books were buried in perpetual oblivion, that

there might be room for better." From this passage Dr Laurence infers that Luther intended to retract his opinions on Free-will, and to give his sanction to the milder views adopted by Melanchthon in the later editions of the *Loci Communes*: and he supports this notion by citing some other expressions in praise of Melanchthon from the same Preface. Yet surely this inference is a fallacy. When a man speaks slightly of his own writings, he does not commonly mean to reject the opinions advocated in them. His dissatisfaction will rather arise from the inadequate manner in which those opinions are set forth, from shame at perceiving how feebly he has expressed the truths which possess him; except when the writings belong to an earlier period of his life, and to a past frame of his mind; and then he will probably explain that such is the case. Now Luther has done this a little further on in the same Preface, where he tells us what he especially condemns in his earlier writings,—the collection only embracing those down to 1520,—namely, the Romish leaven, from which he was only purged by degrees, and especially his exaggerated reverence for the Pope. "Sciat (Lector) me fuisse aliquando monachum et Papistam insanissimum, cum istam causam aggressus sum, ita ebrium, imo submersum in dogmatibus Papae, ut paratissimus fuerim omnes, si potuissem, occidere, aut occidentibus cooperari et consentire, qui Papae vel una syllaba obedientiam detrectarent." Of his other writings he promises to say something, if he lives, in the prefaces to the subsequent volumes. Now surely one has no right to conclude from Luther's words here, that he intended to retract all the opinions in which he differed in whatsoever degree from Melanchthon, and to set up Melanchthon's in their stead. They merely express his singular modesty, which shone so brightly in its union

with his singular assurance whenever he felt he was standing on the Word of God; a combination which might seem almost contra-natural, unless we had seen the same in St Paul. One of the ways in which his modesty is wont to manifest itself, is in depreciating himself by the side of Melancthon, toward whom, from first to last, he felt an intensity of love and admiration, betokening the depth and fulness of the heart it flowed from (w).

In the same Lecture of Mr Newman's, four pages back, we stumble upon another expression, which strengthens the temptation to believe that the life of Luther and the German Reformation must be supposed to belong to the History of Kamschatka. Adopting the phrase, *shadows of religion*, from good Bishop Wilson's Family Prayers, he says, of the Lutheran doctrine of Justification, "Shadows of religion these things fitly may be called, like the Jewish new-moons and sabbaths which the Judaizers were so loth to part with." A more anomalous comparison has never been devised. Outward formal works are likened to an inward spiritual union, which is nothing, except so far as it involves the active energy of a living Faith. Here, as throughout Mr Newman's Lectures, we find a confusion with regard to the meaning of Faith. Faith with him (p. 287) "is not a practical principle" (x). Be it so: then, according to this conception of Faith, Justification by Faith would indeed be a mere "shadow of religion." But with Luther Faith is a practical principle; and Mr Newman has no right to charge Luther with consequences, which merely proceed from his own view of Faith, but are incompatible with Luther's. This argument however belongs to another place. For the present I will only mark the felicitous infelicity of the phrase, "shadows of religion," as applied to Luther.



Mr Newman is so well pleased with it, that he repeats it again in a Note on his fifth Lecture (p. 128): "When are we to escape from the city of Shadows, in which Luther would bewilder the citizens of the Holy Jerusalem?" This expression may indeed suit the apocryphal Luther, "the founder of a school," who lives in the region where the cocks crow, tow-hoo! tow-hoo! and the sun shines so cold: but as for the true Luther, the Luther of Eisleben, of Wittenberg, of Worms,—you might as reasonably call Hercules a milksop, or Socrates a sentimental blockhead. You can hardly read a page of Luther, either in the four folio volumes of his Latin works, or the twenty-two thick, double-columned German quartos,—you can hardly read a single letter, however slight and short, among the 2324 in De Wette's Collection,—without being imprest with the conviction that religion with Luther is not a thing of words and phrases, not a thing of habit or custom, of convention or tradition, not a thing of times and seasons, but an intense, vivid reality, which governs the pulses of his heart and the motions of his will.

Different opinions however have been entertained as to what is a reality, and what a shadow. To savages, to those whose senses overlay their other faculties, even to the early Greeks, as we see from the first lines of the Iliad, the body is the reality, the soul or spirit the shade. The same inversion is found under all forms of superstition. Indeed this is superstition, to seek and lose the reality in the form, in the symbol, in the outward work, in the outward ordinance: and this superstition was pervading the whole Church, from the crown of the head to the sole of the foot, when Luther arose to call it back from the worship of forms to the worship of living realities. It was because he saw hardly anything but shadows

and masks and empty forms, the spawn of the limbo of vanities, moving to and fro in the deathdance around him,—because the spirit of life had slipt away from institutions and ordinances, which may once have had life and a meaning and a practical purpose, but which were now become purposeless and hollow and cavernous for all manner of evil lusts to revel in,—and because, when, in his yearning after realities, he threw his arms round these hollow forms, they crumbled to dust in his fervent embrace,—because he could not bear to live in a world of shadows and fictions, amid a swarm of “unreal mockeries,”—because he felt through all the depths of his heart and soul and mind that God and Christ and Salvation and Justification and Grace and Holiness and Righteousness are not words and shadows, but realities,—while at the same time he felt no less strongly that Sin and Evil and Condemnation and Hell are also terrible realities, which have thrust their iron fangs through our hearts, and hold them bound, and from which in this world we can never wholly get free,—it was because of this yearning after realities, and of his deep conviction of this twofold reality, that, as one shadow after another revealed its hollowness to him, he had it avaunt and vanish.

When reading the history of the German Reformation, as delineated, for instance, by Ranke's faithful pen, one of the things which strike us continually, is the singular, thorough-going contrast between the shadows and masks of religion on the one side, and the living realities on the other. On the one side we find a mongrel rabble of passions and appetites, ambition, statecraft, the pride of dominion, covetousness and every form of cupidity, the love of ease and the anger at having that ease disturbed, hatred, revenge, bloodthirstiness, fraud, a host of traditionary

prejudices, and the obstinate adherence to inveterate habits; while they who persecuted the Reformers the most, and were the loudest in urging the plea of religion, the Pope and the body of the hierarchy, were for the most part utterly destitute of it (y). On the other side, along with many imperfections, and divers faults of weakness and of violence, we find that which is the mightiest of earthly powers, as being the channel whereby we receive power from heaven,—that which is the one earthly principle of all reality, inasmuch as through it alone do we gain the conviction of heavenly realities,—Faith. Hereby the Reformers stand: this is the source of their strength. They look not to earthly means and auxiliaries, to human force or policy. On the contrary, Luther ever disclaims and repudiates all support, except such as appears to him wholly consistent with the Divine Law. *The cause is not mine, but Thine, O God: do Thou uphold it:* this in all his difficulties is the voice that rises from and cheers his heart. *The cause is God's, and He will uphold it:* this is his reply to those who speak to him of danger and perplexity, and who desire to resist or countertermine their foes. Such too is the power of Faith, he was able in a wonderful manner to infuse his spirit into those around him,—“shadows” have no such power,—and to restrain them from measures, which, under their circumstances, would by most men be deemed very excusable, if not perfectly justifiable, but which to him seemed in some respect contrary to the precepts of Scripture (z).

In fact this is the pervading distinction,—so far as there is any manifesting itself in the various practical functions of the Church,—which characterizes that of Rome. Inheriting the ambition of the Republic and the Empire to rule over the bodies and outward actions of all

mankind, she has ever directed her attention mainly to that which is outward, to forms, shadows, rites, ceremonies, observances; while everywhere she betrays a want of that Faith, which gives substance to the unseen, and pierces through the veil to the invisible glory behind. Hence, through the want of Faith in divine realities, has she set up her monstrous fiction of a visible Vicar in the place of the invisible Lord. Hence what she has chiefly cared and shed blood for, has been to enforce outward submission, outward conformity, outward acts of devotion, the repeating of certain prayers, no matter whether in a known or unknown tongue. Hence her missionaries have generally been content to make converts by wholesale, as though Truth could be spread like a disease epidemically (AA). Hence again, from the same inability to substantiate the realities of Faith, has she enshrined her images, and interposed the Virgin and the Saints between man and the only Mediator and Saviour. Hence too the whole system of pious frauds, of innocent deceptions, of holy impostures and impostors. Hence that huge and flagrant imposture of compulsory celibacy (AB). On the other hand, Luther's intense love of truth, which could not be lulled by any make-believe, his yearning after realities, which no phantom or shadow could still, are the legacy which he bequeathed to the Protestant Churches: and so far as they have retained any portion of his spirit, these have been the marks of it, though often exhibiting themselves in uncouth and uncongenial forms. Even the Rationalism, with which Protestant Germany is so often, and not undeservedly reproacht, is itself an offshoot, though a wild and corrupt one, from the love of truth and reality. It bears witness that men could not be satisfied unless the traditional truths of religion were set in harmony with the rest of their knowledge,

their experience, and their philosophy,—that they felt the urgent necessity of giving a reason for their Faith, of knowing in whom they believed, and what, and why. Their philosophy may have been shallow or perverse, their experience superficial, their knowledge very limited: but at all events this Rationalism, gross as its extravagances have been, is far preferable to that secret unbelief, which has been so dismally prevalent for centuries among the more intelligent in the Romish nations of Europe; though its utterance was ordinarily suppressed, and it was often combined with a specious outward conformity to the established creed and worship. He who loves reality will dwell in a mud-cottage, rather than in a palace of froth: and even the crawling and rigging of a worm toward the throne of Truth has more of real life in it than all the freaks and pranks of myriads of monks in the den of Falsehood.

I cannot, as I have already said, enter here into the general argument concerning Mr Newman's view of Justification, and his objections to Luther's: but, as the passage just cited about "shadows of religion" is followed by a vehement burst of indignation, it may be well to remark that the indignation is somewhat misplaced. "Away (Mr Newman exclaims) with this modern, this private, this arbitrary, this unscriptural system, which promising liberty conspires against it, which abolishes Sacraments to introduce barren and dead ordinances, and for the real participation of Christ, and Justification through His Spirit, would, at the very marriage-feast, feed us on shells and husks, who hunger and thirst after righteousness." Even here a long discussion would be requisite to examine the various counts in this cumulative indictment, and to shew how fallacious they all are: I will only touch on two points.

In the first place, the inconsistency and contradiction here, and in other passages to the same effect, ascribed to the Lutheran doctrine of Justification, pervades the whole Christian view of human nature. Pelagius stumbled at it, and fell into his heresy; and numbers of shallow thinkers since, whose logic just reacht the point of perceiving that of two contradictory propositions one or other must be false,—but who never attained to that higher eminence of philosophy, where we discern how such contradictions are perpetually involved in the relations between the finite and the infinite, when essential, eternal truths clothe themselves in the forms of the human understanding,—have followed Pelagius in his one-sided assertion of the unicity of human nature, or have slipt over to the other side of the ship and tumbled into Manicheism. The ordinary form in which the contradiction in human nature manifests itself, is that described in the wellknown passage of the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, which is the key to all profound knowledge of man. Without engaging in the controversy concerning the particular state there described by St Paul,—whether it be that of man prior or subsequent to his conversion,—I may be allowed to assert, that they who have ever had a deep feeling of this inward contradiction, retain that feeling to the end: they who have ever had a deep spiritual conviction of sin, and of their own sinfulness, retain that conviction to the end. Their growth in holiness does not stifle it, but on the contrary renders it livelier and more piercing: and thus, ascending step by step, we come to that singular phenomenon, that the holiest men would be the most opprest by the conviction of their sinfulness, were it not for their conviction of Christ's righteousness, of which they become partakers through Faith incorporating them as living members into

His body, and through which, being *clothed upon* by it, they may humbly hope to stand in the presence of God. It was this deep and lively conviction of sin, awakened primarily in Luther, and partly through his instrumentality in the Protestant Church, that at once swept away the worship of Saints. The Church of Rome, with her superficial, Pelagianizing conception of sin, may set up her Saints by thousands, yea, even *ex quovis stipite*, and may deck them out with works of supererogation and other frippery; and her advocates may taunt us with having none. But our answer is in those grand words of Tertullian: *Solus Deus sine peccato, et solus homo sine peccato Christus, quia et Deus Christus.*

The other point to be noticed in the last sentence cited from Mr Newman is what he says about the Lutheran view of the Sacraments. Here it would seem necessary to take another leaf out of the history of Kamschatka. Yet one finds it difficult to understand how Mr Newman can have failed to hear that this Luther, who “abolisht Sacraments to introduce barren and dead ordinances,” along with his great primary struggle against Popery, carried on two other obstinate contests for years, one to vindicate the reality and power of the first Sacrament against the Anabaptists, the other that of the second against the Zuinglians and so-called Sacramentaries. Or,—if it be replied that Mr Newman is not speaking directly against Luther, but against the Lutheran doctrine of Justification,—in the first place, as the whole preceding argument has been directed almost exclusively against Luther himself, an exception in his behalf ought to have been made, recognising that he is free from this disparagement of the Sacraments; and next, as the Lutheran doctrine must at all events be that of the Lutheran Church, I would ask, can Mr Newman be ignorant that

the Lutherans have a Confession defining the chief peculiarities of their faith, and that in this Confession the Sacraments are thus explained? *De Baptismo docent, quod sit necessarius ad salutem, quodque per Baptismum offeratur gratia Dei; et quod pueri sint baptizandi, qui per Baptismum obliti Deo recipiantur in gratiam Dei.*—*De Coena Domini docent, quod corpus et sanguis Christi vere adsint, et distribuantur vescentibus in Coena Domini.*

Surely this is something different from “barren and dead ordinances,” from “shells and husks.” But one comes every now and then to indications which would incline one to suppose that the Confession of Augsburg can never have been heard of by most of the writers in the new Oxford School of Theology. So pertinaciously do they draw their notions of what they term Lutheranism from English writers of our so-called Evangelical School, ascribing the opinions which they find in those writers, in the gross to Luther,—or else from Romish polemics, from gossip pickt up no matter how or where, from everything except its one genuine source, the Symbolical Books. Thus, by these perversions and distortions, have the minds of our students been led astray and deluded into believing all manner of evil concerning the Reformation, and its authors, and the Churches that have sprung out of it; while a similar course of unjustifiable perversions and distortions and suppressions, exercised upon an opposite class of facts, has beguiled many into looking with admiration and love and reverence upon Rome, nay, into lusting after the corruptions from which the Reformers, through God's appointment, delivered us. It will hardly be rejoined that, in what Mr Newman says about the degradation of the Sacraments, he was not speaking of the actual fact, either with regard to Luther or to the Lutheran Church, but of the consequences



which necessarily flow from the logical carrying out of the doctrine of Justification by Faith. For still more incumbent on him would it have been to acknowledge that this necessity was contravened by the great body who were the main asserters of that doctrine. Surely too the Lutheran conception of Faith, which justifies only by apprehending and appropriating the benefits of Christ's atonement, is no way repugnant to the belief that these benefits are conveyed and received in the Sacraments. At least the sole difficulty, that with regard to the Baptism of Infants, did not repel Luther, who repeatedly explained it: nor is it greater, according to his view of Justification, than according to any other which recognises that the Sacraments are, not magical, but spiritual powers.

The specific charge of Antinomianism is not, I believe, brought against Luther in Mr Newman's Lectures. On the contrary he rightly states Luther's doctrine to be, "not that the Christian is not in fact fruitful in good works, but that they flow naturally from" his faith (p. 31): and he is too fair a controversialist to lay stress on particular exaggerations of language as matter for reproof. At least the only thing of the sort that I have observed is just before the close of the first Lecture, where in a note he quotes the following grand passage from the Argument prefixt to the Commentary on the Galatians. "*Dicimus autem supra quod lex in Christiano non debeat excedere limites suos, sed tantum habere dominium in carnem, quae et ei subjecta sit, et sub ea maneat; hoc ubi fit, consistit lex intra limites suos. Si vero vult occupare conscientiam, et hic dominari, vide ut tum sis bonus dialecticus, recte divides, et legi non plus tribuas quam ei tribuendum est; sed dicas, Lex, tu vis ascendere in regnum conscientiae, et ibi*

dominari, et eam arguere peccati, et gaudium cordis tollere, quod habeo ex fide in Christum, et me in desperationem adigere, ut desperem et peream. Hoc praeter officium tuum facis: consiste intra limites tuos, et exerce dominium in carnem. Conscientiam autem ne attingas mihi: sum enim baptizatus, et per Evangelium vocatus ad communionem justitiae et vitae aeternae, ad regnum Christi, in quo acquiescit conscientia mea, ubi nulla est lex, etc.—Hanc (justitiam Christi) cum intus habeo, *descendo de coelo*, tanquam pluvia foecundans terram: hoc est, prodeo foras *in aliud regnum, et facio bona opera quaecunque mihi occurrunt, etc.*—Quicumque certo novit Christum esse Justitiam suam, is non solum ex animo et cum gaudio bene operatur in vocatione sua, sed subjicit se quoque per caritatem magistratibus, etc.—quia scit Deum hoc velle, et placere hanc obedientiam.” To this quotation Mr Newman subjoins, “Perhaps it is a happy thing that all of Luther’s followers are not ‘boni dialectici’ enough to carry out his principles this length.” This remark is not meant to have much of a sting; nor in fact has it any. If they were *boni dialectici*, they would be able to distinguish between the true consequences of the doctrine, and the abuse of it. If they were not, they might fall into a mischievous confusion. Of course the mere intellectual perception of a negative proposition will be of little use to common minds; and it may become hurtful, when it relates to practical matters and stops short of the higher affirmative proposition, to which that negation ought to be a step. This however is no reason why the two should not be stated together, especially in writings the very language of which precludes them from vulgar use. Else the same objections might be brought against the *Lutherus ante Lutherum*, who wrote, that *the Law is not made for a*

*righteous man, but for the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly and for sinners, for the unholy and profane, for murderers of fathers and murderers of mothers, for manslayers, for whoremongers, for menstealers, for liars, for perjured persons, and if there be any other thing that is contrary to sound doctrine.*

On the whole however, as has been acknowledged above, Mr Newman preserves that decorous tone, which so honorably distinguishes his polemical writings. If in any instance he has deviated from that tone, it is in a quotation; which, when it strikes us as apposite and smart, often inveigles us to say more than we should deem it warrantable to say in our own person. At the head of the first Lecture he has placed the following words from the Book of Job: *Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge?* and he says in p. 5, "What I think of the (Lutheran) system may be gathered from the text I have selected." Here I will not stop to argue whether these words can in any sense be applied with the slightest justice to Luther, of whose "system," it is clear, Mr Newman, when he wrote these Lectures, had a very incorrect notion: but probably it will have seemed to many, when they terminated their wanderings through the mazes of his Lectures on Justification, that the text prefixt to the first Lecture had been selected under a judicial blindness as the aptest motto for the whole work. Moreover, when we look back on the Author's subsequent career, when we reflect how he has gone on year after year sharpening the edge of his already overkeen understanding, casting one truth after another into his logical crucible, and persuading himself that he had dissolved it to atoms, and then exhibiting a like ingenuity in compounding the semblance of truths out of fictions,—when we call to mind how in this way he

appeared to be gradually losing the faculty of distinguishing between truth and falsehood, and the very belief in the existence of any power for discerning truth, nay, as it seemed at times, in the existence of any positive truth to be discerned, and how, taking refuge from the encroachments of a universal scepticism, he has at length bowed his neck under a yoke, which a man, gifted with such fine qualities of mind and character, could hardly assume, until he had put out the eyes of his heart and of his conscience, as well as of his understanding,—it is not in scorn and triumph, but in deep sadness and awe, that we repeat, *Who is this that darkeneth counsel by words without knowledge* (AC)?

REPLY TO MR WARD'S ATTACKS  
ON LUTHER.

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ALAS, Mr Newman's own mind is not the only one that he has thus darkened. How many there may be, we know not yet. That there are many is lamentably clear, and not a few who might otherwise have been profitably employed in the service of our Church. Among these it has for some years been the fashion to depreciate the Reformation in all manner of ways: this was the first symptom of their apostasy from the Church of their fathers. By degrees the depreciation swelled out into vehement abuse; and of this a portion fell upon the German Reformation, especially upon something which was called Lutheranism, and, as connected therewith, upon Luther. It proceeded mainly from a series of articles in *the British Critic*, since acknowledged by a writer who has attained an unenviable notoriety. Those articles exhibited a good deal of cleverness in the spinning of a system out of materials, not very abundant in regard to thought, and still less in regard to knowledge; and they were further characterized by the exaggerations of a mind, which, on gaining sight of a few truths, fancies it has got hold of all truth, and that whatever is not comprised in its narrow circle is worthless and false. Indeed the tone of the language now and then comes up to frantic railing, rising in proportion to the ignorance it betrays, like the mercury in a vacuum. Thus it fell out that the fervid vials of the writer's wrath were

discharged on what he was pleased to call the Lutheran doctrine of Justification. Of this he says, in one place, that "no heresy has ever prevailed so subtile and extensively poisonous.—It corrupts *all* sound Christian doctrine, nay the very principle of orthodoxy itself.—*As far as its formal statements are concerned*, it poisons at the very root, not Christianity only, but natural religion.—A religious Heathen, were he *really* to accept the doctrine which Lutheran *language* expresses, so far from making any advance, would sustain a heavy loss, in exchanging fundamental truth for fundamental error" (Vol. xxxii. pp. 390, 391). In another place (xxxii. 446), the Lutheran scheme of doctrine is termed "radically and fundamentally monstrous, immoral, heretical, and antichristian," and in another (xxxiv. 33), "the soul-destroying heresy of Luther on the subject of Justification:" in another (xxxiv. 18) it is asserted "to bring omnigenous corruption in its train." In another place (xxxiv. 407), the writer says, "When we speak of Lutheranism, we speak of an abstract doctrine, which cannot, we verily believe, be held consistently even by the devils.—And of this abstract doctrine we now say, that the considerations in the text shew it to be worse, that is, to be more fundamentally at variance with our higher and better nature, than Atheism itself." Yet with all this reckless virulence, or rather just as one might expect from it, the writer does not shew the slightest acquaintance with Luther's writings, or with those of any of the Lutheran divines, or even with the symbolical expositions of the Lutheran doctrine in the Confession of Augsburg and in Melancthon's Apology. On the contrary it is evident that he has no such acquaintance, that he has poured forth this flood of railing in utter ignorance of the subject, or at least that he has drawn his impressions of

Lutheranism from Mr Newman's *Lectures*, from the translation of Moehler's *Symbolik*, and from certain English writers of the so-called Evangelical school, whom he has chosen to identify with Luther.

This is a sample of the conscientiousness and of the reverence deemed becoming by a writer, who, with the rest of his school, is continually complaining of the want of conscientiousness and of the want of reverence as characteristics of our modern religion. He shews his conscientiousness by pronouncing a peremptory sentence of condemnation, without taking the trouble to enquire whether there are any just grounds for it, merely picking up extracts quoted by enemies, and therefore to be examined with caution; although these extracts themselves, if read with care, would amply refute the worst parts of his invective: and even from these he must merely have severed certain insulated propositions, setting himself thereupon to elicit poison out of them, such as may often be found in particular propositions, when detached from the body of truth they belong to, as has been seen repeatedly in the immoral paradoxes extorted from the words of the Bible. This too is the measure of his reverence, railing unscrupulously and without restraint at a doctrine, which he designates with a name implying it to have been held by one of the greatest teachers and by one of the richest branches of Christ's Church, and in which many of the wisest and holiest of men have found the spring and stay of their spiritual lives.

In the passage last cited indeed, the writer, having been reprehended by the Bishop of Ossory for "calumnious misrepresentations" of Lutheranism, and for "rabid violence of language,"—a censure which the reader of the foregoing extracts may think pretty well merited,—says, "When we speak of Lutheranism, we speak of an

abstract doctrine, which cannot, we verily believe, be held consistently even by the devils ;” and he leaves the question of fact, whether he has any right to call this “abstract doctrine” Lutheranism, for future discussion. This is a novel kind of apology. Suppose a man were to keep on month after month publishing gross libellous attacks on the Duke of Wellington, calling him a robber and a murderer, with a garniture of suitable phrases, and then, on being prosecuted, were to plead that he had been inveying against the abstract notion of a conqueror, which, he verily believed, was too hateful and horrid for any human being ever to come up to it, what would such a plea avail him ? unless indeed it were regarded as evidence of his not being in sound mind. If our Reviewer can ever bring himself to investigate the historical question honestly, he will find that he had no right whatever to attach the name of Lutheranism to his fiendish doctrine. The strange thing is, that any man, with the slightest consciousness of the responsibility incurred by the public expression of opinions on such topics, any man who had the least self-respect, or feeling of his duty to his neighbour, should have gone on pouring out these vollies of abuse in number after number of the *British Critic*, without its ever occurring to him that he ought to ascertain whether there was any ground for what he said. This seems so incredible, that the charitable reader will naturally deem he must have done so : yet that he did not, is quite clear on the face of the Articles themselves, first from the absence of all indications of an acquaintance with any of the Lutheran divines, and secondly from the outrageous misrepresentations, which, in the choice between two miserable alternatives, one would rather believe, for the writer's sake, to have been fabricated in ignorance than against knowledge.



These Articles have since been acknowledged by Mr Ward in the Preface to his *Ideal of a Christian Church*; in a note to which book (in p. 168) the author, with the view of vindicating himself from the imputation of having written against Luther, with no further knowledge than he had pickt up from extracts in the works of his adversaries, asserts, “I *have* read great part of Luther’s Commentary on the Galatians:—I *do* know more of Luther than extracts, having read continuously great part of his principal work.” Here one cannot help remarking that this assertion still leaves it doubtful how much he had even “read” of Luther, in the lowest sense of the word *reading*, previously to his attacks on Lutheranism: and at all events it is plain from what follows that, even if he had read through the whole Commentary, his state of mind totally disqualified him for forming a judgement, or so much as seeing and understanding what he read. “First, I took up the Commentary (he says) with an expectation of finding much to agree with.—Alas! I found no such points of sympathy and agreement as I hoped. Never was my conscience so shockt and revolted by any work, not openly professing immorality. On looking at it again more recently, I think I hardly did it justice in my first perusal: probably the naked expression of his doctrine on Justification (which, in its undisguised deformity, had never been previously presented to my imagination) so seized on my mind, that I did not sufficiently observe the various happy and creditable inconsistencies which were to be found in it. I now perceive in one place (and very likely the same may be found in other passages) that he distinctly admits that Christians, after justification, continually advance in conquest over sin.” A man is reported to have walkt from Whitechapel to Hyde Park Corner, and to have said at

the end of his journey, *I think I saw a house somewhere on the way*. What he had done with his eyes is not recorded: he cannot well have put them in his pocket: a sleepwalker would have run against a wall or a pedestrian, and thus been startled out of his sleep: some have fancied it may have been a fugitive from Bedlam: some conjecture it was a Frenchman, who carried the map of Paris tied before his eyes, and had come across the Channel in the persuasion that there was not a town in England. Thus it was probably from looking through Mr Newman's spectacles, that Mr Ward could see nothing except what was revolting in Luther: only here, as is so often the case, where the master spoke on the whole intelligently and moderately, the disciple, merely following his master's whistle, without knowing the country, has dasht and floundered through all sorts of extravagances.

Else the very passage quoted above (in p. 97) from the Argument prefixt to Luther's Commentary, as extracted by Mr Newman, must have met him at the outset. Even as it stands in Mr Newman's Note, that passage should have made him hesitate; still more so, when read with the omissions supplied in Luther's text. "Hanc (justitiam) cum intus habeo, descendo de coelo, tanquam pluvia foecundans terram: hoc est, prodeo foras in aliud regnum, et facio bona opera quaecunque mihi occurrunt. Si sum minister verbi, praedico, consolator pusillanimes, administro sacramenta; si paterfamilias, regeo domum, familiam, educo liberos ad pietatem et honestatem; si magistratus, officium divinitus mihi mandatam facio; si servus, fideliter rem domini curo: summa quicumque certo novit Christum esse Justitiam suam, is non solum ex animo et cum gaudio bene operatur in vocatione sua, sed subjicit se quoque per caritatem

magistratibus, etiam impiis legibus eorum, et omnibus praesentis vitae, si res ita postulet, oneribus atque periculis, quia scit Deum hoc velle, et ei placere hanc obedientiam."

It is true, Luther does not represent his Christian as imposing arbitrary penances upon himself, or indulging in acts of willworship. Still one would have thought that any man in his senses, after reading this passage, along with what was cited in p. 97, would have stopt before he pronounced that the doctrine here set forth is "worse than Atheism," and too bad "to be held consistently even by the devils." Allowing that this passage may appear to be inconsistent with other portions of the Lutheran doctrine, surely a candid man, an honest man, a lover of truth, a man of reverent spirit, a man who had any regard for the common decencies of life,—nay, any man who was not besotted by party rancour and presumption,—would have paused before he uttered such a sentence, and would have askt himself, *Is it indeed quite certain that I have rightly apprehended the doctrine which is thus explained by its chief expounder? Is there not a possibility that he, who had lived near twenty years with his whole heart and mind under and in and by this truth, may have understood it as well as I, who only know it from a few hasty glances at fragments disht up in the pages of its opponents? At any rate I must hold my peace, till I have satisfactorily made out the hiatus in the chain of his logic. His major, I am quite positive, is diabolical, nay, too bad even for the devils: how, by what strange process, has this angelical conclusion been deduced from it? One thing too is plain: whenever I set about exposing the monstrous evils of this hyperdiabolical doctrine, I must take the utmost care to note that Luther, through a happy blunder, is not personally implicated in the guilt of having*

*inculcated them. Nay, before I give vent to my indignation, ought I not to enquire whether the other principal teachers of the doctrine are chargeable with that guilt, or no?*

Mr Ward pleads indeed, that he had said very little about Luther personally, and that "the extracts with which one meets, whether in Moehler or elsewhere, are quite sufficient to justify all that he had ever published in his individual disparagement." What this apology is worth, will be seen anon. But at all events Mr Ward had spoken out strongly enough against Lutheranism and the Lutheran doctrine. Now what is Lutheranism and the Lutheran doctrine, according to the ordinary acceptation of words? Surely it is the doctrine of Luther, or that of the Lutheran Church. So at least it would be understood by every scholar, by every person fit to bear the name of a theologian, or to write on theological subjects. Such a person, if he deemed himself called upon to attack Lutheranism, would also deem himself bound to study Lutheranism carefully in the writings of its great promulgator, in the recognised expositions of the Lutheran Church, and in the works of the principal Lutheran divines. He would not be content to draw his conception of Lutheranism from recent English writers; although this seems to be a practice that commends itself to the new Oxford School of Theology. He might indeed attack these by themselves: but then, if it be unreasonable to expect a man to confess that there is anything in the whole sphere of knowledge, of which he is ignorant, he would shew at least that his censure was restricted to them: and he would feel that, if his views of the doctrine were drawn exclusively from them, and he were then to boast, as Mr Ward does in his *Ideal* (p. 305), that he had "ventured to characterize

that hateful and fearful type of Antichrist in terms not wholly inadequate to its prodigious demerits," it would be much as if Thersites had boasted of having run his spear through Hector, because he had spit at one of his Lycian auxiliaries. This is a point which needs to be urged on the consciences of our writers in these days. However a prater about conscience may deem himself at liberty to shower down foul words at haphazard, a truly conscientious writer will hold himself bound to take pains in ascertaining the grounds of the censures he expresses. But the literary conscience of our age is sadly torpid: every sciolist fancies himself entitled to pronounce judgment on all men and on all things, while few care to go through any previous enquiry: the patience of laborious research is become rare: the love of truth is grievously flagging and waning, as it needs must in a country where Romanizing principles are gaining ground. Another motive too for dwelling longer than one fain would on such a point is, that our students of divinity may know the trustworthiness of the guides, who are provoking them to quit their own Church, to despise and hate what she has hitherto prized and loved, and to admire and fondle what she has ever reprobated and rejected.

But let us see what is this "abstract doctrine," which Mr Ward dubs with the name of Lutheranism, and of which he declares his belief that it is too bad "to be held consistently even by the devils,"—this doctrine by the invention of which Luther has created in the lowest hell a lower still. In the note in the *British Critic* (Vol. xxxiv. p. 406), the Reviewer defines what he means by Lutheranism, in order to justify himself from the charge of having misrepresented it. "We consider it a first principle, that the *unum necessarium*, the only possible preparation for the enjoyment of any real blessings, is

'obedience to the rule of right at whatever sacrifice of self;' and that any profest revelation, which should not fully recognise this cardinal principle as its very foundation, could not possibly be received by any serious mind. Now, whether or not a denial of this principle be rightly called, as we call it, Lutheranism, is a question of history." Such is the definition he gives of the "abstract doctrine," which he calls Lutheranism: it is the denial of the proposition just stated. A vaguer, more confused, more inadequate definition was never laid down. Whatever Lutheranism may be, seeing that it has exercised a vast power over mankind, its principle or form, the kernel of its true definition, must be something positive, not something negative, an assertion, not a denial. The assertion will indeed involve a denial, or, it may be, many denials; and these will be the limits of the definition: but a *No* has little power, unless it be the rebound of a *Yes*, the thunderclap following the lightning-flash. Erasmuses *No*, Voltaire's *No* merely awakened echoing *Noes* in the hollow caverns of men's hearts, and, the latter at least, gnawed at men's hearts, dried up the fountains of tears, and turned their smiles into sneers. Luther's shook the world, but shook it in order to steady it. It burst the chains of death, to set free the spirit of life.

That the denial of the above-stated proposition is not explicitly the principle, or any principle of Lutheranism, is most certain. If it is so implicitly, this needs proof. Here it behoves us to remember that there are two ways in which a proposition may be denied, by being rejected as false, or by being absorbed into a higher truth; as the animal nature is denied by being subordinated to the spiritual, according to that grand process, whereby, through losing our life, we save it. A particular proposition may be the best and highest mode of expressing

a moral truth for one stage of man's moral and intellectual life, and may be brought forward less distinctly at another stage, not because it is denied and rejected, but because it is involved and vanishes in a higher declaration of the same truth. The commands which are given to a child of three years old, are not given in the same words to a boy or girl of ten, but are comprehended under some wider forms, which again will be enlarged at fifteen, and again still more at twenty. So the Mosaic Law, which, with its minute precepts concerning outward observances, belonged to the heir during the period of his bondage, vanisht, when the fulness of time came, in the higher spiritual Law of the Gospel, not as being rejected by it, but as being comprised in a larger enunciation of God's eternal Will. For this, as well as other reasons, it would be wiser and safer to take the declaration of the *unum necessarium* which we find in St Luke, x. 25—28, than Mr Ward's. The latter is rather the statement of a Heathen moralist, and might have come from the pen of a Stoic, but would hardly be recognised in this absolute form by any denomination of Christians, except such as were far gone in the heresy of Pelagius. Not that I would in any respect disparage obedience. In a certain stage it is the highest perfection that we can attain to: and even when man has been raised to a higher stage of moral intuition, the indispensableness of obedience needs to be urged continually, lest we fall into a lax, delusive interpretation of the Law of Love. But the Law of Love is a higher form of the Law of Obedience, comprising it, and supplying the principle and motive which may lead man to fulfill it, not grudgingly, according to the letter, but cheerfully and in good measure, running over with the fruits of the spirit. Thus our Lord Himself has expounded the Law of Love to be the Law of

Selfsacrifice, and that of a far higher kind than what the Law of Obedience can enjoin: and in the heavenly Epistle of the Apostle of Love (iv. 11-19), we learn what is the living principle and spring of that Law, and what has made it, and alone can ever make it, a living Law in the heart. Now if the Law of Obedience seems in any respect left out of sight in Luther's exposition of the Gospel,—though I think the foregoing argument against Mr Hallam sufficiently proves that it is not, but has its due place and dignity assigned to it,—such an appearance, so far as there is any, would arise from this, that, in speaking of the justified Christian, the Christian as living by Faith in Christ, Luther speaks of him as living under the constraint of the Love of Christ, and as fulfilling the Law of Love, rather than as fulfilling the Law of Obedience. This is plain from the very passage last quoted. Were it needful, I could fill hundreds of pages with extracts to the same effect: but I will merely refer the reader to the exposition of the Commandments in the Catechisms; where he will also find that the Law of Love with Luther comprises the Law of Obedience, and that no tittle of the latter is allowed to pass away (AD).

In the *Ideal of a Christian Church*, where the argument against what Mr Ward calls the Lutheran doctrine of Justification forms the subject of a very long chapter, he has given another fuller definition of what he means by it, but with little improvement in regard to correctness, or approximation to the doctrine really held by Luther and the Lutheran Church. Indeed the very process which he has chosen to follow, in order to get at his definition, is one by which he was sure to go wrong. An ordinary mortal in such a case, who was anxious to speak the truth, and to keep from misrepresenting and slandering his brethren, would have had recourse to some of the



authoritative expositions of the Lutheran doctrine, for the sake of ascertaining what the Lutherans themselves meant by it. Having done this, he would have had a full right to point out any inconsistencies which he thought he perceived in that doctrine, or any conclusions flowing from it repugnant to morality. Such a course however was not suited to Mr Ward. It would have required some thoughtful, conscientious study, and might have cut him short in the midst of his railing. When you wish to belabour a man, and to shew off your strength and skill in demolishing him, put up a man of straw, an abstract man; and you may thump away without risk. This is what Mr Ward does. Instead of stating on historical grounds what the Lutheran doctrine of Justification is, he lays down, in p. 186, what, he says, it "inevitably must be." Its two chief peculiarities, according to this new mode of detecting and refuting heresies, are, first "that the pardon is complete and final, involving no terms or conditions whatever;" secondly, "that the trust in Christ—carries with it its own evidence, and leads necessarily, without any special pains or effort on our part, to a holy life." Mr Ward acknowledges that this is merely his own statement of the Lutheran doctrine, which, he says in p. 187, he had "been compelled himself to put into this shape, because he had not been able to find any consistent account of it whatever in the writings of its defenders;" that is, he had not found any account consistent with his own preconceived notions. He acknowledges too that, in all the writers whom he has supposed to hold this doctrine, there are a number of inconsistencies with his view of it. This however does not disturb his persuasion: for the belief in one's own infallibility, and the contempt and abhorrence of all investigation, seem to be two of the qualities

which fit people out for a voyage to Rome. In the words of an old dramatist, "One eye is Put out with zeal, t'other with ignorance ; And yet they think they're eagles."

The process by which Mr Ward gets to his statement, is a curious sample of the logic current in the new school of sophists. "In order to determine the real essence of Lutheran doctrine," he says in p. 167, "it will be impossible perhaps to act more safely, than by taking along with us the remembrance, what it is which Lutheranism professes to accomplish. Now its great achievement, according to the unanimous voice of all its advocates, is, that it provides a full security for personal holiness, at the same time that it rescues the believer from all fear of God's wrath to come." One cannot well find a more glaring instance of that strange perversion of the laws of reasoning which prevails among our Romanizing divines, than this deduction of a statement of a doctrine, held during three centuries by a large portion of the Church, not from historical evidence, nor from the grounds on which it was originally established, but from certain incidental consequences. For though it is truly asserted that Luther's doctrine of Justification does minister comfort to troubled consciences, and does tend to promote holiness, it is only when we already know what it is, that we can understand how it does this. By no process of mere ratiocination can we make out from an applepie that the fruit must have grown on an apple-tree, or from warmth and light that they must have proceeded from the sun. Nor, to take an analogous instance, could any one, meditating on the salvation of mankind, have made out through reasoning by what wonderful manifestation of Divine Love it was to be effected. Yet here the effect was the direct purpose of the cause: whereas the

Lutheran doctrine was not devised for any purpose, but was drawn from the word of God as it revealed itself to Luther: and only after he had discerned what seemed to him to be the truth, did he also perceive the blessed results which flow from it, as like results ever must from every manifestation of Divine Truth (Æ).

Mr Ward however thinks his course quite unobjectionable. "It is impossible (he says) to adopt a course more free from the possibility of cavil, than to make this, the pretension (of Lutheranism), the test for discovering its real nature and meaning; an attempt of no ordinary difficulty, when we consider the cloudy language and inconsecutive thought so prevalent among its supporters." When such reasoning is in vogue, it is no wonder people grow to lose the notion that there is such a thing as truth. Facts are thrust aside as of no value: anything may be transubstantiated out of anything: and a papal Bull will serve in lieu of all other authority to declare the order and laws of the moral and spiritual universe, nay, has this advantage, that it saves us from the trouble and the perils of enquiry. As to the excuse alledged for adopting this anomalous method, by which it was morally impossible ever to get at the truth,—namely, "the cloudy language and inconsecutive thought prevalent" among Lutheran divines, and the inability "to find any consistent account of the Lutheran doctrine whatever in the writings of its defenders,"—it may not be irrelevant to observe, that Baur, when reprinting his masterly and triumphant refutation of Moehler's attack on the Lutheran doctrine of Justification, remarks (in p. 319), "It may be regarded as a cheering proof of the firmness and stability with which this fundamental doctrine of the Lutheran Creed still maintains its central place in the minds of Protestants, that, among the Protestant

theologians who have taken part in this controversy, there is no perceptible difference of any importance on this point." So saying he cites the replies to Moehler by Nitzsch and by Hengstenberg: and assuredly it is a remarkable witness, both to the power of the doctrine, and to the precision with which it has been laid down, that three such men, belonging to three very different theological and philosophical schools, and two of them masters in theological learning and thought, should have coincided so entirely in their statements of such an elementary doctrine, branching, as it does, through every part of Christian life. There cannot well be a surer sign that the doctrine has a consistency in itself, and that the expositions of it have been clear, able, and authoritative. In opposition to the weight which lies in the testimony and example of such men, Mr Ward's will not weigh a chip of straw: for, without comparing their relative competency in other respects, the three Germans are thoroughly acquainted with the matter they are treating of, while he has hardly seen so much as the tip of its shadow.

Such being the mode adopted by Mr Ward to guess out what the Lutheran doctrine may be, it is not surprising that the result of his conjectural operations should be sky-wide of the truth. It would be far beyond my purpose however to attempt any exposition of the numerous fallacies in his Chapter on Justification: all that is requisite is to shew that, whatever he may be contending against, and bowever furious his blows may be, they do not touch the Lutheran doctrine. Nor will this be difficult. For according to Mr Ward, as we have seen,—and the statement is repeated in p. 187,—the distinctive peculiarities of the Lutheran doctrine of Justification "must inevitably be" comprised in these two propositions;

first, "that the pardon is complete and final, involving no terms or conditions whatever;" and secondly, "that the trust in Christ, on which it immediately follows, is a feeling which carries with it its own evidence, and which leads necessarily, without any special pains or effort on our part, to a holy life." Now with regard to both these propositions it may be averred, that they are no part of the Lutheran doctrine, which on the contrary distinctly eschews and repudiates them.

In support of his first proposition Mr Ward adds, "If the pardon once given be not complete and final, then our anxiety is not removed on our future lot:—if it involve any terms or conditions whatever, then the same anxiety remains." Thus he grounds both the parts of his first proposition on that incidental consequence. This is in the true Romish spirit, which could not achieve its object of overriding the world with a huge lie, unless it took speculative arguments for the basis of its historical facts, while it makes tradition serve as the only source of speculative truth. Still however I trust, the Protestant love of truth is not so far extinct in England, as that we should have thrown aside that prime maxim of modern philosophy, that no secure positive knowledge of facts can be drawn from any except documentary evidence: and on the strength of that evidence I reply, that the doctrine here called Lutheran, with regard to the completeness and finality of the pardon once given, is not the Lutheran doctrine, inasmuch as it is expressly condemned in the Confession of Augsburg, where, in the twelfth Article, we read, *Damnant Anabaptistas qui negant justificatos posse amittere Spiritum Sanctum.*

As to the assertion that the pardon "involves no terms or conditions whatever," the Lutheran doctrine does not go beyond the repeated declarations in Scripture

concerning the freeness of grace: but while it constantly maintains the passiveness of Faith in receiving pardon, it is no less strenuous in contending that, if this Faith be real, it must be a living power, full of active energy, and manifesting itself in good works, through the operation of the indwelling Spirit. This is proved by the passage quoted above in p. 45; and a thousand others to the same effect might be cited without much trouble from Luther's works: but, as the statement of a doctrine in a Symbolical Book like *the Apology for the Confession of Augsburg* will naturally be rounder and more precise than in polemical or homiletical writings, I will rather adduce the following words from the Section *De dilectione et impletione legis*. "Profitemur igitur quod necesse sit inchoari in nobis, et subinde magis magisque fieri legem. Et complectimur simul utrumque, videlicet spirituales motus, et externa bona opera. Falso igitur calumniantur nos adversarii, quod nostri non doceant bona opera, cum ea non solum requirant, sed etiam ostendant quomodo fieri possint.—Longe enim imbecillior est humana natura, quam ut suis viribus resistere Diabolo possit, qui habet captivos omnes, qui non sunt liberati per fidem. Potentia Christi opus est adversus Diabolum, videlicet ut, quia scimus nos propter Christum exaudiri et habere promissionem, petamus ut gubernet et propugnet nos Spiritus Sanctus, ne decepti erremus, ne impulsus contra voluntatem Dei aliquid suscipiamus.—Christus enim vicit Diabolum, et dedit nobis promissionem et Spiritum Sanctum, ut auxilio divino vincamus et ipsi. Et 1 Johannis, iii. 8, *Ad hoc apparuit Filius Dei, ut solvat opera Diaboli*.—Item fides illa, de qua loquimur, existit in poenitentia, hoc est, concipitur in terroribus conscientiae, quae sentit iram Dei adversus nostra peccata, et quaerit remissionem peccatorum, et liberari a peccato. Et in talibus

terroribus et aliis afflictionibus debet hæc fides crescere et confirmari. Quare non potest existere in his, qui secundum carnem vivunt, qui delectantur cupiditatibus suis, et obtemperant eis. — Quare fides illa, quæ accipit remissionem peccatorum in corde perterrefacto et fugiente peccatum, non manet in his qui obtemperant cupiditatibus, nec existit cum mortali peccato.”

This passage from *the Apology* is also a sufficient refutation of what Mr Ward lays down as the second characteristic of Lutheranism, that “the trust in Christ, on which pardon follows, is a feeling which carries with it its own evidence, and which leads necessarily, without any special pains or effort on our part, to a holy life.” For it asserts that, unless Faith manifest itself in good works, in the conquest of sin, in an increasing performance of the law, and a growth in spiritual graces, it is not real Faith,—that Faith does not abide in those who follow their lusts,—that it cannot coexist with mortal sin,—further, that it must be nourisht by continual prayer for the aid of the Spirit in fighting against the devil,—and finally, that it is amid the terrours of conscience and other afflictions, that it has to grow and be strengthened. In fact this one passage from *the Apology* is enough to convict I know not how many of Mr Ward’s charges against Lutheranism of flagrant misrepresentation, and, if he retains any feeling of shame, should make him sink to the earth in confusion, until he has openly retracted his calumnies.

These quotations from the Lutheran Symbolical Books are sufficient, I say, to rebut Mr Ward’s charges, as leveled against Lutheranism, and to convict him of that recklessness about the ninth Commandment, which is so awfully prevalent in the fallen Church of Rome, as almost to be a recognised principle of conduct,

sanctioned by the unreprieved practice of half a dozen centuries, with regard to all those whom that Church has chosen to condemn. But since Mr Ward, after his recent researches in Luther's writings, mainly in the Commentary on the Galatians, for materials to bolster up his slanders, has thought fit specifically to assert (p. 171), "The essence of Luther's Gospel is this, that a person so affected," with the terrors of conscience, "has only one great struggle to go through, in order that he may obtain the indefectible promise of eternal salvation," it will be well to cite a few of the passages in this very Commentary, where the contrary is expressly maintained. To begin with the short Preface, we there read, "Valde prodest ut haec fidei doctrina in publico et assiduo usu —conservetur. Et quantumvis cognoscatur et perdiscatur, tamen diabolus adversarius noster semper obambulans et quaerens nos devorare non est mortuus; item, *caro nostra adhuc vivit; denique omnes undique tentationes nos urgent et premunt.* Quare haec doctrina nunquam satis tractari et inculcari potest." Here the words about the flesh and temptations plainly refer, not merely to the conflict which a man has to go through before he receives the gift of justifying Faith, but to the struggles between the flesh and the spirit which continue through the whole of life. Thus in the Argument we find, "*Ita utrumque manet dum hic vivimus. Caro accusatur, exercetur tentationibus, contristatur et conteritur justitia activa legis. Sed spiritus regnat etc.*" Again near the beginning of the note on i. 3: "Nam satis vel nimium non potest inculcari et urgeri (articulus justificationis). Imo etiamsi probe discamus et teneamus eum, *tamen nullus est, qui eum perfecte apprehendat, aut pleno affectu et corde credat. Adeo lubrica est caro nostra, et repugnat obedientiae spiritus.*" A little before the end of the same



note: “*Ideo oportet nos dare operam, ut fides nostra certa sit, diligenti et assidua tractatione verbi et invocatione crescat et confirmetur, ut Satanae resistere possimus.*” At the end of the note on *quod tam cito*, i. 6: “*Vigilemus igitur sedulo, primum unusquisque pro se, deinde doctores non solum pro se, sed pro tota ecclesia, ne intremus in tentationem.*” Yet Mr Ward, speaking of *watchfulness* as a peculiar Catholic grace, asserts (p. 205), printing his assertion in Italics, to bring out its venom more forcibly, “*This grace can have no place whatever under the Gospel, according to any consistent form of Lutheranism;*” that is, according to that imaginary form which he has spun for it out of his own brain. Again, in the note on vv. 11, 12, there is a striking passage, where Luther speaks of his own experience: “*Deinde causa quoque justificationis lubrica est, non quidem per se,—sed quoad nos; id quod ego ipse saepe experior. Novi enim, in quibus horis tenebrarum nonnunquam lucter. Novi, quoties ego radios evangelii et gratiae veluti in quibusdam densis nubibus subito amittam. Novi denique, quam versentur ibi in lubrico etiam exercitati, et qui pedem firmissime figunt.*—*Ideo, quantum ad nos attinet, res valde lubrica est, quia nos lubrici sumus.*—*Resistit insuper spiritui caro, quae non potest certo statuere promissa Dei vera esse. Ideo pugnat et militat contra spiritum, et, ut Paulus ait, captivat spiritum, ut tam firmiter credere non possit, ac velit. Quare perpetuo inculcamus cognitionem Christi et fidem non esse rem aut opus humanum, sed simpliciter donum Dei, qui, ut creat, ita conservat fidem in nobis, sicut autem per verbum fidem primum donat, ita deinceps per verbum exercet, auget, confirmat et perficit eam. Itaque summus Dei cultus et sabbatum sabbatorum est, exercere sese ad pietatem, tractare et audire verbum.*—*Qui ergo sic friget, quod putat se*

apprehendisse, et incipit paulatim fastidire verbum, *ille jam Christum et evangelium amisit*, et hoc quod putat se nosse, tantum speculative apprehendit;—talesque fiunt tandem fanatici ac nugaces spiritus. *Quare unusquisque pius toto conatu summisque viribus contendat et decertet serio discere et conservare hanc doctrinam, et ad hoc utatur humili oratione coram Deo, et assiduo studio ac meditatione verbi. Et quanquam vehementissime decertaverimus, adhuc satis tamen sudabimus. Habemus enim non contemnendos, sed maximos, fortissimos, et valde assiduos hostes contra nos, carnem nostram, omnia pericula mundi, item legem, peccatum, mortem, iram ac iudicium Dei, et diabolum ipsum, qui nunquam quiescit, intus per ignita tela, foris per pseudoapostolos nos tentare, ut, si non omnes, tamen plures ex nobis subvertat.*” So much for Mr Ward’s assertion, that “the essence of Luther’s Gospel is this, that a person—*has only one great struggle to go through*, in order that he may obtain the *indefectible* promise of eternal salvation.” “This doctrine (he has the audacity to add) does not come in accidentally here and there; it is the one burthen of the greater part of the Commentary.” Yet he has not produced a single passage conveying it; nor can he. “*Ut tenerrimus est (iste articulus), ita facillime laeditur* (says Luther, on ii. 4, 5): *hoc bene expertus est Paulus; hoc quoque experiuntur omnes pii.*” Again, when speaking of St Paul’s withstanding St Peter at Antioch (on ii. 11), he says, “*Hujusmodi exempla scribuntur nobis in consolationem. Est enim plenum consolatione, cum audimus sanctos Spiritum Dei habentes etiam peccare. Hanc consolationem nobis eripere volunt, qui negant sanctos posse peccare. Samson, David, et alii multi celebres viri Spiritu Sancto pleni lapsi sunt in grandia peccata. —Tales errores et peccata sanctorum proponit Scriptura*

in consolationem afflictorum et desperabundorum.—Nemo unquam tam graviter lapsus est, qui non possit resurgere. Econtra nemo tam firmiter fixit pedem, qui non possit labi. Si Petrus lapsus est, et ego labi possum. Si resurrexit, possum et ego resurgere.” Once more, in the note on ii. 13; “Profecto mira res est, quod tanti viri, Petrus, Barnabas, et alii, tam cito et facile labuntur in illo ipso opere, quod noverant recte factum, ac antea docuerant.—*Nam in illo ipso, quod optime scimus, possumus tamen labi et errare, non solum in grave nostrum, sed etiam aliorum damnum. Versemur igitur summa diligentia et humilitate in studio sacrarum literarum, ac serio oremus ne veritatem evangelii amittamus. Nihil igitur sumus cum omnibus quantumvis magnis donis, nisi Deus adsit.—Nisi ipse nos assiduo sustentet, nihil prodest summa cognitio, et ipsissima theologia. Nam sub horam tentationis subito fieri potest, ut astu diaboli eripiantur nobis e conspectu omnes loci consolatorii, ac solum comminatorii occurrant ac obruant nos. Discamus igitur, Deo subtrahente manum facillime posse nos labi ac everti. Itaque nemo superbiat et gloriatur de justitia, sapientia, et donis suis, sed humilietur ac oret cum apostolis, Domine adauge nobis fidem (AF).”*

In truth almost the only semblance of evidence, which can be produced in support of Mr Ward's description of the Lutheran doctrine of Justification, is the fact, which is sufficiently notorious, that far more attention is paid by the Romish than by the Protestant Churches to rules of discipline for the moral training of its members. It may be that the Reformers undervalued such things; though, if they did, we cannot well wonder at it, considering the many gross and demoralizing perversions of such discipline, which they had seen and past through. But when Mr Ward says that, according to the Lutheran doctrine,

“the trust in Christ, on which pardon follows,—leads necessarily, without special pains or effort on our part, to a holy life,”—not to mention the misunderstanding involved in the words, *on which pardon follows*, instead of *by which pardon is received*,—he entirely leaves out of account the two mighty arms wherewith man is to strive in his heavenward course, Faith and the prayer of Faith. As we read that *Whosoever is born of God cannot sin* (1 John iii. 9), and as our Saviour Himself has declared, *He that heareth My word, and believeth in Him that sent Me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation, but is past from death to life* (John v. 24), the great truth here exprest, of which the Church previously knew not well what to make, is recognised as fundamental by Lutheranism; though without the omission of the opposite side of the picture, the imperfection of our faith, and of our regeneration, and the sinfulness which consequently cleaves to us. But Mr Ward, as one might expect of a Romanizer, cannot get rid of the notion that the act of Faith, by which justification is received, is an *opus operatum*. In arguing against Lutheranism, he ever leaves out of sight, that Faith, according to the Lutheran view, is an abiding, energetic, active principle, manifesting itself necessarily by the conquest over sin, and by all manner of good works: nor has he attained, any more than the whole Romish Church, to an adequate conviction that the only really efficacious means which man can use for overcoming sin and advancing in holiness, is the prayer of Faith for the help of the Spirit.

The efficacy of disciplinary regulations Luther mistrusted, it may be too much so, from his experience of their impotence, from having found in his own case that they were as powerless to bind the strong man as

Samson's withes, and from having seen how in others they were often a mere form, the mockery of a form, a trick to lull and cheat the conscience. Besides he had a strong conviction that it is not fitting that *those who have known God, or rather are known by God*, should *turn again to the weak and beggarly elements of the world, and be subject to ordinances, Touch not, taste not, handle not*. It should be borne in mind too that the laxity of recent times was very unlike what he and other Reformers, whether in Germany or in England, desired to see established. But it may be questioned whether any one else ever felt such intense, unhesitating reliance on the power of prayer, as the best and only sure auxiliary in all our struggles, either against temporal or spiritual enemies. In Luther's Letters, which present such a picture of every movement of his heart and soul from the year 1517 to his death, as we scarcely have in the case of any other man, we see ever-recurring proofs of this, on the one hand in the confidence with which he encounters every outward danger, however appalling in itself, through his trust in his Heavenly Helper; and on the other hand in his continual, earnest entreaties to his friends for their prayers, in order that he may be enabled to overcome the assaults of sin and Satan. Among the twenty-three hundred letters in De Wette's Collection, far more than half, I believe, are wound up with a solicitation for the prayers of his correspondent.

Immediately after the passage just cited from p. 171, Mr Ward pursues his account of what he calls "Luther's Gospel." "When conscience has performed its office of frightening and alarming the sinner, its usefulness is over: from that time it is no longer man's *guide* to salvation, but the one only *impediment* in the way of his *attaining* salvation. Well was it for Luther that he

had enjoyed the unspeakable blessings of a Catholic education and monastic discipline, and so had learnt to feel in some slight measure the real sinfulness of sin, before he turned his mind to the invention of these blasphemies." It would take no little time to set forth the blunders and misrepresentations, the bewildering confusion of history and philosophy and theology, in these two short sentences.

The remarks about *Conscience* shew that Mr Ward wholly misunderstands Luther's use of the word, and the meaning which it bore in his age. In its primary and most legitimate signification, Conscience is the testimony which a man's inward sense bears to his feelings, and to his acts as proceeding from and expressive of his feelings, with reference to their moral value. It is *consciousness* determined in this specific direction, by recognising a moral obligation, and comparing our feelings and acts therewith. The particular form of law which it may acknowledge, does not belong to its essence: for it is wholly subjective; wherefore that form will vary with the culture which our moral sense may have received. What characterizes the Conscience as such, as that which is distinctive of man in all stages of culture, and constitutes him a moral being, is merely that it recognises a law, a principle, an obligation, which, as moral beings, we are bound to obey. Now the voice of law is almost always vetative; so therefore is that of Conscience; and, like law, it reproves and punishes transgressions. Hence, as our moral acts are notoriously mostly evil, and fall far short even of that very imperfect moral standard which exists in each individual mind, Conscience, even among Heathen writers, is generally found to be used *in malam partem*, signifying the consciousness of something wrong and vicious. Much

more did this become the case, when the knowledge of sin, of its depth and universality, and of the sanctity of the moral law, was brought out so distinctly by Christianity. Then even the answer of *a good conscience* could be nothing more than *a conscience void of offense*, when *our heart does not condemn us*. Seeing therefore that the exceeding sinfulness of sin, the sinfulness underlying, even when it does not rise up and shew itself in every human feeling and action, was manifested to Luther more vividly than perhaps to any man who lived between him and St Paul, *Conscientia* with him usually means the consciousness of our sins and of our sinfulness; a consciousness under the crushing misery of which, when a man has once been awakened to a spiritual conviction of this sinfulness, he cannot find rest in anything except the atoning sacrifice of the Saviour. This is the great work of the Conscience in the scheme of salvation. The Law being our schoolmaster to bring us to Christ, Conscience acts as the executive of the Law, applying it to each several case. In this sense, when we have *our hearts sprinkled from an evil Conscience*, and so far as they continue under that purificatory sprinkling, the work of the accusing Conscience is at an end; or, as Mr Ward says, "its usefulness is over."

In his next words,—“from that time it is no longer man’s *guide* to salvation”—it is difficult to make out any tenable meaning. Can he intend to say, what the words seem to imply, that Luther speaks of a man’s Conscience as being, at any moment in his spiritual course, his “*guide* to salvation?” Luther did not use his words thus vaguely. Later moralists have indeed enlarged the domain of the Conscience, so as to make it comprehend our special convictions of the moral law, according to our highest discernment of it, with reference

to our own personal conduct: for Conscience is always subjective, and acts reflexly, pronouncing only on our own actions, but never sallying forth to pass judgement on the actions of others. It is in the earlier sense, taking Conscience for the consciousness of evil and sin, that Hamlet says, *Thus Conscience does make cowards of us all*; which line is quoted by Coleridge in the *Friend* (vol. I. p. 226), in order that he may bring out the opposite truth: "*But it is Conscience too which makes heroes of us all.*" This remark however, though there is grandeur in the thought, seems to rest on a partial misconception of the powers of Conscience; the office of which, at least in Shakspeare's age, was like that of Law, to keep us from evil, but which has no positive spring to prompt heroic enterprises. This, the ordinary action of the Conscience, is set forth in a masterly manner in the dialogue between the Murderers of Clarence in *Richard the Third*, and with exquisite humour in Launcelot Gobbo's argument with himself about leaving the Jew's house (AG). There may too be cases, where a stout, unflinching obedience to the voice of the Conscience will be heroic; where Conscience, forbidding us to comply with the threats of power commanding us to violate it, does indeed *make heroes* of us: as when Luther closed his answer at Worms with saying, *Unless I, and the texts which I have quoted, are refuted by testimonies out of Holy Scripture, or by open and clear reasons and arguments, and unless my Conscience is thus bound by God's word, I cannot and will not recant anything; because it is neither safe nor advisable to do anything against one's Conscience. Here I stand; I can do nothing else; God help me! Amen!* This was Luther's practical exposition of the meaning of Conscience (AH): we have seen several examples of Mr Ward's. Yet Luther would have shrunk from calling the Conscience in any



respect "the guide to salvation;" although the law by which he set and regulated his Conscience was that of God. He had far too deep a conviction of sin, to fancy that we can have any "guide to salvation," except a heavenly.

What Mr Ward meant by the expression is not clear. If we take this passage along with that quoted in p. 109, and divers others in his writings, we might have ample grounds for charging him with the Pelagian heresy; and this would be in keeping with his hankering after Rome. But it is more probable that these passages, as well as a number of others, are merely the floundering and sprawling and splashing of a person who has got beyond his depth, and who thrusts out his arms and legs on all sides, and catches at every twig, that he may have something to take hold of. For Conscience is a word with which sundry tricks have been played by the new school of sophists at Oxford; until it has come to be held that Conscience is to pronounce on the moral fitness of particular outward acts; whereas that fitness can only be determined by the calm and patient exercise of the practical understanding, examining the materials supplied by experience and observation, and applying the laws of the reason to them, with a due regard to the demands of the affections, and, in certain cases, to the imaginative parts of our nature. By this unlimited extension of the office of Conscience, its majesty and sanctity are violated. It loses that infallibility, which belongs to it only when it is declaring that a person ought to do what according to his best convictions he verily believes to be his duty, a proposition which is very far from identical, inasmuch as hereby it pronounces that the convictions of the understanding ought to bind the will, thus casting a bridge over the great primary chasm in our nature, while on

the other hand it sighs and groans at every act which widens that chasm. But when we charge the Conscience with the office of determining upon outward acts, its infallibility passes away, and we become not only still more prone to error, but more presumptuous and headstrong in our errors. The decisions of the Conscience, being summary and immediate, supersede that careful thought and diligent investigation, which are requisite before we can pass a right judgement on a complicated practical question. Every prejudice, every caprice, every wayward impulse of fancy or passion may be stamped with the authority of Conscience (A 1).

This sophistry is still, as ever, a favorite part in the Romish system of falsehood. Hereby the Massacre of St Bartholomew, the persecutions of the Waldenses, the murder of Henry the Fourth, the Gunpowder Plot were baptized in its hellish baptism as Acts of Conscience. Thus too in our days one man after another is quitting the Church in which he was baptized, and the ministry to which he had solemnly devoted himself, for the sake of some idle fancy, some petty whim, some phantom of unity or authority, without having anything more than a visionary notion of what the Church of Rome is, or being able to alledge any solid reasons for abandoning that of England. He pleads that, in taking such a step, he is following the dictates of his Conscience. Thus he cheats his Conscience, and stifles its remonstrances, and gulls himself with the belief that he is acting a heroic part. Whereas such conduct is much as if a judge were to pass sentence of death on a man, who was arraigned before him on a charge of murder, without thinking of examining the evidence, on the ground that murder is a very horrible crime, from which his Conscience revolts, and that all the laws of God and man condemn it, and

that the man's countenance speaks ill of him, or that a friend for whom he has a high esteem thought him guilty, or that the culprit's coat is of an ugly colour, or that he dislikes the cut of his hair. This is painfully, awfully absurd; but scarcely more rational are the grounds on which many persons nowadays are falling into the sin of schism, on the plea of Conscience, whereby they bar out all the reasoning by which their follies might be dispelled.

Such are the natural results of that wild, jacobinical principle asserted by Mr Ward in p. 44,—which, he says, it is “one great object of his work to enforce and illustrate,—*the absolute supremacy of the Conscience in moral and religious questions.*” There is indeed a true principle of high moment intimated, though strangely distorted and exaggerated, in these words, the principle exprest by the Apostles, when they said, *We ought to obey God rather than men.* But this true principle Mr Ward wholly misunderstands: for it is the very principle on which the Reformers, whom he so virulently reviles, Luther above all, acted, as we have just seen in his speech at Worms, which is confirmed by an abundance of similar evidence during the whole of his public life. Only Luther's conduct is that of a reasonable being. He does not call an arbitrary notion, an imaginary persuasion, the voice of his Conscience: he does not pretend that his Conscience can pronounce whether such and such propositions are true or not. He says, *Prove to me by solid, cogent arguments, and by the plain testimony of God's word, that the propositions which I have maintained are erroneous; and then I will recant them. But so long as the best and calmest exercise of my own understanding, enlightened by God's word, and building upon its express declarations, assures me that my doctrine is true, my Conscience forbids*

*me to recant; and how can I disobey it?* Of the recent abuse of the word Conscience he knew nothing, nor of the wider signification attacht to it by moralists of the last century. Hence Mr Ward's rebuke of him for not regarding the Conscience as "man's guide to salvation," in addition to the other marks of wisdom we have discerned in it, involves a sheer anachronism, as gross as it would be to quarrel with him for not having gone to Worms by the railroad.

The worth of Mr Ward's next assertion, that, in "Luther's Gospel," after "the Conscience has performed its office of frightening and alarming the sinner," it is now "the one only *impediment* in the way of his *attaining* salvation," may be perceived in some measure by a reference to the passage quoted in p. 122. There is a state of mind indeed, through which spirits of a peculiar depth and earnestness have to pass, when they have been first brought to a lively conviction of their sins, and of the sanctity and terrours of God's Law,—the state represented in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans,—the state, of which there is such an awful picture in Bunyan's account of his own spiritual conflicts. When thus stirred and shaken, the Conscience, in its agony and bloody sweat, will often for a while reject all consolation, and is unable to discern the angel coming to strengthen it through the thickness of the surrounding night. Now to those who have past through this state, and have been brought by God's grace to a hopeful trust in the Saviour, this crisis of their spiritual life must necessarily ever be of overpowering interest; and therefore, as Luther had been brought through it, and as it was during this very crisis that he first discerned the hollowness of the prevalent formal religion, with its outward acts and penances, *which could not make him who*

*performed them perfect as pertaining to his Conscience*, he ever after spoke of everything connected with these struggles, and of the only way in which the Conscience can be *purged from dead works to serve the living God*, with an intensity of earnestness totally incomprehensible to those who have never known anything of this inward warfare. It is in this relation only that Luther speaks of the Conscience as “an *impediment* in the way of a man’s attaining salvation;” when, in the recoil from carelessness, or from self-righteousness, unable as yet to relinquish the notion of his own importance, a man magnifies his sins, or rather raises them up as a thick mist of darkness around him, which interposes a veil of wrath before the mercy-seat, so that the Sun of Righteousness is turned into a ball of fire, and instead of the crown of thorns and the drops of blood shed for others trickling down the calm, forgiving brow, he can see nothing but the head of a Fury attired with whips and snakes. At the same time it is utterly false, that Luther speaks of the Conscience as, at any time, “the one only *impediment* in the way of a man’s *attaining* salvation.” Nor, as we have seen from his speech at Worms, is it less false to say, that he regarded the Conscience as having no office to perform except that “of frightening and alarming the sinner;” or that he thought its usefulness would ever in this life cease.

Among the remarks I have been led to make about Luther, much has already occurred to shew the strange ineptitude of Mr Ward’s next observation: “Well was it for Luther that he had enjoyed the unspeakable blessings of a Catholic education and monastic discipline, and so had learnt to feel in some slight measure the real sinfulness and evil of sin, before he turned his mind to the invention of these blasphemies.” In this sentence I will

only speak of one point: the stones which, after the writer's fashion, are spouted forth so profusely from the Geyser in his breast, may be left to fall back on his own head. The gist however of this sentence, if it means anything, is, that, though Luther had some insight into the sinfulness of sin, it was but slight, at least in comparison with that possessed by the Church under the dominion of Rome, and cultivated by its discipline and institutions, and that for the insight which he had, such as it was, he was indebted to that discipline and those institutions. It cannot, I think, be pleaded that Mr Ward's words do not imply this; for if they do not mean this, what do they mean? Yet one should be loth to suspect any writer, except one who is so fond of playing at heels overhead with History, of broaching assertions so contrary, not only to well-known facts, but also to the view of those facts recognised by all who have the least acquaintance with the History of the Church. To cite a single testimony: my honoured friend, Mr Trench, in his admirable and well-timed Lectures *On the fitness of Scripture for unfolding the Spiritual Life of Men*, has just been saying (p. 60), "Who can fail to see in the great Apostle of Tarsus, —him who by the past training of his life, and the consequent fulness with which he brought out the scheme of our justification, should become the spiritual forefather of the Augustines and Luthers, of all them *who have brought out for us, with the sense of personal guilt, the sense also of personal deliverance, the consciousness of a personal standing of each one of us before God?*"

In truth, if there is one thing notorious about Luther, it is that his deep, irrepressible, unappeasable consciousness of sin was the primary motive of his whole public life, and of all that he did for the reformation of the

Church. It was on account of this deep feeling of the inward disease in the Conscience, that he tore off the plasters and lenitives with which the Romish quacks were wont to lull and skin over the wounds at the surface. It was on account of this that he set his foot upon the scandalous fraud of Indulgences. It was by reason of this that he saw through the utter vanity of the penances and so-called good works, by which men were idly trying to purge their consciences. He felt, as St Paul and Augustin felt, that the evil in man does not lie in the imperfection of his outward works, but in the corruption of his heart and will. Therefore did he insist so strongly on the frailty which clings to our very best works; and therefore did he continually urge that, if we are to be justified, it must be wholly through grace, by the righteousness of our Divine Saviour, to be received and appropriated by Faith, without any admixture of the works wrought by so frail and peccable a creature. On the other hand, among the characters whereby the Church of Rome is distinguished from those branches of the Church, from which she cut herself off at the Reformation, none is more plain and manifest than this, that she has a less deep and pervading conviction of sin, and of the sinfulness of human nature. Thus much must be admitted by every intelligent judge, to whichever side his own predilections may lean. Hence the apologists for the Romish doctrines are ever wont to urge that the Protestant representations of the corruption of human nature are monstrously exaggerated, so as to have a Manichean character; while the reciprocal charge of Pelagianism is constantly brought by Protestant polemics against Rome (A J). This, even without our prejudging the question as to which representation may be the most correct, is enough to prove on which side lies the deeper

consciousness of sin: and the conviction we are thus led to is confirmed by divers features in the Romish system. The whole doctrine of penances and of acts of mortification, so far as these are regarded, not as disciplinary, but as expiatory, implies a no less false and superficial conception of the sinfulness of man, than of the mercy of God. The whole notion of human merit and of meritorious works is incompatible with the knowledge of man's deep and pervading sinfulness: and how, unless that knowledge had been checked and almost stifled, could the Church ever have devised and propagated the fraud of Works of Supererogation, and that of Indulgences founded thereon? I do not mean to deny that, among the holy men in all ages of the Church, many were truly oppressed by a heavy consciousness of sin: but the system of the Church either deluded them into trying to lull this consciousness by outward works of satisfaction; or else, if it did not openly condemn and reject them as heretical, it drove them into themselves, and made them seek solace in Mysticism.

Here it may seem incredible,—and yet, if the reader turns to Mr Ward's book, he will find it the fact,—that in the very page in which Luther is stated to have learnt through his “Catholic education and monastic discipline, —to feel *in some slight measure* the real sinfulness and evil of sin,” and only a dozen lines before this strange statement, Mr Ward cites portions of the following passage. “Perpende diligenter singula verba Pauli, imprimis bene nota et urge hoc pronomen: *nostris*. (*Qui dedit semetipsum pro peccatis nostris*: Gal. i. 4.)—Facile dixeris et credideris Christum Dei Filium traditum esse pro peccatis Petri, Pauli, et aliorum sanctorum, quos dignos fuisse judicamus hac gratia. Sed difficillimum est, ut tu, qui indignum te judicas hac gratia, ex corde dicas



et credas Christum traditum pro tuis invictis, infinitis, et ingentibus peccatis. Ideo in genere et sine pronomine facile est magnificis amplificationibus praedicare et extollere beneficium Christi, scilicet, quod traditus sit quidem pro peccatis, sed aliorum, qui digni fuerunt. Quando autem pronomen, *nostris*, addendum est, ibi resilit infirma natura et ratio. Ibi non audet accedere ad Deum, nec polliceri sibi tantum thesaurum gratuito dandum. Ideo neque cum Deo vult agere, nisi prius sit pura et sine peccatis. Quare si etiam legit, audit hanc sententiam, *Qui dedit semetipsum pro peccatis nostris*, aut similes, tamen pronomen, *nostris*, non applicat pro se, sed pro aliis, qui digni et sancti sunt. Ipsa vero tantisper exspectare vult, donec digna reddatur suis operibus. Hoc tunc nihil aliud est, nisi quod humana ratio libenter vellet, quod peccati vis non esset major nec potentior, quam ipsa somniat. Hinc hypocritae ignari Christi, etiamsi sentiant remorsum peccati, tamen cogitant se facile suis operibus et meritis illud abolituros. Et tacite sic optant, quod illa verba, *Qui dedit semetipsum pro peccatis nostris*, essent verba in humilitate dicta, et peccata non essent seria et vera, sed inania et ficta. In summa ratio humana vellet libenter Deo offerre et adducere fictum et simulatum peccatorem, qui nihil esset conterritus, qui peccatum non sentiret; sanum vellet adducere, non indigentem medico, et tunc, quando non sentiret peccatum, vellet credere quod Christus traditus esset pro peccatis nostris. Sic totus mundus affectus est, et praesertim qui in mundo esse volunt aliis religiosiores et sanctiores, ut ipsi somniant, scilicet, monachi et omnes justitiarum. Hi ore quidem fatentur se peccatores esse, fatentur item se quotidie peccata committere, sed non tam ingentia et multa, quin suis operibus ea abolere possint. Imo ultra hoc volunt afferre justitias

et merita sua ad tribunal Christi, et pro illis postulare a iudice retributionem vitae aeternae. Interim tamen, ut sunt humiles fratres, ne penitus mundi sint, fingunt quaedam peccata, ut pro illorum venia possint magna devotione cum ipso publicano orare, *Deus propitius esto mihi peccatori*. Illis haec verba Pauli, *pro peccatis nostris*, sunt plane inania et nugacia. Ideo neque ea intelligunt, neque in tentatione, cum peccatum serio sentiunt, consolationem ex eis accipere possunt, sed ibi simpliciter desperare coguntur. Est igitur haec praecipua scientia ac vera sapientia Christiana, haec verba Pauli pro seriis et verissimis habere, scilicet, quod Christus in mortem traditus sit, non propter justitiam aut sanctitatem nostram, sed propter peccata nostra, quae vera, grandia, multa, imo infinita et invicta sunt. Itaque ne fingas ea esse parva, quae tuis operibus aboleri possint. Neque desperes propter ipsorum magnitudinem, cum aliquando in vita vel in morte serio ea senseris; sed disce hic ex Paulo credere, Christum non pro fictis aut pictis, sed veris, non pro parvis, sed maximis, non pro uno atque altero, sed omnibus, non pro devictis (quia nullus homo, nullus etiam angelus vel minimum peccatum vincere potest), sed pro invictis peccatis traditum esse.—Da igitur operam sedulo, ut non solum extra tempus tentationis, sed et in periculo et pugna mortis, cum conscientia perterrefit recordatione praeteritorum peccatorum, et diabolus magno impetu te invadit, et mole, fluctibus, ac diluvio peccatorum obruere vult, et perterrefaciat, a Christo abstrahat, et ad desperationem te adigat, ut, inquam, tum possis cum fiducia dicere: Christus Dei Filius traditus est non pro justis et sanctis, sed pro injustis et peccatoribus. Si justus essem, et peccatum non haberem, non indigerem Propitiatore Christo. Cur ergo, O perversum in modum sancte Satan, vis me facere

sanctum, et a me exigere justitias, cum nihil habeam praeter peccata, et ea vera et gravissima, non ficta aut inania? Qualia sunt peccata contra primam tabulam, videlicet, summa infidelitas, dubitatio, desperatio, contemptus Dei, odium, ignorantia, blasphemia Dei, ingratitude, abusus nominis Dei, negligentia, fastidium, contemptus verbi Dei, etc.; deinde etiam illa carnalia contra secundam, qualia sunt, non habere honorem parentibus, non obedire magistratui, appetere alterius res, uxorem, etc. quanquam ista levia sint respectu superiorum. Et esto sane, quod homicidium, adulterium, furtum, et id genus alia peccata contra secundam tabulam, facto non commiserim, commisi tamen corde. Quare sum transgressor omnium mandatorum Dei, tantaque est peccatorum meorum multitudo, ut bubalum corium ea complecti non possit. Imo non est numerus eorum; peccavi enim supra numerum arenae maris. Ad haec diabolus tam callidus est artifex, ut etiam ex bonis operibus meis et justitia mea possit facere maximum peccatum. Cum igitur peccata mea tam seria, vera, grandia, infinita, horribilia, et insuperabilia sint, et mea justitia coram Deo mihi non prosit, sed plus obsit, ideo Christus Dei Filius pro ipsis in mortem traditus est, ut ea aboleret, et me et omnes qui hoc credunt salvos faceret."

This passage attracted Mr Ward's notice, when he was hunting after stumblingblocks in *the Commentary on the Galatians*; and we must suppose him to have read it through, since he quotes several fragments of it, though in such a way that the reader is sure to misapprehend the meaning, and will never divine that the appalling enumeration of sins is represented as a part of the last agony of a troubled conscience, "*in periculo et pugna mortis.*" Not that Mr Ward's misrepresentations, either here or elsewhere, seem to have been intentional: he is

as candid and veracious as his violent delusions, his blinding idolatries and antipathies, his ignorance on many of the matters treated of, his carelessness, and his presumption will let him be. If his extracts from this passage do not adequately convey its meaning, one can see plainly that he himself had totally misunderstood it. Else he could not have said, immediately after those extracts, "The essence then of Luther's Gospel is this, that a person so affected *has only one great struggle to go through*, in order that he may obtain the indefectible promise of eternal salvation." For in the latter part of this very passage Luther is not speaking of the primary struggle, when the sinner is first brought to seek the righteousness of Christ: on the contrary he is exhorting those who have been so brought, *to hold the beginning of their confidence firm to the end*; and he sets forth the enormous difficulty of doing so. "*Da operam sedulo, ut non solum extra tempus tentationis, sed et in periculo et pugna mortis—ut, inquam, tum possis cum fiducia dicere, etc.*" So that the believer is expressly warned in this passage to exercise constant diligence and watchfulness throughout his life, to the end that he may not *at his last hour for any pains of death fall from Christ*; in direct contradiction to Mr Ward's inference from it, that he "*has only one great struggle to go through.*" Such a perversion, though probably arising from no worse cause than the recklessness with which he gathers up materials for abusing the objects of his aversion, proves him wholly unfitted for exercising any critical or judicial function. Far more difficult however is it to understand how any one, having read through this awful and terrific catalogue of sins,—the sins, not of an openly vicious life, but such as every sensitive conscience, looking back through the dark line of its past years, must acknowledge itself to

be burthened with,—should immediately say that Luther had “learnt to feel *in some slight measure* the sinfulness of sin,” and should not have expunged the assertion, which stands two pages before, that he can see nothing in *the Commentary on the Galatians* “shewing any deep and true insight even into human corruption.”

Nor is it a much less strange defiance of the ordinary rules by which we frame our conclusions concerning facts, to ascribe Luther’s feeling of “the real sinfulness of sin,” such as it was, to “the unspeakable blessings of a Catholic education and monastic discipline,” just after reading his statement of the miserably false and perverted notion of sin which prevailed in the monasteries. To this subject he often recurs, because it was one of the crying delusions of the age. In consequence of the general blindness to the real nature of sin, and to the real sinfulness of man,—from the vulgar notion that sin consisted mainly in certain outward forbidden acts, from which if a man abstained, he was deemed to be comparatively pure,—a notion which rules of discipline and the practice of compulsory confession are pretty sure to foster,—it grew to be held that the monastic life, as being to a certain extent removed from the grosser temptations of the world, had a sort of inherent purity: and thus people were brought into such an unnatural state, that artificial sins were fabricated, in order that they might have something to confess. Of these *ficta peccata* some instances are mentioned in a passage quoted in the Notes to *the Mission of the Comforter*, p. 243. Hence Luther says, in the Commentary on II. 16: “Ipsi (Papa cum suis episcopis, doctoribus, monachis, etc.) peccatum mortale tantum intellexerunt de opere externo commisso contra legem, ut est homicidium, adulterium, furtum, etc. Non viderunt peccatum mortale esse ignorantiam, odium,

contemptum Dei in corde, ingratitude, murmurationem contra Deum, aversari voluntatem Dei.—Quisque enim monachus hanc habet imaginationem: ego per observationem sanctae regulae possum mereri gratiam de congruo; operibus autem, quae post acceptam gratiam facio, tantum meritum accumulare possum, ut non tantum mihi sufficiat pro consequenda vita aeterna, sed etiam hoc aliis communicare et vendere possim. Sic docuerunt et vixerunt omnes monachi, et pro hac manifesta blasphemia in Christum defendenda nihil non tentant hodie contra nos papistae.”

Where such opinions prevailed, there could not possibly be any deep feeling of “the real sinfulness and evil of sin:” and that which the monastic system had not, it could not impart, unless by awakening a feeling of its own shallowness and hollowness. Hence, in the Commentary on i. 15, Luther says, “Ego in monachatu Christum quotidie crucifixi, et falsa mea fiducia, quae tum perpetuo adhaerebat mihi, blasphemavi. Externe non eram sicut caeteri homines, raptores, injusti, adulteri; sed servabam castitatem, obedientiam, et paupertatem; denique liber a curis praesentis vitae, totus eram deditus jejuniis, vigiliis, orationibus, legendis missis, etc. Interim tamen sub ista sanctitate et fiducia justitiae propriae alebam perpetuam diffidentiam, dubitationem, pavorem, odium, et blasphemiam Dei.” Again,—for it is desirable that these assertions concerning “the unspeakable blessings of a Catholic education and monastic discipline,” and their aptness for teaching “the real sinfulness and evil of sin,” assertions by which the ignorant and credulous may so easily be beguiled, should be exposed in their naked falsehood,—in the Commentary on ii. 18, Luther gives a form of absolution, which the monks “inter se usi sunt,” especially those “qui volebant

haberi religiosiores caeteris." He records it, he says, "ut et posteritas intelligat infinitam et ineffabilem fuisse abominationem papistici regni." And now that all the arts of sophistry are busily employed, in order to prove that black is white, and white black, that evil is good, and good evil, it is unhappily needful to refute them by shewing that black is indeed black, and evil indeed evil. The form is as follows: "Parcat tibi Deus, frater. Meritum passionis Domini nostri Jesu Christi, et beatae Mariae semper Virginis, et omnium sanctorum, meritum ordinis, gravamen religionis, humilitas confessionis, contritio cordis, bona opera, quae fecisti et facies pro amore Domini nostri Jesu Christi, cedant tibi in remissionem peccatorum tuorum, in augmentum meriti et gratiae, et in praemium vitae aeternae: Amen." It is true, this document does contain a mention of Christ's Passion, as one of the grounds whereby the remission of sins and eternal life are to be obtained: but well might Luther say, "Si diligenter verba expenderis, intelliges Christum plane otiosum esse, et ei detrahi gloriam et nomen Justificatoris et Salvatoris, et tribui monasticis operibus." When the merits of Christ's Passion were set in the same rank with the merits of the Virgin Mary, and of all the Saints, and of a religious order, and with the burthens of religious observances, and the good works done and to be done by the person to be absolved, it is plain that the whole stress would be laid on the religious observances and good works: and the natural result was what Luther describes as his own state: "Ego in eodem luto haesitavi; putabam Christum esse Judicem (etsi ore fatebar eum passum et mortuum pro redemptione generis humani) placandum observatione regulae meae. Ideo cum orabam aut celebrabam missam, solitus eram semper adjicere in fine: *Domine Jesu ad te venio, et oro ut gravamina ordinis*

*mei sint compensatio pro peccatis meis.*" Well too might he give thanks for his deliverance from this darkness, in which the fallen Church had been given up to that miserable idolatry, the worship of our own works. "Nunc vero gratias ago Patri misericordiarum, qui me e tenebris vocavit ad lucem Evangelii, et donavit me uberrima cognitione Christi Jesu Domini mei; propter quem, una cum Paulo, omnia duco esse damna, putoque esse *σκύβαλα*, ut Christum lucrifaciam, utque inveniar in Illo, non habens meam justitiam ex regula Augustini, sed eam quae est per fidem Christi: cui sit laus et gloria, una cum Patre et Spiritu Sancto, in saecula saeculorum, Amen."

These last extracts will, I hope, still be efficacious in preserving some from being duped by empty phrases about "the unspeakable blessings of a Catholic education and monastic discipline," and their fitness for teaching men to feel "the sinfulness and real evil of sin." During several ages there were indeed divers beneficial purposes, which the monastic institutions were calculated to effect, and which to a large extent they did effect: and even in these days a modified form of them might be serviceable for the performance of some of the mighty works to which the Church is called. But among the special temptations to which such institutions are liable, one is that of substituting fictitious offenses, *peccata ficta*, and fictitious good works, for the ordinary transgressions and the ordinary duties of morality (Α Κ): and the proneness of man in every condition to magnify whatever belongs peculiarly to that condition cannot fail to exercise its noxious influence with regard to these fictitious offenses and good works, so that they are apt to throw what is higher and deeper, and belongs to our common humanity, into the background. This delusion had reached a dismal highth at the beginning of the sixteenth century: and



hence do we find Luther continually inveying against the hollowness of such arbitrary works, whereby men's consciences were deceived ; while he is no less strenuous in urging the infinite superiority of the simple moral law, with its every-day household duties, to all such self-imposed, artificial acts of willworship : see for instance above, pp. 52 and 60.

Here however Mr Ward interposes with the bold assertion, that Luther " shews the greatest misconception of Catholic doctrine " (p. 172). Now on what grounds does he rest this assertion ? Has he taken the trouble to examine Luther's statements concerning the various matters of doctrine and practice, against which he lifts up his voice ? and has he compared them with the information which may be derived from other writers, as to the state of the Church at that period ? No : such a laborious process would never suit a person whose conscience is to pronounce summary judgement on every question pertaining to religion. In limited monarchies it may be thought right to attend to facts ; but the autocrat of all the Russias would feel his supremacy impeacht, if he were not allowed to deal with facts also, to make and unmake them, at will. Mr Ward does not attempt to shew that Luther's representations of the opinions and practices current in his age, with the knowledge and sanction of the highest authorities in the Church, are at variance with the facts ascertainable from other sources. His plea is merely that they are inconsistent with certain higher and more spiritual views of Romish doctrine and practice, which he has formed for himself, so far as one may judge from the books quoted in various parts of his volume, out of a few devotional works, almost all of them belonging to later times, some of them to the nineteenth century.

I do not mean to deny that similar views are to be found also in writers anterior to the Reformation. In every age of the Church there was a Christian element in it, contending with the Antichristian, an evangelical, scriptural, spiritual element, struggling with more or less success against the corruptions which the hierarchy sucked in from its adulterous intercourse with the world. Hereby the life of the Church was preserved from sinking into utter rottenness. Hereby too the Reformation, when this Evangelical element was raised into distincter consciousness, and for a season into predominant power, was united, by an unbroken, though in certain places a very slender, thread of truth, to the first ages of the Church. At the end of the fifteenth century indeed the thread seemed almost about to snap: but then, as so often in history, it was again seen that, *when need is highest, then aid is nighest*. Hence, although it is quite true that the gross corruptions of Christian doctrine, with the consequent practical corruptions, which roused Luther to protest against them, were not the only form of doctrine previously discoverable in the Church, yet it is a sheer fallacy to make this, as the Romish apologists are wont to do, the ground of a charge that he misunderstood and misrepresented the doctrines of the Church. His protest in the first instance was directed, not against the doctrines of the Church, but against the corruptions of her doctrine and practice, which he saw spreading unchecked on every side. He had no thought of separation; but when his conscience forbade him to keep silence any longer, he spoke, hoping earnestly, however fondly, that the evils, when pointed out, would be corrected (AL).

Here I feel bound to repeat, that the schism was not Luther's act, but the Pope's, whose fatal Bull decreed

that, in lieu of a reformation of the whole Church, the Reformation should be confined to a portion of it, with which the remainder should no longer hold Christian communion. For the imagination so readily becomes a slave to the objects by which we are habitually surrounded, that, in thinking of persons living whether in foreign lands or in past ages, we involuntarily place them amid circumstances similar in the main to our own: and it requires constant effort and watchfulness to bear in mind how much that to us is so familiar, as almost to seem a part of the order of the world, must in their eyes have been totally different. Thus Mr Ward, in a passage where, for the sake of sharpening his abuse of our English Reformers, he makes a sort of admission in favour of the German, says in p. 44: "It does appear that the Continental Reformers had submitted themselves to the discipline under which God's Providence had placed them, until their conscience (most ill-directed, I admit, and morally perverse, but still honestly) seemed to them to command its abandonment." These words give an erroneous notion of Luther's position and conduct; for it is plain that he is the Reformer especially referred to: and this they do by transferring the relations of our days to his; as though two different bodies and systems had been existing in his days, and as though he, after making trial of one, and being dissatisfied, had gone over to the other, under the expectation of liking it better. Such capricious conduct was totally alien from Luther. Mr Ward's words may apply more or less to several of the schismatics in our days, who have recently been "abandoning the discipline under which God's Providence had placed them," being moved to do so by certain speculative or imaginative impulses, or by mere caprices of will, which they have confounded with the

dictates of Conscience: but they are wholly inapplicable to Luther, who did not of his own accord *abandon* the system he was placed under, but who was driven out of it; and who did not allow his Conscience so to transgress its proper sphere, as that it should command him to abandon that system, pronouncing judgement on an act of so complicated a nature and involving such far-stretching consequences, but confined it rather, as we have seen above, to its most appropriate office, that of pronouncing a categorical veto when he was called upon to deny what the word of God, interpreted according to the best exercise of all his faculties, convinced him to be the truth.

That Luther's representations of the doctrines and practices current in his age are not founded on a misconception of them, but are quite correct, is proved by the most indisputable documents: nor would there be any difficulty in producing a crushing mass of evidence to confirm them (AM). Indeed it may be doubted whether any one, except a person who had set up the infallibility of his own fancies and prepossessions under the name of Conscience, would have presumed to deny this, at all events without attempting to bring forward some chain of proofs in warrant of his assertion. In default of such proofs, the first question that suggests itself is, which is the most likely to have understood the real character and purport of the doctrines and practices prevalent in the German monasteries at the beginning of the sixteenth century,—Luther? or Mr Ward? To this question Mr Ward himself might be allowed to return an answer: shame, if no better motive, would keep him from engrossing the minority to himself. For while his view of "Catholic doctrine" appears, as I have already said, to be derived mainly from the devotional writings of later ages, Luther had the best of all means for understanding

it thoroughly, such as it was in his days, seeing that he spent a dozen years of his prime in endeavouring to realize it in his own life, as it presented itself to him: and the strenuousness and perseverance of his efforts prove that he was earnestly desirous of knowing its meaning and value (AN).

After the statement of what Mr Ward is pleased to call Luther's Gospel, in p. 171, he adds: "Luther speaks in many places of his own great difficulty in acquiescing in the system he had devised: and from himself he seems to have argued to others; so that—any one who knows ever so little of Luther's writings must see how painfully aware he is of the opposition presented by human instincts to his lax system; and how anxiously he endeavours to deceive both others and himself as to the potency of the remedy, which he had the almost incredible boldness of devising from his own invention, against the plainest testimonies of Scripture, against the unceasing and continuous voice of the Church. All this is very pleasing in considering his personal character." Here we have another sample of the morality lookt upon with favour by the modern sophists who prate about the supremacy of the Conscience. Mr Newman, we have seen above, in p. 85, thinks he is bringing forward an apology for Luther, when charging him with the baseness of "*indirectly renouncing*" immoral doctrines, which he maintained publicly with the utmost vehemence and apparent earnestness down to his death. And now Mr Ward deems it "*very pleasing in considering his personal character,*" that he should have been "painfully aware of the opposition presented by human instincts to his lax system, which he had the boldness of devising from his own invention, against the plainest testimonies of Scripture, against the unceasing and

continuous voice of the Church." The greater the crimes committed in the service of the apostate Church, the more the criminals were often exalted in her eyes. Jaques Clement, Garnet and Catesby, were highly extolled: in honour of the Massacre of St Bartholomew medals were coined. Still it was reserved for the new school of the Conscience to find out that it is a matter of commendation in an adversary to renounce *indirectly*, what he has asserted thousands of times openly, and still goes on asserting; and that it is a "very pleasing" trait of character for him to have been aware how the doctrine which he invented, and upheld on every occasion with all his heart and soul and mind, in defiance of Scripture and of the Church, was also in opposition to the instincts of human nature. Mr Ward complains of "the cloudy language and inconsecutive thought prevalent among the supporters" of Lutheranism. To a man in a thick fog all the country round, even places which are lying under a clear sky, seems to be involved in a like atmosphere.

While the remainder of the last extract may be left to burst through its own tumidity, it seems right to note that here again the Pelagian hoof peeps out. Otherwise it would be strange to find it alledged as a strong argument against Luther's doctrine, that it is "opposed by human instincts," at all events without some enquiry as to the nature and character of those instincts. For human instincts must needs be opposed to that doctrine, of which we are told that *the world cannot receive it*, that *the natural man cannot know it*, to that which was a *stumbling-block to the Jews, and foolishness to the Greeks*. Therefore, though the opposition to human instincts is not of itself enough to prove a doctrine true, yet we may be sure that, unless a doctrine be in opposition to them, it cannot

be more than a partial, superficial representation of the Gospel. Even the second Commandment, *Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself*, is in opposition to human instincts; so too far more is the first. I grant that, even in man's fallen state, traces may be discerned of feelings which were designed to respond to these Commandments, and which can only receive their full expansion by means of them. But so are there traces of feelings which respond to the great truth, that we are justified by Faith, without the works of the law. Here however, as in many other places, Mr Ward betrays that very want of "any deep and true insight into human corruption," which he ascribes to Luther.

In p. 172 another admission is made in Luther's favour: "Of course it should be most fully acknowledged, that he expresses a confident opinion that justifying faith will always lead to good works." This is another instance how, even when Mr Ward tries to do justice to Luther, he cannot. His mind is so full of his own notions, there is no room in it for Luther's. Mr Newman, we saw, in p. 88, falls into a misconception, from confounding Luther's view of Faith with his own. In like manner this acknowledgement of Mr Ward's implies a very inadequate apprehension of what Luther means by Faith, as may be seen from the passage already quoted in p. 45. If Luther's idea of Faith had corresponded to Mr Newman's and Mr Ward's, he could then have done no more than "*express a confident opinion that justifying Faith will always lead to good works.*" But then his whole theory of Evangelical truth would have wanted its keystone. It would no longer have been a Gospel in which Righteousness and Peace meet together, but a loose, disjointed string of thoughts, in which the holiness and justice of God and the moral interests of

mankind are equally sacrificed to the establishment of absolute and arbitrary decrees. He who would understand Luther rightly, must keep fast hold on the idea, that Faith, according to his view, by an inherent, irrepressible necessity, must produce good works: *Fides semper est efficax, vel non est fides*. In confirmation of this I will merely quote one passage from the Commentary on the Galatians, ii. 18. "We conclude therefore with St Paul that we are justified solely by Faith in Christ, without the Law or Works. But when a man is justified by Faith, and already possesses Christ through Faith, and knows that Christ is his Righteousness and his Life, assuredly he will not be idle, but, like a good tree, will bring forth good fruit, because, in that he believes, he has the Holy Spirit; who, wherever He is, allows not a man to be idle, but impells him to all the exercises of piety, to the love of God, to patience in afflictions, to the calling upon God, to the giving of thanks, to the shewing forth of charity to all. *Wherefore we also say that Faith without works is nought and empty*. Hereby the Papists and the Fanatics mean that Faith, without works, does not justify, or that Faith, however real, if it have not works, is of no worth. This is false: but Faith without works, that is, a fanatical notion, mere vanity, and a dream of the heart, is not Faith, and does not justify."

The rest of Mr Ward's remarks on particular passages in the Commentary on the Galatians do not seem to call for any special notice. With regard to most of them it is clear that his apprehension of their meaning is more or less imperfect; but the misunderstandings are of the same kind as those which have been already exposed. Nor is there any need of vindicating the book itself from his contemptuous sentence. "The Commentary (he says in p. 172), considered intellectually as a theological



effort, is perhaps one of the feeblest and most worthless productions ever written." I was told some years since of an Oxford bachelor of arts, who, having heard Euclid spoken of with much praise in the common-room, said the next day at dinner that he had been reading through six books that morning, but had not found much in them. Had he been a disciple of Mr Ward's, he would probably have said that they were the stupidest and most worthless books ever written. After the abundant evidence we have had of Mr Ward's incapacity to understand Luther, we shall not attach much more weight to his sentence. The doctrine which was *foolishness to the Greek* from the first, is so still: and since Luther's Commentary is an exposition of that one doctrine in all manner of forms and relations, as might be anticipated from his declaration in the Preface, quoted above in p. 31, one cannot wonder that it should fall under the same condemnation.

Those who look into it expecting to find a learned critical commentary, will be disappointed. It is not such, and was never intended to be such: nor would the circumstances of its composition have allowed it to be so. Luther had too much practical work of paramount importance on his hands, to find leisure for critical exegesis. Indeed the very form of the work forbad this: for it appears from the Preface to have been made up of a course of Lectures, which were taken down by some of his friends: "I myself can hardly believe (he there says), that I was so prolix as this volume represents me, when I was expounding this Epistle publicly. Yet I feel that all the thoughts, which I find noted down with such diligence in this book, are mine; so that I am forced to confess that the whole, and perhaps still more, was said by me in those public lectures." This

homiletical character of the work accounts for its diffuseness, which would have been wholly unsuited to a written commentary: in fact it is not so much this, as a course of lectures on the doctrine of Justification by Faith as declared in the Epistle to the Galatians. At times the author's strong will forces passages to bend somewhat reluctantly to his interpretation; but on the whole it is marvellous how he enters into St Paul's mind, and draws forth his thoughts, and expands them: and it is hardly too much to say, what is nearly implied in the passage quoted just now from Mr Trench, that Luther has done more to bring out the innermost spirit of St Paul's writings, than all other critics put together.

This has been recognised by many godly men ever since, especially by those who have had to go through the same spiritual conflicts. Not till the world's course has run out, will it be known to how many such persons this Commentary on the Galatians, of which Mr Ward speaks with unmeasured contempt, has been a blessed wellspring of spiritual light and consolation. Let me be allowed here to quote the words of one of those great teachers, who are now and then raised up for the edification of Christ's Church, the author of *the Pilgrim's Progress*. In his account of that awful warfare by which he was so wonderfully prepared and fitted for the ministry of consolation, he says: "Before I had got thus far out of these my temptations, I did greatly long to see some ancient godly man's experience, who had writ some hundreds of years before I was born.—Well, after many such longings in my mind, the God in whose hands are all our days and ways, did cast into my hand one day a book of Martin Luther; it was his Comment on the Galatians; it was so old that it was ready to fall piece from piece if I did but turn it over. Now I was

pleased much that such an old book had fallen into my hands; the which when I had but a little way perused, I found my condition in his experience, so largely and profoundly handled, as if his book had been written out of my heart. This made me marvel; for thus thought I, this man could not know anything of the state of Christians now, but must needs write and speak the experience of former days. Besides he doth most gravely in that book debate of the rise of these temptations, namely, blasphemy, desperation, and the like, shewing that the law of Moses, as well as the devil, death, and hell, hath a very great hand therein, the which at first was very strange to me; but considering and watching I found it so indeed. But of particulars here I intend nothing: only this methinks I must let fall before all men, I do prefer this book of Martin Luther upon the Galatians (excepting the Holy Bible) before all the books that ever I have seen, as most fit for a wounded conscience." The book of which Bunyan speaks thus, will not be extinguisht by Mr Ward's scornful censure.

After saying all the evil he can of the Commentary on the Galatians,—the total amount of which, as attaching to Luther, is just nought, so that, if no momentum can be lost, it must recoil on the head of its author,—Mr Ward seems to have spent a quarter of an hour in turning over a few pages here and there, in this and that volume of his works, in the hope of lighting upon something to condemn. "Another short work of Luther's, which I have lookt through, is his *Sermò de Matrimonio*, preacht, let it never be forgotten, publicly before a large congregation. Let those who speak of him as a spiritually-minded man read that Sermon. Quotations however of that kind are better omitted. The following are extracted from certain *Disputationes pro Veritate*

*inquirenda.*” From these he cites five propositions. In such a frivolous manner does this writer pursue the task he has set himself,—a task which, if ever entered upon, ought to have been carried on with judicial accuracy and deliberation,—of taking away the character of one who for three centuries has been held in the highest veneration by so many of the best and wisest of men. He “*looks through*” his Sermon on Marriage, insinuates that there is great impurity in it, and then flies off to another book to pick up something offensive there. This is another instance how our newfangled, autocratical Conscience pronounces her verdicts without examination. Whereas a conscientious man of the old school,—of that Protestant school which loves truth above all things,—if called to pass sentence on a treatise such as Mr Ward describes, would not have been content with *looking through* it, but would have *read it through* carefully, to ascertain whether the necessities of the argument did not justify what, taken unconnectedly, might seem obtrusively indelicate: he would have called to mind how the picking out of particular expressions might warrant a charge of impurity against the purest writings, for instance, against the First Epistle to the Corinthians: and he would further have taken into consideration how much in such matters is variable and arbitrary, how the plainness of speech which is offensive to later ages, was deemed no way unbecoming by earlier, and how the differences between different periods in this respect are totally irrespective of moral purity, even as the outside of the whited sepulchre affords no criterion of what is to be found within.

Which of Luther's Sermons on Marriage shockt Mr Ward so that he could not bring himself to read it, but forgot the obligations of justice, in his eagerness to note down his moral indignation, I do not feel quite certain.

Walch's collection of his German works contains four, one preacht in 1519, the second in 1522, the third in 1525, the fourth in 1545. In all four there is much that is wise and wholesome; and several passages are of exceeding beauty: in no one of them is there anything to warrant Mr Ward's censure, if we read them with a due regard to the age and occasion. But the latter two do not seem to have been translated into Latin; and the Jena edition of his Latin works only gives a translation of the first. As this stands in the same volume with the *Theses pro Veritate inquirenda*, under the Title *De Matrimonio*, Mr Ward's flying from it to those *Theses*, might lead one to suppose that this must be the Sermon he refers to. If we had to deal with any other critic indeed, it might be regarded as an objection to this notion, that this Sermon only fills three folio pages; so that the laziest of human beings, unless the plea of conscience had deadened the sense of moral responsibility, would have had patience enough to read it through, before he held it up to reprobation. So too, if we had to deal with any other critic, would it have seemed incredible that he should speak in such a tone of this Sermon, seeing that it does not contain a single word to offend the purest ears in our days, not a single sentence which one need hesitate on this score to preach before any congregation in England. A stronger reason for doubting whether this Sermon is the object of Mr Ward's censure lies in the Romish leaven still found in it: for it speaks of marriage as a sacrament; which notion Luther did not controvert, I believe, till he publisht his treatise *De Captivitate Babylonica Ecclesiae* in 1522: nor had he as yet entirely divested himself of the exaggerated honour for celibacy. The Sermon ends however with a beautiful passage on the primary duty of parents to

bring up their children in the fear of God, a duty which, we have seen above (p. 71), Luther took every opportunity of enforcing. "If you would exercise true penitence, would obtain the highest indulgences here and elsewhere, if you would die happily, would have your offspring increase and spread abroad, strive with your utmost diligence, with all your powers, that your boys may be well brought up. If you cannot do this yourself, use the help of those who know how, can, and will; nor spare any labour, money, or expense. These are the altars, the testaments, the vigils and masses of the dead: these are lights which will shine for you perpetually, here while you live, and elsewhere after your death in life eternal." Can this be the passage which is to prove that Luther was not spiritually minded?

Perhaps however the longer Sermon *Vom Ehelichen Leben*, preached in 1522, of which a translation is inserted in the Wittenberg edition of Luther, is that to which Mr Ward refers: and this is the more likely, inasmuch as Audin, who is one of Mr Ward's purveyors, quotes a number of passages from it, and uses his utmost skill in making them as offensive as possible. Here, as Mr Ward is rightly withheld by delicacy from citing what would pain our more fastidious ears, I will follow his example, merely remarking that, though this sermon is characterized by a Lutheran plainness of speech, and though in ordinary times such subjects are ill fitted for being treated in the pulpit, we cannot be qualified for pronouncing judgement upon it, unless we know before what congregation it was preached, and what was the occasion which called it forth. Luther himself says in the Preface, that he had shrunk from touching the subject, but that necessity must overcome reluctance: "I must try to instruct miserable perplexed consciences." The date of this Sermon, 1522,

when many of the inmates of the convents were quitting them, and when the errors of the Anabaptists were beginning to spread, shews that there was urgent need for the voice of wisdom to set forth the true idea, relations, and obligations of marriage: nor could this be done without an exposition and refutation of the manifold scandalous errors and abuses concerning it bred and propagated by the Papacy (AO), many of them for no other purpose, it would seem, than that of extorting money from those who desired to violate any of the prohibitions.

At the same time, although there is nothing in the Sermon *De Matrimonio* to justify Mr Ward's censure, I do not deny that in Luther's writings we now and then meet with certain coarsenesses of expression, such as to the more delicate ears of our days would be very offensive: and they who are unable to distinguish between what is essential and permanent, and what is merely accidental and variable, that is, ninety-nine hundredths of mankind, would be apt to exclaim that he who could allow himself to use such language, cannot possibly have been "spiritually minded." But to judge of such matters, we ought, according to a favorite expression of Luther's, which has already occurred above, to be *boni dialectici*, so as to discern how much in the prescriptive usages of society belongs to particular configurations of manners, and how much results of necessity from the principles of morals. On this point, as I have already remarkt, different ages differ greatly; and even in the same age there are considerable differences between different classes of society. Culture increases delicacy: as a nation becomes more cultivated, it becomes more delicate and fastidious in its language: so too in the same age are those classes whose minds are more cultivated. Hence, though much in the

conventions of society on this score is somewhat arbitrary, yet, since there is a sort of connexion between delicacy of language and purity of feeling, inasmuch as that delicacy implies a shrinking from the very notion and suggestion of impurity, a person who wantonly violates these conventions is justly an object of moral condemnation. Still, even in the same age, although the various classes of society to a certain extent breathe the same moral and intellectual atmosphere, and are subject to like influences through the manifold intercourse amongst them, a plainness of speech, which would be revolting in members of the higher classes, is continually used by the lower inoffensively and irreprehensibly. Moreover, if we examine the question on the widest scale, we find that the feeling of shame did not exist in the paradisaical state, any more than it does in early childhood, that it only sprang out of the Fall, being, so to say, the shadow cast by Sin on the pure surface of the Conscience, and that, as the consciousness of sin has deepened, so has shame. Thus we learn that, though shamelessness, in all ages since the first, betokens a deadness of Conscience, yet the increase of fastidiousness with regard to language by no means betokens an increase of moral purity, but often the very contrary. Words which might have been used with unsuspecting freedom in Cato's age by grave senators, and even by virtuous matrons, were discarded as unseemly in that of Augustus: for sensitiveness may arise from soreness, as well as from a natural fineness of organization; and the sparks, which would be harmless elsewhere, become dangerous in the neighbourhood of tinder and of gunpowder. Thus in Luther's age a plainness of speech prevailed, whereby, if we look at it unreflectingly, we may easily be disgusted. But it gave no offense then, because, in the greater simplicity, or call



it rusticity, of men's minds, it was not provocative of impure feelings.

Besides, in forming a judgement on this matter, it would be necessary to take into account the class in which Luther was born, and his life in the monastery. For peasants know little about conventional niceties of language; and the absence of female society deprived the monks of that which is the great refiner and purifier of manners; while the practice of the confessional induces a necessity of speaking on subjects from which a man might otherwise shrink. He who has lived in foreign countries must have been often tempted, in this as in many other respects, to condemn the natives hastily and rashly, and therefore unjustly, trying them by his own standard, instead of theirs. If it be urged that we do not find similar coarsenesses in the Latin writings of the pious monks in earlier ages, I would reply that neither do we in Luther's. Few of them have left any remains in their native tongue; and the very use of a dead language operates as a check on familiarity of expression. The nations too which sprang out of the Roman empire may be said to have inherited a traditional consciousness of impurity, and, along therewith, to a certain extent, a traditional shame, and a traditional refinement of speech. Many words came to them already bearing a stamp of reprobation, which was not attached till later to their German synonyms. With regard to Luther moreover we must ever keep in mind that his energy and his mighty love of truth constrained him always to speak plainly and strongly. He could not mince his words, or take thought about suiting them to fastidious ears, even if there had been such to suit them to: and the humour with which he was so richly gifted, and which is the natural associate of an intense love of truth, if it be not rather a particular

form and manifestation of that love, led him to strip off the artificial drapery and conventional formalities of life, and to look straight at the realities hidden beneath them, in their naked contrasts and contradictions (AP). In fine, if we would understand Luther rightly, as has been well said in one of the excellent articles in defense of his *Tabletalk*, in the *Zeitschrift für Protestantismus und Kirche*, which seems to be by the editor, Harless (vol. ii. pp. 207, 209), "we must not expect to find a saint of Padua, with downcast look and hollow voice; we must not be afraid of seeing him everywhere, without any cloak or ornaments, in the fulness, freedom, and truth of his natural character; we must accustom ourselves to observe him in his private human relations, as one who, like the whole race sprung during six thousand years from the loins of Adam, was weak and sinful, or, as Jerome says of the whole body of the Apostles, *homo vasculo clausus infirmo*, and to remember that he too was fallible in higher things.—We do not lose him, we do not lose his greatness, when we draw near and watch him in the pettiest concerns of his daily life. He is one of those grand characters that *can do all things*. Hating all show, free from all self-consciousness, scornfully heedless of all consequences, he wins and conquers every one who comes within his sphere, by the simple truth of his bearing, by the energy of his will, and by the inward majesty of his sanctified nature. He is so utterly destitute of everything like a halo, that one's first glance at him has to beg pardon of the next for seeing so little in him."

As to the propositions selected by Mr Ward from the *Theses pro Veritate inquirenda*, some others akin to them have already been spoken of in the remarks on Bossuet (pp. 17—20): and as he does not specify what he deems objectionable in them, thinking no doubt that their very

enunciation is sufficient to condemn Luther, there seems no need of saying more on the character of such Theses, or on the Lutheran idea of Faith, without a right apprehension of which we shall perpetually imagine stumbling-blocks where there are none. At the same time a candid critic, when looking at these Theses, and at Luther's other writings anterior to 1521, will remember his own sentence on them prefixt to his first Volume: "All these things are to be read with judgement. For there are many assertions and arguments in this first volume which breathe and smell of the lees and bilge-water of Paris and Louvain. You will perceive that I am merely striving to emerge and force my way out of this thick darkness." Moreover it is especially incumbent on a person who quotes passages as grounds of condemnation, to be careful that his extracts are thoroughly correct, neither distorted nor mutilated. On this score Mr Ward does not offend often. Here however, in citing the 15th proposition, he merely gives, "It is certain that thy sins are forgiven, if thou believest them forgiven." Whereas the original is: "*Certum est, remissa esse peccata, si credis remissa, quia certa est Christi Salvatoris promissio.*" The proposition is indeed complete in itself; but as it is scarcely intelligible without the reason given for it, which must needs be deemed weighty, this should not be withheld when we are called on to condemn it. Nor is the translation of the 25th thesis quite correct. Much too of what is startling in them vanishes when we view them in connexion with those which precede and follow, as links in a logical chain. Hereby that which is vague and general in them is defined: we perceive under what relations, and with what specific purpose the assertions are made: we discern their bearing, their logical force and cogency, and the necessity which drew them forth.

EXAMINATION OF MR WARD'S EXTRACTS  
FROM MOEHLER.

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WITH these propositions Mr Ward ends the string of extracts which he has gathered out of Luther's writings, in order to justify his way of speaking of him. But he seems to have felt that he had made out a poor case: so he looks round as far and wide as his reading enables him, in the hope that other enemies and revilers of Luther may supply him with something worse than what he himself has been able to discover. In so doing he is as unscrupulous as ever. He does not take the slightest pains to ascertain whether the charges brought against Luther are well-founded or no. Whatever presents itself is welcome, if it will but blast his name: the more heinous it is, the more eagerly he embraces it. Indeed he would almost seem to have shaped his conduct after the model of that tribunal which sought false witness against Luther's Heavenly Master: and he also has at length succeeded in finding two witnesses, whose evidence is in exact accord with his wishes. One of them quotes Luther's own words; but so did the false witnesses before that infernal tribunal. What the other does we shall see presently. At all events, as Luther always rejoiced and gave thanks, when he had to endure any cross whereby he might in any respect be likened to his Master, so would he rejoice, as far as he himself is concerned, that men should still revile him and speak all manner of evil of him falsely for Christ's name's sake.

The evidence which Mr Ward's learning has collected in this manner, is a quotation taken from the English translation of Audin's *Life of Luther*, two quotations from the English translation of Moehler's *Symbolik*, a quotation from an Article of his own in the *British Critic*, which appears there to have been borrowed from the French translation of Moehler, and certain extracts from an Article in the *Edinburgh Review*, and from a Pamphlet on the recent schism in the Church of Scotland. Verily, a formidable array of witnesses, pickt out with a due recognition of the judicial maxim that secondhand testimony is to be rejected! To one point however they do bear conclusive testimony, which is confirmed by all the rest of the volume, namely, to Mr Ward's utter incompetency for pronouncing an opinion on any question relating to the German Reformation.

The passage taken from Audin need not detain us, nor the first of the three taken from Moehler. They merely declare the impotence of man's unregenerate will in regard to divine and spiritual things, with Luther's peculiar force of expression. I will only beg the reader, who might otherwise be shockt by these passages, as contradictory both to his own consciousness and to universal experience, to remember that Luther is speaking of the impotence of the natural mind with reference to spiritual things. He does not deny, nor does Calvin,—though both are commonly supposed to do so,—that man, even since the Fall, has always possess a power, however it may have been almost stifled in the great mass of men, to fulfill the duties of civil justice and morality, at least to a certain extent. From among the number of passages which prove this, I will cite one, which also shews that Luther readily recognised the virtues of the great Heathens, however the misinterpreters and exaggeraters of

his doctrines may have fancied themselves bound to deny them. "The works of the Law however may be performed either before justification or after justification. Before justification many good men even among the Heathens, such as Xenophon, Aristides, Fabius, Cicero, Pomponius Atticus, &c., performed the Law, and wrought excellent works. Cicero suffered death bravely for a just and good cause. Pomponius was a true and firm man, who never spake, nor could tolerate any falsehood. Now firmness and truth are noble virtues, and admirable works of the Law: yet they were not justified by them." Comment. in Gal. ii. 16. See also the fifth note in the Appendix to Laurence's fourth Bampton Lecture (A Q).

On the next two extracts it will unhappily be requisite to dwell longer. For they are two of the favorite passages with those who set themselves to revile Luther: at least they have been so since they were held up to indignation by Moehler in his *Symbolik*. Yet this itself would have excited a scruple in a lover of truth. Would you judge of Laud by what Prynne may say of him, without sifting his assertions? or of Cromwell from Clarendon? Would you choose Eschines as your authority for determining the character of Demosthenes? or take the statements of Celsus or Julian as authentic documents for the principles of Christianity? Then, if you have such an appetite for falsehood, may you swallow the reports of a Romish writer concerning Luther. A sample of the enormous lies which were circulated about him during his lifetime and soon after, even by men of considerable eminence, may be found in Bayle's Article upon him. What we have seen of Bossuet shews that, though he does not deal in such gross fictions, he is far from having a due regard for truth. Moehler may perhaps be more veracious: but his religion compelled him to look at

the Reformation and its authors under the influence of a blinding prejudice: and instead of training him to a conscientious accuracy in the minutest things, it habituated him to attend solely to what coincides with the tenets of his Church, and to reject whatever opposes them. Hence it may be said that the task which Moehler undertook in his *Symbolik*,—that of examining the various Protestant Confessions of Faith, and comparing them with the Creeds of the Church of Rome,—is one which a Romish divine cannot possibly perform. The submission he is bound to pay to the dogmas of his own Church incapacitates him for an impartial examination of doctrines which his Church condemns: and this applies even to the German Romanists, notwithstanding the greater freedom and expansion which their minds acquire through their intercourse with the theology and philosophy of their Protestant neighbours. Besides, though from a higher point on the hill of knowledge one may look back on the lower steps, and discern their relative bearings, no one standing at a lower point can survey the higher. In fact a Romanist could not attain to an intelligent apprehension of that higher and purer manifestation of Christian truth which was vouchsafed to the Church at the Reformation, and by which the corruptions and errors of the previous centuries were dispersed, without ceasing *ipso facto* to be a Romanist. It is a moral impossibility almost analogous to that of a Heathen sitting in judgement on Christianity.

A Protestant also, it may be objected, is in like manner unfitted by the shackles of his own faith for judging the Church of Rome with fairness: and doubtless all men, in whatever position they may stand, have a multitude of prejudices and prepossessions, which it is very difficult to repress or lay aside, and which turn their

judgement awry, especially when it is exercised upon those who differ from them on matters of importance. Still the case is by no means the same. Every advance we make in philosophy, or in any department of science, throws a light upon all the preceding stages in its history, and enables us in some respects to understand their nature and purpose better even than those who lived under their immediate influence: and in like manner assuredly the clearer insight into Christian truth which was granted to us at the Reformation, should enable us to appreciate what was really good and evil in the mediæval Church, and to discern its place and office in the Providential order of the world. Besides, the chief Confessions of the Protestant Churches do not make the same arrogant pretensions to determine the minute particulars of Christian doctrine: they are in many respects wisely negative, merely protesting against certain definite, prevalent corruptions; and they assert little positively, beyond the primary, universal principles embodied in the ecumenical Creeds, and recognised by every denomination of Christians. Thus they do not cramp and fetter the mind, but enlarge it, and fulfill the divine office of Truth by setting it free.

For these reasons the readers of Moehler's *Symbolik*, more especially those who have little previous knowledge to counteract the impressions produced by his statements, ought to bear continually in mind that he cannot, from his very position, be a trustworthy witness, much less a safe critic, with regard to the meaning and spirit of the Protestant Confessions. For he sets out with the unhesitating conviction that they are wholly erroneous, and with the determination to prove that they are so. He cannot do them justice; because his Church forbids him, and because his mind has been so trained and moulded



by the teaching of that Church, that his very conceptions of the primary ideas of Christianity,—Faith, Works, Sin, Grace,—are very different; nor can he help substituting his own conceptions, when he meets with those words in their Protestant signification. At the same time his critical faculty has been studiously repressed; because, if it were not, it would overthrow or undermine a large portion of the walls which the Church has cast around his faith: and hence he must inevitably missee, misread, misunderstand, and consequently misrepresent what he finds, however unintentionally. He will catch at every straw that will tickle or bolster up his prejudices; and when he comes to anything that seems very offensive, as it is just what he expected and was seeking for, he will not stop to examine whether on a nearer view it may not prove perfectly innocent.

Here, as Moehler's work has been translated into English, as it has been much bepraised by our Romanizers, and has evidently exercised a good deal of influence among them,—and as it is well calculated to foster most delusive prejudices against the Reformation, and in favour of the Church of Rome, in readers prepared by visions about the glories of the middle ages, and who are ready to regard the Protestant Churches as outcasts from the pale of Christianity, because, through whatever cause, they have adopted a different form of government,—let me be allowed to remark that, able as the *Symbolik* certainly is, considering the cause it has to maintain, and plausible as it must needs seem to such as have nothing more than a superficial acquaintance with the topics which it discusses, still, in addition to the errors already spoken of, its value in the service of Truth is destroyed by two pervading fallacies. In the first place, while the author's professed object, as is

intimated by his title, is to compare the Protestant Symbolical Books with those of the Romish Church, in order to ascertain and examine the doctrinal antitheses between them, he soon finds out that, if he confines himself to these deliberate, dogmatical expressions of doctrine, he shall not be able to make out a case : therefore he scrapes together all sorts of passages, not merely out of professedly dogmatical treatises,—which under certain restrictions would be allowable, —but out of occasional pamphlets, out of sermons, out of private letters, nay, even out of Luther's *Tabletalk*, to kindle and fan an odium which he cannot otherwise excite. Yet it is plain that such a procedure can only mislead and dupe the reader with regard to the great subject matter of the controversy ; which is not whether such and such individual Protestants may not at times have written extravagantly or unadvisedly, but is instituted to determine the relative value of the body of Truth set forth by each Church in the solemn Confession of its Faith. Strange too it may seem that the thought of the *Lettres Provinciales* did not come across him, and warn him of the tremendous retribution he might provoke. Moreover, after he has thus craftily shifted the whole ground of the contrast, so that, while it is nominally between the symbolical declarations of doctrine recognised by the opposite Churches, in lieu of the Protestant symbolical declarations he is continually slipping in whatever errors he can pick up in the most trivial writings of the Reformers,—and these too not seldom aggravated by gross misrepresentations,—even this does not content him : a like trick must be played with the other scale. As the one side is degraded below the reality, the other is exalted above it. The fallacy spoken of above, in p. 32, runs through the whole book. The opposition of the Reformers is represented

as having been directed, not against the gross corruptions and errors which prevailed when they began the conflict, but against the modified exposition of Romish doctrine drawn up with such singular adroitness at the Semi-reformation of Trent: nay, even this is often refined and spiritualized by the interpolation of views belonging to the theology and philosophy of the nineteenth century. Hence it is not to be wondered at that Moehler's work should impose on such readers as do not see through these fallacies, but suppose his representations of the opposite parties to be correct.

Yet its influence ought to have been exploded long ago. For never in the history of controversies was there a completer victory than that gained by the champions of Protestant truth who replied to it. Indeed the attack, instead of being injurious, was eminently beneficial to the German Protestants. It led them to examine the foundations of their strength, to bring out the divine armour of truth stored up in the writings of the Reformers. Among the answers which Moehler called forth, some, which are highly spoken of,—for instance, Hengstenberg's and Marheineke's,—I have not seen: but the two that I have read are triumphant. That by Nitzsch is a masterly assertion and vindication of the great Protestant principles which Moehler assailed; and its calm and dignified tone and spirit, its philosophic power and deep Christian wisdom render it one of the noblest among polemical works. Baur on the other hand takes up his Herculean club and smashes Moehler's book to atoms. Immeasurably superior to his adversary through his vast learning and wonderful dialectic power, he pursues him through sophism after sophism, unravels fallacy after fallacy, and strips off misstatement after misstatement, till he leaves him at last in a condition of pitiable

nakedness and forlornness. In several of Baur's other works the Hegelian predominates over the Christian, to the great disparagement and sacrifice of Christian truth; and his criticism has of late years become extravagantly destructive: even in his answer to Moehler his philosophy at times is too obtrusive. But his vindication of the doctrines of the Reformation, and his exposure of the Tridentine fallacies, as well as of Moehler's, is complete. Varus himself hardly fared worse, than the modern who has recently been attempting to bring the countrymen of Arminius under the bondage of Rome (AR). May such be the fate of those who would bring us also under that bondage!

Like conquest may the Church of England see!  
And her foes find a like inglorious grave!

Such being the witness against Luther,—one who, in addition to the common human readiness and carelessness in suspecting evil, labours under so great special disqualifications as render it a moral impossibility for him to look at Luther with a calm, candid eye,—it might be thought that every one who cared for truth, or feared to commit the sin of slander, would have examined his allegations to make out their real purport and bearing. Suppose a man were to quote such words as *I came not to bring peace, but a sword*, and to assert that they are a characteristic specimen of the doctrines of Jesus, what sentence would such a false blasphemer incur? and what should we say of those who took up and repeated his blasphemy, without so much as enquiring after its grounds? Surely we do not need to have it proved, in this sixth millennium of the world, that words, however accurately cited, when wrested from their context, may seem to bear a very different meaning from that in which they were originally uttered.

The first of the two passages we have to examine stands thus in Mr Ward's note. "So thou seest how rich is the Christian; even if he will, he cannot destroy his salvation by any sins how grievous soever, unless he refuse to believe. For no sins can condemn him except unbelief alone. All others, if faith in the divine promise made at Baptism *return or remain, are absorbed in a moment through the same faith.*" These words, if faith be nothing more than an intellectual conviction, are doubtless very false and mischievous. At the same time it is plain on the face of them, even as they stand here, that they will admit of an interpretation, whereby they will only be a strong and abrupt way of declaring that forgiveness of sins which we receive through the death and passion of our blessed Saviour, of which we become partakers by faith, and which is not limited to sins of a certain magnitude, and incapable of embracing the greater, but is sufficient to cover them all,—with the exception at least of the one unpardonable sin,—and, though they are as scarlet, can make them white as snow, though they are like the sins of David, can put them away in a moment.

Now if we turn to the Treatise *De Captivitate Babylonica Ecclesiae*, from which the extract is taken,—a treatise written in 1520, in the very crisis and agony of the conflict between the principle of the old Church and that of the Reformation in Luther's own soul, and therefore necessarily bearing marks of the vehemence of the strife,—we find that it stands in that portion which is devoted to the vindicating of the sacrament of Baptism from its Romish corruptions. After saying that this sacrament, as administered to little children, had been preserved through God's mercy uncontaminated by the manifold abuses which had turned the other into an instrument

of gain, he adds: " But while Satan was unable to extinguish the virtue of Baptism in infants, he yet prevailed so as to extinguish it in all adults; insomuch that there is scarcely anybody who calls to mind that he was baptized, much less who glories in it, so many other ways having been found out for remitting sins and for going to heaven. These notions have been promoted by that dangerous saying of St Jerome's,—in which he calls repentance the second plank after the shipwreck. For hence, when people fell into sin, despairing of the first plank or ship, as though it had been lost, they began to lean and rely solely on the second plank, that is, on repentance. Hence arose those infinite burthens of vows, religious orders (As), works, satisfactions, pilgrimages, indulgences, sects, and out of these those oceans of books, questions, opinions, human traditions, which the whole world can hardly contain, so that this tyranny is oppressing the Church of God incomparably worse, than it ever opprest the Synagogue, or any nation under the sun.— Primarily therefore in Baptism should we attend to the Divine promise, which declares, *He who believes, and is baptized, shall be saved.* Which promise is to be preferred immeasurably to all the pomps of works, vows, religious orders, and whatsoever man has introduced.— This declaration ought to have been inculcated diligently into the people; the promise ought to have been assiduously repeated to them; they should have recurred continually to their Baptism; faith in it ought to have been perpetually excited and cherisht. For as, when this Divine promise has once been brought to bear upon us, its truth endures even to our death, so our faith in it ought never to intermit, but to be fostered and strengthened even to our death by the constant recollection of the promise made to us in Baptism. Wherefore, when

we arise out of our sins, or repent, we do nothing else than return to the virtue of our Baptism, and to that faith in it from which we had fallen; and we recur to the promise then made to us, which through sin we had deserted. For the truth of the promise once made abides for ever, ready with outstretcht hand to receive us when we return.—In the next place it will be no slight benefit, if the penitent laying hold first of all on the recollection of his Baptism, and trustfully calling to mind the Divine promise which he has deserted, acknowledges it to God, rejoicing that he has such a bulwark of safety still in reserve, in that he has been baptized, declaring his detestation of his impious ingratitude in falling away from the faith and truth of his baptism. For his heart will be wonderfully comforted, and animated to a hope of mercy, if he considers that the Divine promise made to him, which cannot lie, is still entire and unchanged, and cannot be changed by any sins of his; as St Paul says, *If we believe not, He abideth faithful: He cannot deny Himself.* This truth of God, I say, will save him, so that, though all other things perish, this, if he believe in it, will not forsake him.—For if the children of Israel, when about to turn to repentance, began by commemorating their coming out of Egypt, and by this recollection returned to the God who brought them out,—which recollection, and this their safeguard, is so often inculcated on them by Moses, and repeated by David,—how much more ought we to commemorate our coming out of our Egypt, and in this recollection to return to Him who brought us out by the laver of a new regeneration, the remembrance of which is enjoined on us for this very purpose!—Thus we read of a certain virgin who, whenever she was tempted, repelled the temptation with her Baptism, saying briefly, *I am a Christian.* For the enemy immediately

understood the virtue of Baptism, and of her faith which relied upon the Truth of God's promise, and fled from her. *Thus you see how rich the Christian or baptized person is, who, even though he wish it, cannot destroy his salvation by any sins whatsoever, unless he will not believe. For no sins can condemn him, except unbelief alone. All others, if faith in the Divine promise made to him at his Baptism return or stand fast, are absorbed in a moment by the same faith, yea, truth of God; because He cannot deny Himself, if you confess Him, and cleave faithfully to His promise.* Whereas contrition, and the confession of sins, and satisfaction for them, and all those human devices, will soon fail you, and make you more unhappy, if, forgetting this Divine truth, you rest upon them. For whatever laborious efforts we make, without faith in God's truth, are the vanity of vanities and vexation of spirit."

From this extract we perceive the real meaning of the words, which Moehler, and Mr Ward after him, hang up in their pages as a scarecrow. Indeed they had already been anathematized by the Council of Trent in its sixth Canon on Baptism, in which these words are cited,—though without mention of Luther's name,—with a sophistical perversion of their meaning, through the omission of the context. Luther,—he, be it remembered, whom Mr Newman charges with "abolishing Sacraments to introduce barren and dead ordinances,"—is speaking of the power of that grace which is conferred on us in our Baptism, and whereby we become the children of God: and he asserts, most truly, that the adoption bestowed on us then is not a mere shadow, but a mighty reality,—that the evangelical promise of the forgiveness of sins, of which we then receive the pledge, is not given merely to Heathens, on their becoming Christians, but to Christians also,—that to the Christian sinner also Christ says,



*Thy sins are forgiven thee*, before He says, *Arise and walk*,—that, if we go to Him with a humble, living faith in the power of His atonement, in the reconciliation which He has wrought for us, our sins, though they be as scarlet,—and who, knowing the terrible depths of sin, will not confess that his are so?—shall be washt out at once, and will not be left for us to wash out by an endless scouring with the sand of good works: whereby, even though they were like the sand of the sea in number, we should be continually deepening the stain, rather than expunging it. *Take thy stand on thy Baptism*, says this disparager of Baptism; *not on thine own works, thine own sorrow, thine own penances, but on God's promise made to thee at thy Baptism. Therein thou wast received by Him to be His child. Be assured that this reception was a reality, that thou didst become His child. Go to Him as such in humble faith. His arms are already stretcht out to receive thee. Great as thy sins may be, let them not keep thee away: they cannot be greater than those of many whom He has received among His saints. Christ did not die for the righteous, but for sinners. The way into the kingdom of heaven has been opened for publicans and harlots; and so is it open for thee* (ΔΤ).

Thus the passage which Mr Ward holds up to reprobation, is in fact an assertion of that blessed truth, which is the only possible comfort for all such as have been brought to a spiritual conviction of sin: and it coincides exactly with the sentences on the same subject cited by my dear friend and brother, Mr Maurice, in the Second Letter in the first edition of his *Kingdom of Christ*; where, strengthening himself with the authority of Luther, he vindicates the same blessed truth against the unscriptural notions concerning post-baptismal sins promulgated by the new Oxford School of Theology. It is

an assertion of the blessed truth declared in the parable of the Prodigal Son, as its meaning and purport have been beautifully explained by Mr Trench,—a truth so blessed that the natural understanding cannot receive it, even after it has been revealed and declared. Hence all those who, following the dictates of their natural understanding, have set themselves to dechristianize Christianity, have ever begun by denying the freedom and fulness of Divine grace, and by maintaining that God cannot give it except to those who will buy it of Him, though the utmost we could do would be to pay a grain of sand for a skyful of light. The irrepressible workings of this spirit have especially manifested themselves in the Church of Rome, and are manifesting themselves among us at this day in our modern Romanizers. They cannot believe that there is joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth. *No, they say, the only cause worthy to make the angels rejoice is the sight of the ninety-nine righteous men who need no repentance.* They cannot reconcile themselves, any more than the elder brother could, to the notion that the Father should bring forth the best robe, and kill the fatted calf, to welcome the returning Prodigal. They are sure that, if the Father receives him at all, it will be as one of his hired servants, to work off his sins by yearlong service, at the rate of a sin a year; whereby forsooth at the end of the world he might just be beginning to clear off the score of his youth, while a fresh score was daily growing against him.

The next passage which Mr Ward quotes, it must be confessed, is very startling: "Be thou a sinner and sin boldly, but still more boldly believe and rejoice in Christ. Sufficient is it that through the riches of the glory of God we know the Lamb who taketh away the sins of the world; from Him sin shall not separate us, no, though a

thousand thousand times in every day we should *commit fornication or murder.*" Verily it does seem here as though hell were casting up its spray into heaven. Still, after our ample experience of the manner in which words may be misrepresented, and after the thousand thousand proofs afforded by Luther's writings and life, that he did know something of the Gospel, we will not be disheartened. At all events we will try to make out what these awful words can mean, to whom they can have been said, for what purpose. Were they said to Simon de Montfort, when he marched against the Albigenses? or to Alva, when he entered on his government in the Netherlands? or to Louis the Fourteenth, when he revoked the edict of Nantes? or to poor Mary, when she mounted the throne after the death of her brother Edward? Were they a dram administered to Charles the Ninth and to Catherine of Medicis on the eve of St Bartholomew? or a *billet-doux* sent to Charles the Second during the progress of his conversion? Or were they a motto written up in the halls of the Inquisition? Or can it be that Luther was once engaged in a friendly correspondence with Munzer? or with Alexander the Sixth? The only hint Mr Ward in his *Ideal* gives about this passage, is, "Here I may add a quotation I made in the *British Critic.*" On turning however to the place in the *British Critic* (xxx. 438), we find that this quotation also is borrowed from Moehler. Mr Ward there says: "As to the natural *tendency* of Luther's principles, the following passage from one of his letters to Melancthon is worthy of observation." To Melancthon, of all men that ever lived! not to Munzer; not to Alexander the Sixth; not to Leo the Tenth: not to Clement the Seventh; but to Melancthon! A strange person truly to choose as the confidant of such a doctrine, as the recipient of such an

exhortation! The Tempter, against whom Luther so often battled, must for once have gained complete possession of him, and turned him into an instrument for destroying the soul of his younger friend.

Mr Ward proceeds: "Its genuineness, we believe, is unquestionable; though his admirers profess they can give it an innocent meaning; nor must it be read without remembering that it was plainly written in haste and under excitement, nor indeed do we quote it as proof of his *habitual* feeling, but the *tendency* of his doctrine in proportion as his conscience should sleep." He then gives the passage, and adds, "Quoted in Moehler's *Symbolique*, French Translation, and acknowledged genuine by Bauer in his answer to Moehler." Here it is noticeable that these apologetical remarks are omitted, when the passage is quoted in the *Ideal*: there it stands in its naked, hateful deformity. Such is the natural advance in recklessness as a person draws nearer to Rome. The nails and cramps which held the vessel of his Conscience together, fly out as he approaches the magnetic mountain; and at last he sinks into the deep. Again, though these remarks might lead one to suppose that Mr Ward had referred to the passage in Luther's letter, with the view of ascertaining the correctness of Moehler's charge, this is not the case. He was already too far gone for that. They merely repeat what Moehler himself had said in nearly the same words. Further,—for I must make one more observation on Mr Ward's mode of citing this passage,—he says it is "acknowledged genuine by Bauer in his answer to Moehler." Of course he means, by *Baur*. Thus much is true: Baur does not think of questioning the genuineness of the passage: indeed no one could, who knows anything of Luther's unmistakable style. But Baur proves that the words quoted by

Moehler, when torn from the context, have an offensive, revolting meaning, which clearly cannot belong to them if they are taken along with it; and he enters into an argument of some length to shew what the real meaning must be, and that it is perfectly innocent. What then are we to think of a person, who appeals to Baur as acknowledging the genuineness of the passage,—which he only does tacitly, by not disputing it,—and yet does not mention that Baur proves from the context that the meaning of the words must be far less offensive than, when we look at them without the context, it seems to be; even supposing that he is not quite successful in establishing his own interpretation of them? Can the fraudulent tricks of calumny be carried to a higher pitch? A man kills a ruffian, whom he finds attempting to violate his wife. A friend deposes that he saw the ruffian attempting the violation, at the time when the incensed husband slew him. Then comes the calumniator, and says, *Here is a man who has committed murder; and his friend testifies that he saw him commit it.* Unless indeed Mr Ward should alledge that, in appealing to Baur, whom he miscalls Bauer, he was acting under the ignorance, which would be the best excuse for so many of his offenses, and that he did not know, except from hearsay, who Baur is, or what he has said.

Let us however do, what Mr Ward ought to have done, and has not done: let us turn to Luther's letter to Melancthon, and try to ascertain the real meaning of these strange words, which the great Reformer utters in the ears of his younger friend. In so doing I shall avail myself of the help afforded by Baur's note in his Answer to Moehler, pp. 651—655, and by the writer whom I have already quoted, in the *Zeitschrift für Protestantismus und Kirche*, II. 216—219. The letter was written on St

Peter's day, 1521, during the second month of Luther's confinement in the Wartburg. We have only a fragment of it, deficient at the beginning; and it is said by Aurifaber to have been found in Spalatin's Library: it had of course been sent to him on account of the important questions it discusses. Here, while we disclaim the notion of trying to get out of the scrape by questioning the genuineness of the letter, the style and substance of which prove that it cannot have been written by any one except Luther, let us equally reject the flimsy apology of its having been written "under excitement." For though he suffered much in bodily health from want of exercise while he was in the Wartburg, yet even in his letters from thence we see that then, as ever, he was the stouthearted, faithful man of God, resolute to do and to suffer all things for the sake of the Truth, and grieving, not on account of any personal dangers or restraints, but solely for the calamities of the Church. Nor do these letters really furnish any support to Coleridge's strange fancy, which he broacht in *the Friend* on the ground of some expressions in them,—but which in after years, when he knew more of Luther, he would probably have laid aside,—that there was any genuine similarity of character between Luther, the healthy man of God, and that morbid, dreaming, unprincipled egotist, Rousseau (AU).

At all events the letter in question is written with the calmest self-possession, and enters into an interesting argument on several matters which were agitating the minds of his friends, especially on the obligatoriness of the clerical and monastic vows with regard to celibacy; concerning which his advice had been sought by Melanchthon; and which at that time Luther inclined to deem binding on the regular, but not on the secular

clergy. He then speaks on the administration of the Eucharist in one or two kinds. Carlstadt and some of his more violent followers seem to have been already promulgating the opinions, which a few months after gave rise to the disturbances at Wittenberg spoken of above, and to have been declaring that to receive the Eucharist under one kind was in itself a positive sin. Luther on the other hand, with that exemplary sobriety of judgement which he displayed through life in all practical matters, contends, as he ever does with regard to outward things, that they should be left to right themselves, that the peace of the Church should not be disturbed by precipitate and violent innovations, and that his friends ought to content themselves with preaching the truth, holding fast the assurance that, when that was duly recognised, the errors of discipline and practice would fall to the ground. In Carlstadt's opinion Melanchthon seems to have participated. Were his previous letter remaining, it would doubtless explain the difficulties in Luther's answer; but, as all his letters to Luther in the Wartburg are lost, we are left to make out the tenour of it from Luther's reply.

The point he mainly discusses is, whether the receiving in one kind is a sin. "Nihil arguit illos, unam accipientes, *peccasse vel non peccasse*.—Nec consentiunt pia corda privari altera specie: qui vero consentiunt et probant, *eos—peccare quis negabit?* Cum ergo non exigat (Christus) necessario, et hic urgeat tyrannus, *non video quomodo peccent unam accipientes*.—Scriptura nihil definit, *sine qua peccatum pronunciaré non possumus*.—In summa, *quia Scriptura non urget hic peccatum esse, peccatum non assero*." He then expresses his approbation that, at Wittenberg, where they had the power, they had resolved to re-establish Christ's original institution in its integrity, and declares his own purpose never again to celebrate a

private mass : “ et ego amplius non faciam missam privatam in aeternum.” After this he speaks of the calamities which he seems to himself to see impending over Germany. “ Obsecro oremus Dominum ut festinet nobis ampliorem Spiritum suum dare. Suspicio enim fore ut cito visitet Dominus Germaniam, sicut meretur ejus incredulitas, impietas, et odium Evangelii. At haec plaga tum nobis imputabitur, quod haeretici Deum provocaverimus, erimusque *opprobrium hominum et abjectio plebis*: illi vero apprehendent excusationes in peccatis suis, et justificabunt semet ipsos, ut probet reprobos neque bonitate neque ira bonos fieri: *et scandalisabuntur multi*. Fiat, fiat voluntas Domini. Amen.” And now, after this solemn prognostication of the evils hanging over the Church, he turns to Melanchthon, and winds up his letter with the following exhortation. “ Si gratiae praedicator es, gratiam non fictam, sed veram praedica : si vera gratia est, verum, non fictum peccatum ferto : Deus non facit salvos fecte peccatores. Esto peccator, et pecca fortiter ; sed fortius fide et gaude in Christo, qui victor est peccati, mortis, et mundi. Peccandum est, quam diu sic sumus. Vita haec non est habitatio justitiae ; sed exspectamus, ait Petrus, *coelos novos et terram novam, in quibus justitia habitat*. Sufficit, quod agnovimus per divitias gloriae Dei Agnum, qui tollit peccatum mundi : ab hoc non avellet nos peccatum, etiamsi millies, millies uno die fornicemur aut occidamus. Putas, tam parvum esse pretium et redemptionem pro peccatis nostris factam in tanto ac tali Agno ? Ora fortiter : es enim fortissimus peccator.”

When we read this passage in connexion with the rest of the letter, especially with the solemn prophecy which just precedes it, thus much assuredly is quite plain, that, even if Luther could at other times have given admission to the opinions, which the mutilated words cited and



mistranslated by Mr Ward seem to imply, and which he may truly characterize as too bad “even for the devils,”—and could have avowed them to Melanchthon, nay, could have urged Melanchthon to act upon them, could have urged him to continue reveling in the grossest sin, in order that *grace might abound*,—at all events he must have been stark mad to have done this immediately after speaking in such a tone of the evils coming on the Church, that is, on the lovers of truth in it, whereat their enemies would exult and triumph, and many would be offended (AV). Unless some evil spirit had actually taken possession of him, he could not just then have cried to Melanchthon, *Come, brother, let us sin, let us wallow in sin, so that our enemies may indeed have good reason to exult and triumph over us, and that all the lovers of godliness may be offended*. But further, on reading over the whole passage it is manifest that the words, *esto peccator et peccator titer*, are dependent upon, or at least closely connected with the sentence which precedes them. *Si gratiae praedicator es, gratiam non fictam sed veram praedica : si vera gratia est, verum, non fictum peccatum ferto : Deus non facit salvos fecte peccatores*. If we had Melanchthon’s letter, this would probably be quite clear. As it is, the passage quoted above, in p. 138, from the Commentary on the Galatians happily comes to our aid, and explains what Luther means by *fictum peccatum* and *fecte peccatores*. We there found him inveying against that miserable ignorance of the pervading sinfulness of human nature, which led people to devise artificial sins, that they might have something to confess and be forgiven for. “*Ratio humana vellet libenter Deo offerre et adducere fictum et simulatum peccatorem.—Ne penitus mundi sint, fingunt quaedam peccata, ut pro illorum venia possint—orare.—Disce hic ex Paulo credere, Christum non pro fictis aut*

*pictis, sed veris*, non pro parvis, sed maximis,—*peccatis traditum esse.*” Shortly after he adds, “Muniamus igitur cor nostrum his et similibus Scripturae sententiis, ut diabolo accusanti, *Tu es peccator, ergo damnatus*, respondere possimus, Quia tu me peccatorem dicis, ideo volo esse justus et salvus. *Imo damnaberis.* Non. Confugio enim ad Christum, qui semetipsum tradidit pro peccatis meis. Nihil igitur efficies tu Satan, quod proponendo peccati magnitudinem conaris me perterrefacere, et sic adducere in tristitiam, diffidentiam, desperationem, odium, contemptum, et blasphemiam Dei. Imo per hoc, quod me peccatorem dicis, ministras mihi arma contra te, ut tuo proprio gladio te jugulare et conculcare possim, quia Christus propter peccatores mortuus est. Deinde tu ipse mihi praedicas gloriam Dei. Nam commonefacis me paternae dilectionis Dei erga me miserum et perditum peccatorem, qui *sic dilexit mundum, ut Filium suum daret*, etc. Item, quoties objicis me esse peccatorem, toties revocas mihi in memoriam beneficium Christi Redemptoris mei, in cujus humeris, non meis, jacent omnia peccata mea.”

This passage affords us a clew to what is perplexing in the letter to Melancthon. When we look back to the previous argument about the Eucharist, it seems evident that Melancthon must have been insisting on the sinfulness of receiving in one kind. This Luther speaks of as a *fictum peccatum*, and says, You, who are a preacher of Grace, remember that the Grace you are to preach of is not a makebelieve, but a mighty reality, and that it is not bestowed on us for the forgiveness of artificial peccadilloes, but of those awful, cleaving sins, of which every man with an awakened conscience must acknowledge himself guilty. God sent His Son into the world to save real sinners, not *fictæ peccatores*. Therefore *esto peccator, et pecca fortiter*: acknowledge that thou art a sinner; but

be of good heart notwithstanding: *do not torment thyself about peccadilloes*: let not the consciousness of thy sins drive thee to despair: believe in Christ, and rejoice in Him, who is the Conqueror of sin and death and the world; and let this faith and joy prevail over the consciousness of thy sins. We needs must sin, so long as we are in our present state. This life is not the habitation of righteousness; but we *look*, St Peter tells us, *for a new heaven and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness*. It is enough that through the riches of the glory of God we have known *the Lamb who taketh away the sin of the world*. From Him sin shall not separate us, *etiamsi millies, millies uno die fornicemur aut occidamus*. Thinkest thou that the price and redemption offered for our sins by this Divine Lamb is so small, that it will not avail to cover your *ficta peccata*? Pray boldly and instantly; for thou art a very great sinner (AW).

That this paraphrase expresses the real meaning of the passage which has been held up to reprobation by Mr Ward, I cannot doubt. In his citation it is mutilated and mistranslated; but whether the guilt of the mutilation and mistranslation belongs wholly to him, or is shared by the French translator, I have not the means of determining. In the third edition of the German *Symbolik*, Moehler begins the Latin quotation with *Si gratiae prae-dicator es*, and carries it down to *in tanto ac tali Agno*: thus one may divine that the meaning of the passage is not so utterly monstrous; though the portion which he renders into German, as it were, for the sake of deluding his unlearned reader, is only coextensive with Mr Ward's extract. From what Baur says, it would seem as if in Moehler's first edition nothing had been given except this mutilated translation; and it is possible that this may have been the original of the French version. Still the

extract just before is professedly taken by Mr Ward from the English translation, which is from the latest German edition: and it is the very passage in a note on which Moehler introduces the extract from the letter to Melanchthon. Hence at all events it was disgraceful carelessness in Mr Ward not to correct his quotation thereby. Again, Luther's words, rightly cited in the *Symbolik*, are *etiamsi millies, millies uno die fornicemur aut occidamus*; whereas Mr Ward renders them, "Though a thousand thousand times *in every day* we should commit fornication and murder." Perhaps this may be imputable to the French translator; for Mr Ward's learning must surely be extensive enough to know that *in uno die* does not mean *in every day*. Though it might perhaps be shewn that there are a score of blunders in one page of Mr Ward's *Ideal*, we should not be quite justified in saying that there are a score of blunders *in every page*. This mistranslation serves his purpose of blasting Luther's fame, inasmuch as it substitutes a hellish horror,—the thought that a continuous life of the most atrocious sin can coexist with faith and prayer and Christ's righteousness,—for that which, justly offensive as it may be, is so mainly from its peculiar, Lutheran extravagance of expression (AX).

Let me here remind the reader that, in estimating what is personally reprehensible in such expressions, we are bound to look at them in connexion with the tone and style of the age. Now in the age of the Schoolmen, as has been the case in every age when metaphysical speculation has been active, it became a common practice to enunciate paradoxical propositions in a startling form; it might be in mere defiance to the common sense of mankind,—the fondness for being stared at being often no less busy in the student's closet than in the dressingroom

of the fop,—or it might be for the sake of exemplifying the fallaciousness of vulgar prejudices, or of shewing how often common opinions, even when sound in themselves, are maintained on untenable grounds. The very forms too of the scholastic logic, and the manner in which the exercises were conducted, encouraged such a habit. Hence everybody who has heard anything about the Schoolmen, has heard of some of their paradoxical propositions; and the custom of asserting such propositions in scholastic exercises has come down traditionally even to our times. Indeed they have their use with a view to the training of the logical and dialectic faculties. A large collection of such theses is to be found in the first volume of Luther's Latin works: and the singular clearness of his understanding, the distinctness and rapidity with which he ever discerns a central, germinal truth, and separates it from its adjuncts and accidents, bear witness to the benefit of this training, when kept in check by such masculine sense and such stern conscientiousness.

Some of these propositions however have been pickt out by his enemies for reprobation, especially one which asserts, *Si in fide fieri posset adulterium, peccatum non esset*. Yet this proposition is logically true; though doubtless it would be rank folly, if not worse, to scatter such sayings abroad among those who are likely to misunderstand and misuse them. But however offensive and mischievous this proposition may seem, when taken insulatedly, if we look at it in the original chain of theses, by which Luther in the year 1520 set forth the great truth, that faith, as the recipient of justification, is exclusive of works, and that unbelief is the prime, fontal sin, the source of all other sins, the meaning of the paradox is quite plain: and we see how he was led to assert it in this naked form, while contending against the dismal confusion

which prevailed with regard to the relation between faith and works. That relation is strikingly declared in the following antithetical paradoxes: *Fides nisi sit sine ullis, etiam minimis operibus, non justificat, imo non est fides. Impossible est fidem esse sine assiduis, multis, et magnis operibus.* Hence it is plain what is the purpose of the thesis selected for reprobation, and how it is to be answered, by the denial, not of the consequence, but of the premiss; for if the premiss be granted, the consequence must follow (AY). Logically it is analogous to such common sayings, as *If the sky falls, we shall catch larks*; which serve a like purpose of sharpening the faculty of making distinctions: and though it would be justly shocking to use such a moral paradox for this comparatively trivial purpose, Luther's saying is justified by the occasion which called it forth, and the company amid which it stands, which sufficiently guards it against misapprehension.

It is true, the logical and dialectic faculties have no immunity from abuse, any more than the other talents committed to man. To make our moral convictions the subject of analysis, to question them as if they might be erroneous, though for the sake of establishing them more securely, must needs brush off the dew of reverence which hangs on the mind at dawn: it may foster indifference to positive truth: it may encourage the conceited to fancy that, by acquiring the power of playing tricks with words, they also acquire a right of playing tricks with realities, and are elevated thereby far above the reach of those, the sum of whose knowledge is that *Yea is Yea*, and that *Nay is Nay*. Nor need we go back to Plato and Aristophanes, in order to see how dialectic subtilties may be perverted to the undermining of all moral distinctions. The casuistry of later ages has afforded too many grievous

proofs that the intellect in Christian countries may be as corrupt and corruptive as ever it was among the Heathens. The point however which I am urging here, is that the familiarity with such speculations will naturally breed a habit of asserting broad, absolute propositions, without the limitations arising from their combination with the other elements of human nature, and of putting impossible cases, with the view of distinguishing the essential principle from all its accidental accompaniments.

Now in the passage of Luther which we are considering, the real offensiveness lies in the monstrous exaggeration of the language. The indignation bestowed upon him might indeed have been bestowed most deservedly upon the truly atrocious and blasphemous proposition, whereby the venders of Indulgences, whom he assailed, tried to lure purchasers for their trumpery,—*Venias papales tantas esse, ut solvere possint hominem, etiamsi quis per impossibile Dei Genitricem violasset.* Such a proposition is indeed an abomination in the sight of God and of man: yet this doctrine, which Mr Ward might well call *too bad for the devils*, the flagitious hierarchy encouraged; or at least they would not repress and condemn their emissaries for proclaiming it, even when called upon and earnestly implored to do so. Luther's proposition on the other hand is fundamentally true: his words render it probable that he was thinking of David's crimes: the addition of *millies millies*, as everybody acquainted with his writings will recognise at once, is a mere Lutherism. Most readers will remember his answer to Spalatin with regard to the advice of his friends, who would have dissuaded him from venturing to Worms, that, *even if there were as many devils in Worms as there were tiles on the housetops, still he would go thither.* So again, in his grand letter to the Elector from the Wartburg, when he

declares his resolution of returning to Wittenberg, he says he will not be withheld by fear of Duke George. *This I know full well of myself, if affairs at Leipsic were in the same case as now at Wittenberg, I would ride thither, even though (your Electoral Grace must forgive my foolish speech) it were to rain pure Duke Georges for nine days, and each one of them were nine times more furious than this.* These instances are notorious: a multitude of similar ones might be cited from Luther's writings, especially from those belonging to this critical period of his life, when all his powers were stretcht beyond themselves by the stress of the conflict. To our nicer ears such expressions may seem in bad taste. Be it so. When a Titan is walking about among the pygmies, the earth seems to rock beneath his tread. Mont Blanc would be out of keeping in the Regent's Park; and what would be the outcry if it were to toss its head and shake off an avalanche or two? Such however is the dulness of the elementary powers, they have not apprehended the distinction between force and violence. In like manner, when the adamantine bondage in which men's hearts and souls and minds had been held for centuries, was to be burst, it was almost inevitable that the power which was to burst this should not measure its movements by the rules of polisht life (AZ). Erasmus did so; Melanchthon did so; but a thousand Erasmuses would never have effected the Reformation: nor would a thousand Melanchthons, without Luther to go before him and to animate him.

Should any doubt remain as to the correctness of the foregoing explanation, it must be removed by the following extract from the beautiful letter (No 375 in De Wette's Collection), written a few months after to Hartmuth of Kronberg, who had been deprived of his domains



in consequence of his attachment to the cause of the Reformation. The train of thought is the very same. After speaking of the disasters and scandal brought on the cause by the disturbances at Wittenberg, Luther says, he thinks that these things may have happened in part as a punishment to himself, "for this reason, because at Worms, to oblige some good friends, that I might not be deemed too stiffnecked, I quenched my spirit, and did not deliver my confession before the tyrant more haughtily and severely; although the unbelieving heathens have since reviled me for the insolence of my answers. They judge as heathens (such they are) must judge, who have never felt the power of the Spirit or of faith. I have often repented of my humility and respectful conduct. But, be this as it may, whether I sinned or acted rightly, let us nevertheless be undaunted and undismayed. For as we do not vaunt ourselves on our good deeds, neither do we despond at our sins. We thank God that our faith stands higher than good deeds or sins. For the Father of all mercy has given to us to believe, not in a wooden, but in a living Christ, who is Lord over sin and innocence, and who can raise and preserve us, *even though we were to fall into a thousand and again a thousand sins every hour*. Of this I have no doubt. And even though Satan try us still more fiercely and cruelly, he shall not make us faint, unless he find a way to pluck down Christ from the right hand of God. Because Christ continues sitting there, we too shall still be lords and masters over sin, death, the devil, and all things: nothing shall hinder us." It may be well to remark that *the thousand and thousand sins every hour* here spoken of must not be appealed to in defense of Mr Ward's translating *uno die* by *every day*. For the context shews the nature of the sins referred to, that they are sins of ignorance and of infirmity; so that

this passage merely bears witness to Luther's intense feeling of clinging, pervading sinfulness.

I will add one more extract to shew how habitually Luther's imagination contemplated its objects in large masses and swarms, a habit naturally fostered by the consciousness that he had long been standing almost single, and at certain critical moments altogether so, against the world. Only while in common cases it is fear that multiplies its enemies, with him it was courage: their number itself seemed to make him still bolder; for he felt he was protected by Him who is One, and who yet is mightier than all the myriad myriads of the universe. The passage comes from a Sermon preached during the plague at Wittenberg in 1539, calling upon the citizens not to run away, and is printed by Walch, vol. x. p. 2349. "This is not a time to fly; but we must do what Christ bids us in Matthew xxv. 35: *I was an hungry, &c.* You know that I never fled in the plague, but staid through it with my whole house and family. Yet I might have fled with a good conscience, especially having the Prince Elector's command. Not so. He who has grown to his wife, brothers, children, sisters, neighbours, let him stay, and help and comfort in the common danger. We all owe each other a death. Thus am I now your parson and makeshift, am tied to my pulpit, *from which a hundred pestilences shall not drive me away*; but I shall remain to visit the sick with my priests. If we die in this work of love, well for us: *our last hour will be better for us than a thousand years of life.* On the other hand, if you fly from your distresses, *the time will come when you would rather have died a thousand times over*" (BA).

OBSERVATIONS ON DR MILL'S REMARKS  
ON LUTHER.

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HERE I am constrained, though with pain and reluctance, to remark that a writer of a very different stamp from Mr Ward has committed the same sin of citing the same mutilated words with the purpose of holding up Luther to condemnation. Yes, sin it is, and sin it ought to be called, so long as the Ninth Commandment keeps its place in the Decalogue, to take up slander hastily, without examination, and to repeat it and circulate it through the world, and that too against a man whose memory has been an object of sacred reverence to millions for ten generations. In fact, the higher the character borne by him who does so, the more such conduct ought to be reprobated. That which in Mr Ward may seem of a piece with his ordinary procedure, is doubly painful in such a man as Dr Mill, a grave man, a thoughtful man, deliberate and weighty in most of his judgements, and one of the very few in our days who uphold the reputation of English divines for theological learning. Yet, wide as his learning is, and in some departments profound and accurate, it is unfortunately by no means so in the region against which he has been induced by the present state of theology to direct his polemical batteries. The intelligent reader of Dr Mill's attacks on modern German philosophy has frequent occasion to regret that the assailant is not more intimately acquainted with the authors he is assailing, and will think

it would have been better that he who professes to teach the English public what great reason they have for abhorring Hegel and Schelling, should at least have read some fair portion of the works he so strongly condemns: whereas it is quite clear that, when he went forth to war against those celebrated philosophers, he had not read a word of Hegel, beyond a few extracts in other writers, and very little of Schelling: nor does he even seem to have known that for the last twelve years Schelling has been strongly contending against Hegel, and has made, or at all events professes to make, the idea of personality and of a personal God the central principle of his system (BB). When we remember however what is the ordinary practice among Englishmen, who give vent to their bile and their self-satisfaction in abusing German Philosophy and Theology, it may not be thought surprising that even such a man as Dr Mill should deem himself warranted in passing sentence without searching into the merits of the case. But it does seem strange that he should count it right to act on the same plan toward Luther; unless indeed he holds that the sins of the children are to be visited on the father, and that Luther is to be brought to summary punishment on account of the extravagances of modern Rationalism and Pantheism (BC).

At all events, from whatsoever cause, he seems to delight in seizing an occasion of snarling at Luther, or rather at scraps of Luther, and opinions entertained by Luther, which he has happened to meet with in the course of his miscellaneous reading. Thus, having learnt from Coleridge's *Tabletalk* that Luther had conjectured that the Epistle to the Hebrews may have been written by Apollos, he dismisses this conjecture with a contemptuous mark of admiration in a note on his *Praelectio*

*Theologica* ; though surely this is not the way for a divine to treat an opinion which the two recent learned editors of that Epistle, Bleek and Tholuck, have confirmed, after an elaborate investigation, by the sanction of their voices, extolling it as an instance of Luther's remarkable "critical tact." Thus again, in note Z to his *Sermons on the Temptation*, he extracts a fine passage from Chillingworth's Sermon on Rom. viii. 34, where that masterly logician, after speaking of the enemies that have no power over the Christian, adds: "Yet for all St Paul's exactness there remains one enemy behind; and that is a sore one of prime note; and truly I wonder how the Apostle could miss him: and that is sin. I would to God St Paul had taken notice of him; for this one enemy is able to do us more harm than all the rest put together; nay, but for sin, all the rest almost were our very good friends. Had we best supply St Paul's inco-  
 gitancy, and even adventure to put him in the catalogue too? Well, let those that have a mind to do it, do it: truly I dare not. And but that I know Martin Luther was a bold-spirited man, I should wonder how he durst so confidently have ventured upon it. In his book entitled *Captivitatis Babylonicae*, cap. *de Baptismo*, near the beginning, he hath these words: *Vides quam dives sit homo Christianus sive baptizatus, qui etiam volens non potest perdere suam salutem quantiscunque peccatis, nisi nolit credere.*—Only let us do thus much for St Paul's credit, to believe it was not merely inconsiderateness in him to leave out sin in this catalogue; that there was some ground of reason for it. For though it may come to pass, by the mercy and goodness of God, that even sin itself shall not pluck us out of his hand, yet it would be something a strange preposterous doctrine for a preacher of the New Covenant to proclaim that we

shall undoubtedly obtain the promises of the Covenant, though we never so much break the conditions."

After what has been said in explanation of this extract from Luther, it will not, I trust, need further apology. Still I will take leave to remark that, while Chillingworth's calm and grave tone in speaking of it shines much to his advantage, when contrasted with that of Luther's modern assailants, his argument in the last sentence is built on the erroneous notion that the evangelical dispensation is a Covenant (BD). Besides we here find that same reluctance and inability to recognise the Son of God as the friend of publicans and sinners, which characterize the whole body of Arminian Theology, and whereby that Theology relapst Romeward, after the grand assertion of that truth at the Reformation. Moreover, with all Chillingworth's acuteness, we here see how,—in this respect also like the other Arminian divines, though as a logician far superior to most of them,—he used the truths at the surface as the materials of his logical processes, instead of digging down to those at the centre. For what is the confidence which St Paul entertains that no power whatsoever will be able to separate us from the love of God manifested in Jesus Christ? It must either be that no enemy whatsoever will be able to draw us into any sort of sin; in which case he would be contradicting the whole tenour of his own doctrine, as well as the strong declaration in St John's first Epistle (1. 8, 10), and would raise the justified Christian beyond the need of using the fifth petition in the Lord's Prayer. Or else it must mean that, although they whom God has chosen and justified will still fall continually into sin, while they abide in our present state of infirmity, yet the grace of the Spirit shall so strengthen them, that, notwithstanding the number and power of

their enemies, these shall not prevail over them, so as finally to separate them from the love of God, and to nullify the propitiation of their Heavenly Intercessor. But if this be the true interpretation of that passage in St Paul, though Sin is not expressly enumerated among the enemies that shall not separate us from God, it is implied throughout that, as he says in another place, Sin shall not have dominion over us. In other words, the passage of Luther which Chillingworth finds fault with, if we bate its overstrong expressions, will be found to be in unison with that of St Paul.

Dr Mill however, after his quotation from Chillingworth, adds: "The same author who wrote the words quoted, and in whose Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians similar sentiments may be found, gave utterance also to the following, in a letter to Melancthon: 'Sufficit quod agnovimus, per divitias gloriæ Dei, Agnum qui tollit peccata mundi: ab hoc *non avellet nos peccatum, etiamsi millies millies uno die fornicemur aut occidamus.*' Greater outrage against the grace of Christ can scarcely be conceived, than the maintenance of such propositions under the idea of magnifying it." What an erroneous impression of Luther's meaning these words, standing by themselves, convey, has been sufficiently shewn. Not that Dr Mill intended to mislead his readers: doubtless he took the quotation from some one else, probably from Moehler. But at all events, when such a man is beguiled, in whatever way, into committing such an act of injustice against Luther, it is a lamentable instance of that torpour of the literary conscience in England, of which I complained above. Verily every teacher in England ought to make it one of his first businesses to write these golden words from Niebuhr's Letter to a Student of Philology on the minds and hearts of his pupils. "Above

all things, in every branch of literature and science, ought we to preserve our truth so pure, as utterly to shun all false show,—so as never to assert anything, however slight, for certain, of which we are not thoroughly convinced,—so as to take the utmost pains, when we are expressing a conjecture, to make the degree of our belief apparent. If we do not, where it is possible, ourselves point out defects which we perceive, and which others are not likely to discover,—if, when we lay down our pen, we cannot say, in the presence of God, *I have written nothing knowingly, which, after a severe examination, I do not believe to be true ; in nothing have I deceived my reader, either with regard to myself or others ; nor have I set my most odious adversary in any other light than I would answer for at my last hour,—if we cannot do this, learning and literature make us unprincipled and depraved*” (BE).



REPLY TO SIR W. HAMILTON'S ATTACKS  
ON LUTHER.

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NIEBUHR adds, immediately after the passage just cited, "Here I am conscious that I demand nothing from others, of which a higher spirit, reading my soul, could reproach me with ever having done the reverse:" and the most diligent and minute examination of his writings has taught me that he was thoroughly warranted in saying so. How many English writers in our days may rightfully say the same I know not, except my fellowlabourer in that translation of his Roman History, which we both felt to be scarcely less valuable as a moral than as an intellectual discipline. That several of our celebrated writers have no notion of this sort of veracity, we have seen: at all events no such notion can ever have crossed Mr Ward's mind, or that of his second witness, whom we have still to cross-examine. He is one just after Mr Ward's own heart. Such a string of charges as he brings against Luther has rarely been seen. After a number of other very grave counts in the indictment, he goes so far as to accuse him of "publicly preaching incontinence, adultery, incest even, as not only allowable, but, if practised under the prudential regulations which he himself lays down, unobjectionable, and even praiseworthy." Not a tittle of evidence indeed is adduced in proof of these tremendous accusations; and though many of the others are asserted to be proved by quotations of Luther's own words, hardly a single

reference is given for them. This would cast suspicion on the evidence in the judgement of any conscientious person, or at all events would make him wait till he had ascertained the correctness of the statements, before he defiled his pen by repeating them. Such scruples however do not trouble Mr Ward: the more virulent the abuse, the more eagerly he catches it up and propagates it.

This witness, as cited by Mr Ward, appears in an amphibious character, as the writer of an Article in the *Edinburgh Review* (No. CXXI), on the Admission of Dissenters to our Universities, and as the author of a pamphlet on the Schism in the Church of Scotland. The pamphlet bears the name of Sir William Hamilton; and Mr Ward says of the Article in the Review, that "it can be no discourtesy to attribute it to its universally acknowledged author, Sir W. Hamilton." Since the Pamphleteer refers to the Article as his own (in p. 59), in order to correct a misstatement in it, Mr Ward is clearly warranted in ascribing it to him. Else it would be a very doubtful honour. The Article is one of a series attacking the English Universities, especially that of Oxford; which series certainly exhibited much learning and considerable logical power, but was characterized, as is truly said in a Note to the *Lectures on the Question whether the Church or the State has the Power to educate the Nation*, (p. 311), "by extreme and even ludicrous ferocity:" and one of the series is there not incorrectly described "as having for its immediate object the establishment of these two propositions, first, that all who took the side opposite to that espoused by the Reviewer were villains; and secondly, that all who took the same side with him were fools:" while, as might be expected from so renowned a logician, "the ultimate object was of course to prove the sinfulness and inexpediency of bigotry,

and inculcate charity and good will." In truth it is much such an Article as might be expected to have come from Polyphemus after the loss of his eye, or from Ajax in his madness. The blows are as violent, and dealt out with almost equal discrimination.

Nevertheless Mr Ward says, "Sir W. Hamilton's authority is a sufficient voucher for the accuracy of the quotations, but unfortunately he does not specify his references." To this I would reply, that no authority whatsoever, not even that of Aristides or the Duke of Wellington, ought to be taken as a voucher for such a vague mass of scurrilous slander. Truth is definite and distinct, above all is scrupulously so, when constrained to speak evil. It is the calumniator who casts his charges pellmell into a witches caldron. What weight then can any one, with the slightest sense of justice, attach to the unsupported assertions of a writer who has shewn himself capable of being hurried along by such blind fury? Mr Ward too, be it remembered, must have been personally enabled to appreciate the correctness of accusations branding the whole governing body of the University of Oxford for many generations with the foulest crimes and the most groveling motives. What can be the worth of such testimony, when imputing the public preaching of these abominations to a man whose name has been revered above all other human names for three centuries by the most truth-seeking and truth-loving nation upon earth, a nation inferior to none in the purity of its domestic morals, notwithstanding the foreign importations whereby during a part of those three centuries the higher classes have been grievously tainted? Surely it may be termed a moral impossibility, that Luther should "publicly have preached incontinence, adultery, incest," and yet that all the learning of Protestant Germany, which explores the

hidden things of every nation and age, should never have found it out,—nay, that all the sharp-eyed malignity of his Romish enemies should never have brought forward the evidence of these facts, in such a mode as to convince and confound their opponents. Nor is it less a moral impossibility, that, if these accusations could have been established on conclusive evidence, the moral sense of Protestant Germany would not have been revolted thereby, and, bitter as the pain might have been, have torn its love and reverence for Luther out of its bleeding heart. Still, in defiance of this twofold moral impossibility, Mr Ward is pleased, through a sort of fraternal affection for a writer so nearly akin to him in the calmness and sobriety requisite for the exercise of judicial functions, to say that the writer's name "is a sufficient voucher for the accuracy of his quotations," that is, of course, not merely for their literal, verbal accuracy, but for the correctness of the meaning which they needs must, and are evidently designed to convey.

Yet the very mode in which the charges against Luther are lugged into the Review, ought to have discredited them; inasmuch as the worst part of them is no way connected with the writer's theme, but seems foisted in to give vent to some personal antipathy or animosity. In contending against an argument which had been used for retaining the tests in our Universities, on the ground that the abolition of them might open the way for a laxity of opinion, such as has prevailed in those of Germany, the Reviewer asserts, "We can easily show—that there is hardly an obnoxious doctrine to be found among the modern Lutherans, which has not its warrant and example in the writings of Luther himself." This is a bold assertion; and the more one knows of Luther, and of that which is objectionable in modern German

theology and philosophy, the more audacious it seems : nor does its audacity diminish, when we examine the proofs by which the Reviewer supports it. To bear out his argument, as well as his assertion, the extravagances of opinion alledged against Luther ought to have been of the same kind as those complained of in the modern German Universities. When it is urged that the teaching in the German Universities is destructive of the Divine authority of Christianity, that it degrades Jesus into a mere man, a teacher of morality, that it divests Him of His superhuman powers, that it substitutes some form of natural religion, Deism, or even Pantheism or Atheism, for the Revelation and Incarnation of a personal God, it is utterly wide of the mark to answer, *Why, Luther did the same thing: he carried the doctrine of predestination and absolute decrees to a wild and shocking extreme*; more especially if we consider that in so doing he was building wholly on what he believed to be the only legitimate sense of the express declarations in Scripture, and that he was reviving the doctrine of Augustin in opposition to the Pelagianism of his age. Or how is the argument enforced by the statement that Luther basely compromised the truth in allowing the Landgrave of Hesse to marry a second wife during the life of the first? However disgraceful or criminal his conduct may have been, it was his own act, and that of his colleagues; nay, the worse it was, the more it was theirs, and the further removed from the controversy about tests. A logician like the Reviewer, who is so fond of displaying his logical dexterity, would not have tript thus, unless some blind passion had driven him headlong. He must have been cherishing some secret aversion to Luther; and being irritated by finding him spoken of with praise by the opponent whom he was refuting, he took

fire and resolved to give vent to his spleen. So he gathers together what he calls "a hasty anthology of some of Luther's opinions," picking out every thorn and briar, every nettle and thistle, everything poisonous and deadly, that he fancies can be found in him. Now hasty assuredly it is, even to a pitch of rashness and recklessness and slovenliness: but the very confession of hastiness ought to have convinced Mr Ward, that the name of a writer who can bring such grave charges against a great and holy man, or at least a man so reputed to be such, hastily, could never be a sufficient voucher for the correctness of his statements.

This hasty *anthology*, as the Reviewer terms it, by a *litotes* like that which gave the Furies the name of the Eumenides, is divided into three classes, *Speculative Theology*, *Practical Theology*, and *Biblical Criticism*. Under the first head his hasty researches have only enabled him to cite the following sentences, in which the doctrine of God's absolute decrees is asserted, in what seems a very offensive manner. "God pleaseth you when he crowns the unworthy; he ought not to displease you when he damns the innocent. All things take place by the eternal and invariable will of God, who blasts and shatters in pieces the freedom of the will. God creates in us the evil, in like manner as the good. The high perfection of faith, is to believe that God is just notwithstanding that, by his will, he renders us necessarily damnable, and seemeth to find pleasure in the torments of the miserable."

Much of this sounds very horrible; but never is the utmost exactitude of greater importance than in arguments on these awful subjects. As a slight obstacle on a railway will drive a rapid train out of its course, and may occasion its destruction, so a few little words more or less

in such speculations will turn truth into blasphemous falsehood. Now in the sentences just transcribed we immediately perceive one expression which Luther cannot have written in the sense the Reviewer means it to bear. He cannot have spoken of God as *damning the innocent*, directly and absolutely: for he could not regard any man as *innocent* before God's judgement-seat. The Reviewer, as usual, gives us no reference; but we may guess that the quotation comes from the Treatise *De Servo Arbitrio*, the object of which is to reassert a most important and profound truth, a truth grievously obscured in those days by the practical Pelagianism of the Church: and the assertion of this truth was a great service to Christian Theology and Philosophy, notwithstanding the occasional harshnesses and exaggerations of expression.

As the sentences just quoted stand in the Review, they seem to form one continuous passage. But when we look through the Treatise *De Servo Arbitrio*, we discover to our surprise that they are culled out from various parts of it, with long intervals between them, and that they are monstrously garbled and misrepresented. I dare say the Reviewer himself does not know this; and he may perhaps be thankful to see the originals of his quotation. Well! if he will look into the third volume of the Jena edition, p. 207 a, he will find Luther arguing thus against an objection urged by Erasmus in his *Diatribes de Libero Arbitrio* on the score of justice: "Vides ergo Diatriben cum suis in hac causa non iudicare secundum aequitatem, sed secundum affectum commodi sui. Si enim aequitatem spectaret, aequo expostularet cum Deo, dum indignos coronat, atque expostulat cum eo, dum immeritos damnat. Aequo etiam laudaret et praedicaret Deum, dum damnat immeritos, atque facit, dum indignos salvat. Utrobique

enim par iniquitas, si sensum nostrum spectes; nisi non fuerit aequè iniquum si Cain ob homicidium laudes regemque facias, atque si Habel innocentem in carcerem conjicias aut occidas. Cum igitur ratio Deum laudet indignos salvantem, arguat vero immeritos damnantem, convincitur non laudare Deum ut Deum, sed ut suo commodo servientem: hoc est, seipsam et quae sua sunt in Deo quaerit et laudat, non Deum aut quae Dei sunt. *At si placet tibi Deus indignos coronans, non debet etiam displicere immeritos damnans.*" Here the sentence which the Reviewer sets at the head of Luther's offensive sayings, and which, as so placed, can only be understood absolutely,—nay, which he plainly meant to be understood absolutely,—comes in as one in a chain of strictly logical propositions, in reply to a particular argument used by Erasmus. Luther is not declaring his own belief, but merely reducing his opponent's argument *ad absurdum*.

Turn we back eighty-four folio pages to 165 a, and we come to the following sentences. "Est itaque hoc imprimis necessarium et salutare Christiano nosse, quod Deus nihil praescit contingenter, sed quod *omnia incommutabili, et aeterna, infallibilique voluntate et praevidet et proponit et facit. Hoc fulmine sternitur et conteritur penitus Liberum Arbitrium.*" If the reader compares this with the Reviewer's second sentence, he will perceive what is the meaning of a "literal translation." Luther says that "the foreknowledge of God is a thunderbolt by which *Liberum Arbitrium* is crushed and destroyed." The Reviewer's *literal translation* most profanely represents God as "*blasting and shattering in pieces the freedom of the will.*" But this mistranslation too, we shall see, is not imputable wholly to him.



The precise original of the next sentence, "God creates in us the evil, in like manner as the good," I have not met with: perhaps there is none, none at all events that the Reviewer knows of; but there are a number of passages that "blast and shatter in pieces" such an accusation; for instance in 199 a: "Quando Deus omnia in omnibus movet et agit, necessario movet etiam et agit in Satana et impio. Agit autem in illis taliter, quales illi sunt, et quales invenit; hoc est, cum illi sint aversi et mali, et rapiantur motu illo divinae omnipotentiae, non nisi aversa et mala faciunt. Tanquam si eques agat equum tripodem vel bipedem, agit quidem taliter, qualis equus est; hoc est, equus male incedit. Sed quid faciat eques? Equum talem simul agit cum equis sanis, illo male, istis bene: aliter non potest, nisi equus sanetur. Hic vides Deum, *cum in malis et per malos operatur, mala quidem fieri, Deum tamen non posse male facere, licet mala per malos faciat, quia ipse bonus male facere non potest, malis tamen instrumentis utitur.*—Omnipotentia Dei facit ut impius non possit motum et actionem Dei evadere.—Corruptio vero seu aversio sui a Deo facit ut bene moveri et rapi non possit. Deus suam omnipotentiam non potest omittere propter illius aversionem, impius vero suam aversionem non potest mutare. Ita fit ut perpetuo et necessario peccet et erret, donec Spiritu Dei corrigatur.—Non igitur quispiam cogitet, Deum, cum dicitur *indurare*, aut malum in nobis operari, (*indurare enim est malum facere*), sic facere, quasi de novo in nobis malum creet; ac si fingas malignum cauponem, qui, ipse malus, in vas non malum fundat aut temperet venenum, ipso vase nihil faciente.—Sic enim fingere videntur hominem per sese bonum, aut non malum, pati a Deo malum opus, dum audiunt a nobis dici *Deum in nobis operari bona et mala*—(can this be the

original of the Reviewer's sentence, "*God creates in us the evil, in like manner as the good?*" the Reviewer himself, we shall see, cannot tell us whether it is or not:) nosque mera necessitate passiva subjici Deo operanti.—Sed ita cogitet,—in nobis, id est, per nos Deum operari mala, non culpa Dei, sed vitio nostro, qui cum simus natura mali, Deus vero bonus, nos actione sua pro natura omnipotentiae suae rapiens, aliter facere non possit, quam quod ipse bonus malo instrumento malum faciat, licet hoc malo pro sua sapientia utatur bene ad gloriam suam et salutem nostram." Let none despise this explanation. Who has given a better? and Luther himself, just before, says, "Oportuit verbis Dei contentos esse, et simpliciter credere quod dicunt, cum sint opera Dei prorsus inenarrabilia. Tamen in obsequium Rationis, id est, stultitiae humanae, libet ineptire et stultescere, et balbutiendo tentare si qua possimus eam movere."

For the last sentence in the Reviewer's quartette we must again go back fifty-six folio pages to 171 a; and there we read, "*Hic est fidei summus gradus, credere illum esse clementem, qui tam paucos salvat, tam multos damnat, credere justum, qui sua voluntate nos necessario damnabiles facit, ut videatur, referente Erasmo, delectari cruciatibus miserorum, et odio potius quam amore dignus.*" The meaning of this passage, as is clear from the context, is: "This is the highest pitch of faith, to believe in the mercy of God, although few are saved, and so many condemned, to believe in the justice of God, who by His will creates us, though by the necessity of our fallen nature we become inevitably subject to condemnation, without the special help of His Spirit; so that, *as Erasmus states it*, He seems to find pleasure in the torments of the wretched, and to be deserving of hatred rather than love."

The argument throughout the whole Treatise is, that God does not create the evil in us, but that He creates us, though our fallen nature is evil, and though, until that fallen nature is renewed, we are unable to resist sin, and thereby become liable to condemnation. How grossly all this is misrepresented in the Reviewer's "literal translation," is plain. In the last clause the words *referente Erasmo*, which show that it was a conclusion drawn, not by Luther himself, but by Erasmus, are wholly left out (BF).

Still in one sense the Reviewer is not so guilty as he appears. For, strange though it may be deemed, it unquestionably is the fact, as I have already hinted more than once, that he had never set eyes on the original Latin of any one of these four sentences. The garbling, the mistranslation, the misrepresentation are not the Reviewer's sin, but Bossuet's, in the second Book of whose *Histoire des Variations* the four sentences stand, almost consecutively, though not in the same order, in one page, § XVII. As a thief is sometimes detected through some flaw in his shoe or boot, which happens to coincide with the foot-prints about the spot where the robbery was committed, so here we may feel confident that the Reviewer, who verily needs an expert policeman to track him, took his quotations from Bossuet, because, after the Chinese fashion, they copy Bossuet's faults. For Bossuet too, in the second sentence, gives, "Toutes choses arrivent par une immuable, éternelle, et inévitable volonté de Dieu, *qui foudroie et met en pièces tout le libre arbitre*;" and Bossuet also, according to his wont, perverts the whole of the last sentence, omitting the very words which the Reviewer omits, not only the clause about God's mercy, but also the two words *referente Erasmo*, the absence of which completely changes the

character of the last clause, shifting its offensiveness from Erasmus to Luther; and Bossuet in like manner mistranslates *qui sua voluntate nos necessario damnabiles facit,* by "*quoiqu'il nous rende nécessairement damnables par sa volonté.*"

But though Bossuet may thus relieve the Reviewer from a part of his guilt, still, when we remember that in the sentence immediately before these propositions, which he quotes as exemplifying Luther's paradoxes in *Speculative Theology*, he promises that his "hasty anthology of Luther's opinions" shall be "*in his own words, literally translated,*"—and when we find it thus demonstrated that the first four sentences which he produces, on a subject on which the utmost precision is, above all, indispensable, as a metaphysician must be especially aware, are not translated from Luther, but from the translation of a Frenchman, a person therefore nationally inaccurate, and Luther's bitter and fierce enemy,—and that he can never have seen Luther's words, that he had no notion whatever of their meaning and logical connexion,—we will leave him to characterize his own conduct, if he can find appropriate terms for it in that rich vocabulary which he has poured out in his attacks on the University of Oxford. On the other hand what a testimony is it to the soundness of Luther's doctrines, that this knot of garbled sentences thus twisted and strained from their meaning are all that so unscrupulous an enemy has been able to scrape together against him under the head of *Speculative Theology*!

As the second head will require some discussion, and is closely connected with the supplementary charges brought against Luther in the Pamphlet, we will proceed next to the third, that of *Biblical Criticism*. Under this head the Reviewer has strung together divers sayings, which

he ascribes to Luther, and which, as here represented, appear derogatory to certain portions of the Bible. From other parts of the Article it is plain that the Reviewer himself feels no repugnance to the freest exercise of criticism on the books collected in the Sacred Volume: therefore these sayings, as quoted by him, are not designed to inspire the same odium, for the sake of which they are reprinted by Mr Ward. But, with a view to common readers, it may be well to remark, that, even if some of Luther's expressions with regard to certain parts of the Bible appear to be objectionable, at all events to him, far more than to any other man, are we indebted for the elevation of the Scriptures to that power and ubiquity which they now possess, for their supreme authority in the Church, and for their abiding presence as the guardian and guide of every household, the comforter of every sick bed, in the cottage as well as the palace.

In fact the very freedom of Biblical Criticism, that practice of trying and proving every part of the Scriptures by the severest tests, fearlessly and unshrinkingly, which the Protestant Churches have derived from the Reformation, is itself a proof of their reverence for the Bible. Because we know it to be of gold, we feel assured that it will only come out the purer, though it be tried seven times, nay, seventy times seven, in the fire. We do not,—so far at least as we have imbibed the true spirit of the Reformation, we do not regard the Bible as a collection of mysterious oracles to be received in unquestioning silence, literally and indiscriminatingly, as all equally sacred, all equally precious and momentous. We do not wrap it up in wool, and lay it in a dark, unapproachable sanctuary. We know that it is the volume of God's word, and that therefore it has light

in itself, yea, that it is full of light, and that this its light it is to manifest by holding its course openly in the eyes of all mankind, like that of the sun through the sky. Did we deem it a candle or a lamp, we should screen it from the winds, and should fear it would burn out: but we cannot fear that either winds or clouds will ever blow out or blot out the sun. For this reason, because the Protestant Churches feel this firm assurance that the Bible contains the Revelation of the Most High God, they are not afraid to let all its parts be tried by the most searching criticism. If they suspected that it might possibly turn out to be a lie, a fiction, a cunningly devised fable, they would keep it out of sight, and debar people from coming too near it, lest the imposture should be detected. But inasmuch as we know and are confident that in the Bible we have the word of God, the declaration of His holy will, and of His infinite mercy and grace,—inasmuch too as we know and are confident that the Spirit of Truth has not forsaken His office of enlightening Christ's Church, but still vouchsafes to direct and preserve the hearts and minds of all such as seek His aid through faith in the Onlybegotten Son of the Father,—therefore we do not shrink from examining the Scriptures, as St Paul throughout requires his readers to examine his writings, by the most piercing light of the purified reason, according to the analogy of the faith.

Hence, although there has been much very deplorable and reprehensible in the Biblical criticism of later times,—although there may be some inconsiderate expressions handed down to us as coming from Luther himself,—the free, living study of the Bible as the Book of God, wherein God manifests Himself livingly and with distinction, even as He does in the outward world, more plainly in some parts, and less plainly in others,—wherein too,

as in everything that comes within the sphere of humanity, some portions belong to the realm of transitory things, as well as others to that of eternal things,—this free, living study of the Bible, without which there can be no vital appropriation and assimilation of its truths, and without which it would still less be able to shape and guide the intellect of mankind, is infinitely preferable to the unreflecting reception of every verse in it, verse by verse, even as we should receive a Koran or a Shaster; just as a living man, notwithstanding all that is frail and perishable about him, ranks immeasurably above a wooden puppet, nay, immeasurably above the finest marble statue. Should any one still feel a scruple, let him read Luther's Letters, or his *Tabletalk*, and see how the Bible was indeed a living book with him, flesh of his regenerate flesh, and bone of his bone, how it was the light which shone on all his thoughts, and the rock on which he took his stand, with the assurance that, God helping him, all the powers of earth and hell would never be able to drive him away from it.

We must look however at a few of Luther's sayings concerning the Scriptures, which Mr Ward exhibits for reproof, taking them from the Edinburgh Reviewer. Among them, of course, we find the notorious one about the Epistle of St James. All sorts of persons complain that Luther called it *an Epistle of Straw*; and perhaps the loudest in this complaint are those to whom the whole Bible is little else than a book of straw. The expression, so far as I have been able to discover, occurs only in a part of the Preface to the German New Testament published in 1522, printed by Walch in Vol. xiv. p. 105, and was omitted in the editions subsequent to 1524. Luther, in pointing out for the instruction of those who were unused to the reading of the Bible, which books in

the New Testament are of the greatest importance, says, as many have said before and since, that the Gospel of St John is to be valued far above the other three, and concludes thus: "St John's Gospel, and his first Epistle, the Epistles of St Paul, especially those to the Romans, Galatians, Ephesians, and St Peter's first Epistle,—these are the Books which set Christ before you, and teach you everything necessary and salutary for you to know, even though you were never to hear or see any other book or doctrine. Therefore the Epistle of St James is quite an epistle of straw by the side of these; for it has no true evangelical character." Now, doubtless, if these Books were to be severed from the rest of Scripture, it would be much as if you were to cut away the roots and trunk of a tree, and to fancy that the upper branches would still continue hanging in the air, putting forth leaves, and bearing fruit. On the other hand it should be observed that the expression applied to the Epistle of St James is not used positively, but relatively, in comparison with those books of the New Testament in which the special doctrines of the Gospel are brought forward more fully and explicitly. It was probably suggested by what St Paul says in 1 Cor. III. 12; and, as I have often had occasion to remark, Luther's words are not to be weighed in a jeweller's scales.

Besides we must take into account that, while he is quite right in denying the specially evangelical character of this Epistle, it had been turned by those who exaggerated and perverted its meaning, into the main prop of those very errors concerning Faith and Justification, which it was his peculiar mission to overthrow. Even in the quietest controversy we well know how difficult it is to measure all our thoughts and words, not to exaggerate what favours our own side, not to depreciate what



supports our adversary. Who then will make a man an offender for a word, uttered in the stress of such a conflict, the most awful perhaps ever waged by man, inasmuch as it was not only against an external power which kept the hearts and minds of half Christendom in abject bondage, and answered an argument with a sentence of excommunication and an *auto de fe*, but also in the first instance against the force of his own inveterate habits and prepossessions, nay, of a faith which he had himself long held earnestly and submissively before he detected its fallacy. Nor should it be forgotten that Luther omitted the offensive expression in the later editions of his New Testament (BG).

The Reviewer, it has already been stated, gives no references for his extracts, a practice utterly to be reprobated when they are cited as grounds of censure. The chief part however of the "hasty anthology" collected under the head of *Biblical Criticism* may be traced to Luther's *Tabletalk*; and when we compare these so-called extracts with the passages from which they appear to have been taken, we discover more than one reason why it may have been thought expedient that the references should here be left out, though in other parts of the Article they are given carefully. In the first place the importance of the allegations, for whatsoever purpose they may be cited, is much diminished when they are known to come from the *Tabletalk*. Precious as that book is, both for the body of truths contained in it, and for its vivid portraiture of Luther's character and familiar habits, we are not entitled to regard it as a sufficient authority for Luther's opinions, except so far as it is confirmed by his acknowledged writings. At least we certainly have no right to make it the ground of accusations against him. For in all conversation there is much

that is prompted, and, it may be, exaggerated, by casual impulses of the moment, much that, at the time of utterance, is limited by previous or subsequent remarks, and so cannot be rightly understood without them. Besides even the best hearers will often misapprehend and misconceive, the best reporters will often misstate, especially when the report is not committed to writing for hours, it may be for days or weeks after. Some collections of *Tabletalk* are indeed very interesting and delightful; but they should always be read in an indulgent, not in a censorious spirit. The only safe rule is, to ascribe whatever we find that is wise or ingenious or instructive, to the speaker, since this is not likely to have been invented by the reporter; while the blunders, the absurdities, the extravagances should be overlooked, from the probability that they may be the scribe's interpolations or perversions, or that they may have had some unrecorded justification at the moment. These remarks apply with double force to Luther's, which is compiled from the manuscripts of a dozen of his friends (BH).

A second reason for the omission of all references might be, that, when it was seen from what a tiny spot in the vast expanse of Luther's writings they were drawn, this would have swept away all appearance of that extensive acquaintance with them which the Reviewer now seems to claim, but which his extreme ignorance of what Luther was proves he cannot have possessed. There is also a third reason why it certainly is expedient for the Reviewer that his readers should not have any facilities for referring to the passages he professes to cite; for then any one would easily have detected how grossly several of them are misrepresented. At present, even if we fancy we have found them out, there is always a possibility that the same words may occur somewhere else, without the

context, through the omission of which they convey a totally different meaning from what Luther intended to express by them.

For instance, when our eyes run through the Reviewer's anthology, one of the most startling sentences is this: "*The Book of Esther I toss into the Elbe.*" If a person familiar with Luther's style lights upon this sentence, he will recognise the great Reformer's unmistakable mark in the words, *I toss into the Elbe*; and it will be a pang to him to find Luther applying such rude words to any book, even the least important, in the Holy Scriptures. But he did not. The Reviewer asserts that he gives us Luther's "own words, literally translated:" Mr Ward asserts that the Reviewer's name is "a sufficient voucher for the accuracy of his quotations:" and yet Luther never said anything of the sort about the book of Esther. The original of this "literal translation" is plainly the following sentence in Luther's *Tabletalk, Das dritte Buch Esther werfe ich in die Elbe: The third book of Esther I toss into the Elbe.* Why the Reviewer left out the word *third* in his "literal translation," it is for him to explain. Were one to follow the example he sets in imputing the vilest motives to all persons in authority in the University of Oxford, one should call this a fraudulent imposition. Was he puzzled to make out what could be meant by the *third book of Esther*? and did he intend tacitly to correct the text? When words are made the ground of an accusation, they should be examined with scrupulous care; and if it appear requisite to alter them, this should be expressly stated. Here the next sentence plainly shews that a totally different correction is needed. "*In the fourth book, in that which Esther dreamt, there are pretty, and also some good sayings, as, Wine is strong, the king stronger, women still stronger, but truth the strongest of*

*all.*" I quote from Walch's edition, Vol. xxii. 2079, and have no means of examining older copies of the *Tischredren*; but the old English translation speaks of *the third book of Hester*. So that the error, gross as it is, seems to have belonged to the original text. For there can be no question that Luther had been talking; not of a non-existent third and fourth book of *Esther*, but of the book of *Ezra* or *Esdras*: though there is still much confusion in the report of his words; since the argument about strength does not stand in the fourth book, but in the third, the first of the Apocryphal ones; those of *Ezra* and *Nehemiah* being numbered as the first two. Thus Luther's words are nothing but a Lutheran mode of saying what Jerome actually did, when he cast these Apocryphal books out of his Version, as he says in his Preface to the book of *Ezra*: "Nec quemquam moveat quod unus a nobis editus liber est; nec apocryphorum tertii et quarti somniis delectetur; quia et apud Hebraeos Ezrae Neemiaeque sermones in unum volumen coarctantur, et quae non habentur apud illos, nec de viginti quatuor senibus sunt, *procul abjicienda.*" Nor can anything well go beyond Jerome's contemptuous expressions about the same books in his pamphlet against *Vigilantius* (B1). Assuredly too the next sentence quoted by the Reviewer,— "I am so an enemy to the book of *Esther* that I would it did not exist; for it Judaizes too much, and hath in it a great deal of heathenish naughtiness,"—though here again the English Translation agrees with Walch in applying Luther's words to the Book of *Esther*, was in fact spoken of the Apocryphal books of *Esdras*. For the whole passage in the *Tabletalk* is as follows: "When the Doctor was correcting the translation of the second Book of the *Maccabees*, he said, *I dislike this book and that of Esther so much, that I wish they did not exist; for they Judaize*

too much, and have much heathenish extravagance. Then Master Forster said, *The Jews esteem the book of Esther more than any of the prophets.*" The combination of the book with that of the Maccabees, — which the Reviewer ought not to have omitted, — as well as Forster's remark, leaves no doubt that Luther spoke of the book of Esdras (B J). These blunders shew how unsafe it is to build any conclusions on the authority of the *Tabletalk*.

What the Reviewer meant by his next extract, — "Isaiah hath borrowed his art and knowledge from the Psalter," — or what Mr Ward meant by repeating it, — what either of them can have deemed reprehensible in it, one cannot well conceive. Even from the English words an intelligent reader would make out, that Luther was only speaking of Isaiah's style and composition: and this is still plainer when we see them in connexion with what goes before. "Neither Cicero nor Virgil, nor Demosthenes was such an orator, or so eloquent as David. — Moses and David are also the two greatest prophets. What Isaiah has, he takes from David; and so do the other prophets." What is there more censurable in this, than in saying that Moses was learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, or that St Paul profited by the instructions of Gamaliel?

Again, the sentence about the book of *Proverbs* is so broken off as to be wholly deceptive: "The Proverbs of Solomon have been collected by others." When such a sentence is cited as an example of licentious criticism on the Scriptures, of such criticism as proves Luther to have furnish warrants and precedents for all that is most "obnoxious" in modern Rationalism, we cannot but suppose that it implies a doubt concerning the authenticity of the *Proverbs*. An honest writer would not have detach it from what follows: "The Proverbs of Solomon

were collected by others, and caught up from his mouth, and written down when he uttered them at table or elsewhere; and in them the king's majesty and wisdom shine and are seen."

On the book of Jonah the Reviewer makes Luther say, "The history of Jonah is so monstrous, that it is absolutely incredible." Verily the misrepresentation in these words is so monstrous as to be almost incredible. It is true, Luther is represented in the *Tabletalk* as saying those words; and he goes on thus (p. 2096): "yea, it sounds like a lie, and more extravagant than any fable of the poets; and if it did not stand in the Bible, I should laugh at it as a lie. For if one thinks about him, how he was three days in the great belly of the fish, where in three hours he might have been digested and turned into the substance of the fish: here he might have died a hundred times, under the earth, in the sea, in the fish, &c. Is not this to live in the midst of death? so that by the side of this miracle that of the Red Sea is nothing. And how oddly it turns out! After he is delivered and saved, he begins to rage and to grumble and to vex himself for the sake of a little thing, namely, a herb. It is a great mystery: I am ashamed of my interpretation of this prophet, that I have treated the main action and purpose of the miracle so weakly." So that the greatness of the miracle, instead of making Luther doubt its truth, as the Reviewer by his shamefully garbled quotation accuses him of doing, is merely magnified by Luther to shew the fulness of his faith in it. After this one should hardly be surprised to find the Reviewer accusing the Decalogue of inculcating all manner of crimes, because it says in one Commandment, *Thou shalt commit adultery*, and in another, *Thou shalt steal*. At all events, when one examines the whole of his

indictment against Luther, the first count of it in the Review, and the second in the Pamphlet, one might be led to fancy that he must have been in the habit of reading the ninth, *Thou shalt bear false witness against thy neighbour.*

In this gross perversion of Luther's saying about the prophet Jonah, the Reviewer has an accomplice in Mr Dewar, the author of a recent work on *German Protestantism*, which is also entitled *A Brief History of German Theology from the Reformation to the Present Time*, and which, for shallowness and presumption, is well worthy to rank with most of the other English diatribes against German theology and philosophy. It has the same aptness for choosing the evil, and refusing the good: indeed the author only looks for the evil; and even if he were willing to do justice to the good, his prejudices would prevent his recognising it. Yet he pronounces summary judgement on a long series of theological and philosophical systems, while it is plain that he has never set himself to study any one of them: nor has he the slightest sympathy with that mysterious instinct which constrains the masters of thought to wear out their lives in seeking after the hidden life and truth and unity in all things. One of the objects of this worthless book is to make out that Luther was the father of Rationalism; though, if he was so, it could only have been as Noah was the father of Ham, and Adam of Cain. In every field, whether of the world or of the Church, however diligent and careful the husbandman may be in sowing good seed only, the tares and other weeds will spring up along with the wheat. But in trying to draw out his pedigree, the author substitutes an arbitrary definition of Rationalism for the received one; a proceeding far from justifiable, inasmuch as he thereby attracts the odium attacht to the

word in its ordinary sense to that which he substitutes in lieu of it; although in no sense can Luther be shewn to be the father of Rationalism, unless in that in which St Paul might be termed its first father, and Augustin and Chrysostom as well as Origen, Anselm and Aquinas as well as Erigena, belong to the family.

With the view of establishing Luther's paternity, Mr Dewar, in pp. 26—28, has collected divers sayings concerning some of the books of Scripture, in proof that "he did not scruple to give utterance to very liberal opinions upon any particular portion of the Bible which did not exactly accord with the theological system which his own judgement had led him to construct." Of these sayings several are taken from the *Tabletalk*; and among them is the following: "The history of the prophet Jonah is so strange, that it is totally incredible; nay, it sounds more fabulous and inconsistent than any legend of the poets; and if it were not in the Bible, I should laugh at it as a lie." When one considers the purpose for which these words are quoted, and the company they stand amongst, it is plain the author intended them to imply that Luther doubted the truth of the book of Jonah. Yet as his title-page proclaims him to be an English clergyman, and as the profest object of his book is to give a history of German Theology, tracing its errors up to Luther, one might have expected from him, what it might be exorbitant to demand from an Edinburgh Reviewer, that, before he charged Luther with the contemptuous rejection of a prophetic book, he would have lookt about to ascertain whether this could possibly be the fact. He might then have found out that Luther in 1526 publisht an Exposition of the book of Jonah, which indeed is referred to in this very passage of the *Tabletalk*, and that in the Preface to



this Exposition he says he had been led to choose this book from the disastrous condition of the Church, "because it is an excellent, singular, comfortable example of faith, and sets a great and mighty miracle of God's goodness before the world. For who can do otherwise than trust in God heartily, and boldly defy all the devils, the world, and all raging tyrants, and take pride in God's goodness, when he considers this example how God's power and grace were able so easily to preserve Jonah in the midst of the deep sea, and in the midst of the whale also, that is, not in one kind, but in many kinds of death, forsaken and unknown by all men, by all creatures, and to restore him, as if it cost no trouble, nay, to do this with a word? As though He would say to us, *Lo, this I do with a word: what, think ye, can I do with My Spirit and power?*" (BK).

The Reviewer's other extracts from Luther's Biblical Criticisms, as well as those collected by the Historian of German Theology, may be dismissed without notice. The original of some of them I have not lighted on; nor did it seem worth any laborious search. For in those which I have traced, it is plain that the offensiveness arises mainly from the Reviewer's garbling severance of a few strong expressions from the context in *the Tabletalk*: and after what we have seen, nobody will require further proofs of his capacity for extracting poison from the wholesomest food.

Under the head of *Practical Theology*, in the Reviewer's "hasty anthology," we find this paragraph. "We [Luther, Melancthon, Bucer, Melander, Corvinus, Adam, Leningus, Winteferte] cannot advise that the license of marrying more wives than one be publicly introduced, and as it were ratified by law. If anything were allowed to get into print on this head, your Highness [Philip

Landgrave of Hesse, champion of the Reformation, who, having lost, as he pleads, conceit of his wife, being touched with scruples of conscience at his adultery, which however, he admits, he '*does not wish to abstain from,*' and 'knowing' (as he tells themselves) of Luther and Melanchthon having exhorted the king of England not to divorce his first queen, but to marry a second over and above,—had applied to the leading doctors of the Reformation for license to have a second wife]—your Highness easily comprehends that it would be understood and received as a precept, whence much scandal and many difficulties would arise.—Your Highness should be pleased to consider the excessive scandal; that the enemies of the Gospel would exclaim that we are like the Anabaptists who have adopted the practice of polygamy, and that the Evangelicals, as the Turks, allow themselves the license of a plurality of wives. . . . But in certain cases there is room for dispensation. If any one (for example) detained captive in a foreign country, should take to himself a second wife for the good of his body and health, &c.—in these cases we do not know by what reason a man could be condemned who marries an additional wife with the advice of his pastor, not with the purpose of introducing a new law, but of satisfying his own necessity.—In fine, if your Highness be fully and finally resolved to marry yet another wife, we judge that this ought to be done secretly, as has been said above, in speaking of the dispensation, so that it be known only to your Highness, to the lady, and to a few faithful persons obliged to silence, under the seal of confession; hence no attacks or scandal of any moment would ensue. For there is nothing unusual in princes keeping concubines; and although the lower orders may not perceive the excuses of the

thing, the more intelligent know how to make allowance." In a note to this passage the Reviewer, after some remarks on the circumstances of the marriage, and its effects, states that monogamy was publicly condemned by Henke, a German Professor of Theology, at the end of the last century, and adds: "However detestable this doctrine, the bold avowal of the Rationalist is honorable, when contrasted with the skulking compromise of all professed principle, by men calling themselves *The Evangelicals*. Renouncing the Pope, they arrogate the power of the keys to an extent never pretended to by any successor of St Peter; and proclaiming themselves to the world as the apostles of a purified faith, they can secretly, trembling only at discovery, authorize in name of the Gospel, a dispensation of the moral law. Compared with Luther or Cranmer, how respectable is the character of Knox!"

I have given this extract thus fully, that the reader may know the whole heinousness of the offense with which Luther is charged. For the Reviewer does not mince matters. If he has to deal out reproof and reproach, he does so with overflowing measure, and after the number of lashes ordained by justice superadds a few out of love at the end, like the closing *bravura* of a popular singer. In this instance too at all events his indignation has run away with him; and he scatters words which betray that he knows nothing about Luther, or that, if he ever did know anything, it must have been obliterated from his mind. For no one acquainted with the story of Luther's life, and with his letters, could have taxed him with want of courage in his dealings with princes. The Reviewer's injudicious comparison shall not provoke me to speak ill of so great and good a man as Knox: but assuredly Knoxes behaviour to Mary will not shew

to advantage when contrasted with Luther's toward his sovereigns. For Luther's, from first to last, was governed by the two Christian principles of submitting and shewing honour to the powers placed over us as being ordained by God, and of obeying God rather than man, whenever their commands clash. Indeed it would not be easy to find any man who has adhered so stedfastly to the first principle under circumstances which so often constrained him to act upon the second. His earliest remaining letter to the Elector, Frederic the Wise, written in the latter part of the year 1517, just after the publication of the Theses, and before his name became notorious, is a beautiful example of respectful frankness and sincerity. After thanking the Elector for the promise of a piece of cloth, and interceding earnestly for Stau-pitz, who was under some disgrace, he adds: "Also, most gracious Lord, that I may shew my faithfulness to your Princely Grace, and may deserve my court-dress, I have heard that your Grace, after the expiration of this tax, means to impose another, and perhaps a heavier. If your Grace will not despise a poor beggar's prayer, I entreat that for God's sake you would not let it come to this: for it grieves my heart, and that of many who favour your Grace, that even this tax in these last days has robbed your Grace of so much good report, good name, and favour. God has indeed gifted your Grace with a high understanding, so that you see further in these matters than I, or perhaps all your Grace's subjects: but it may well be, yea, God will so have it, that a great understanding may at times be taught by a small understanding, to the end that no one may trust in himself, but only in God our Lord, whom I pray to grant your Grace health for our good, and for your Grace's everlasting happiness. Amen." The spirit which

breathes in this letter is the same which manifested itself three years after in Luther's quiet firmness, and simple, immovable conscientiousness at Worms; and all his letters to the three Electors, who governed Saxony during that momentous period, exhibit a like combination of the two often seemingly incongruous principles which are to regulate the conduct of the Christian toward his temporal rulers. Never, for example, did heroic faith find a nobler utterance than in the letters to Frederic the Wise from the Wartburg. Therefore, even if it should prove that, in the affair with the Landgrave of Hesse, Luther did for once yield an unjustifiable compliance to the wishes of a prince, still it is unjust to condemn him summarily for one transgression, when during thirty years he acted in every other instance with uniform magnanimity under the most trying circumstances (BL). What will become of the Reviewer's character for learning, for knowledge, for reasoning, for justice, for veracity, if we try him by the same rule, and pronounce sentence on all his writings, nay, on his whole moral worth, from the evidence contained in his remarks upon Luther?

But that transgression is so monstrous! Luther sacrificed such a sacred principle, the very foundation of all domestic morality, to gratify a libertine prince! and he did it so basely, so cringingly, so skulkingly! Such is the opinion which Luther's enemies make no scruple in proclaiming; and even his lovers and admirers, many of them, hang down their heads, when mention is made of the Landgrave's double marriage. Thus, in the friendly Article on Luther which appeared in the 138th Number of *the Edinburgh Review*, the writer, — a totally different person from his collaborator whom we have been dealing with, — after stating that Bayle has sufficiently vindicated Luther's moral character, says: "One unhappy exception

is to be made. It is impossible to read without pain the names of Luther, Melanchthon, and Bucer, amongst the subscribers to the address to the Landgrave of Hesse, on the subject of his intended polygamy. Those great but fallible men remind his Highness of the distinction between universal laws, and such as admit of dispensation in particular cases. They cannot publicly sanction polygamy. But his Highness is of a peculiar constitution, and is exhorted seriously to examine all the considerations laid before him; yet, if he is absolutely resolved to marry a second time, it is their opinion that he should do so as secretly as possible! Fearful is the energy with which 'the Eagle of Meaux' pounces on this fatal error, tearing to pieces the flimsy pretexts alleged in defense of such an evasion of the Christian code. The charge admits of no defense. To the inference drawn from it against the Reformer's doctrine, every Protestant has a conclusive answer. Whether in faith or in practice, he acknowledges no infallible Head but one."

Now, after what we have seen of this terrible "Eagle of Meaux," we will not utterly despond, however he may flap his wings, and whet his beak, and strike with his claws. Furious as his assaults were, he often dashed against a rock, which repelled him and scarcely felt a scar. Nor on the other hand would we rely for the vindication of Luther altogether upon Bayle, who, keensighted as he was on the surface of things, and clever above all men in saying *No*, and in pulling down the tower of Babel, had no fellowfeeling with that which was the central spring of Luther's whole life, that without the discernment of which it is quite impossible to understand him. With this latter Reviewer's last remark however I fully concur. It is strange to find the Romanists assailing the Reformation by impugning the moral character of

its teachers, without thinking what a tremendous retaliation they are inviting. But, if we did not know it from other sources, Luther himself has taught us a thousand times over, that in no human being are we to look for anything like an exemption from evil, and that the Reformation does not rest on the character of Luther, but on the word of God, who is wont to accomplish His purposes by choosing the weak and base things of this world to be His instruments, lest man should glory in anything except the Lord. Still, for the sake of truth and justice, if for nothing else, it is worth while to ascertain, so far as we may, what was the real amount of Luther's sin in this matter of the Landgrave's marriage: and though, at the very worst, we may find comfort in his own remark concerning David's grievous crimes, that "God suffered him so to fall, lest he should grow proud" (*Tischreden*, LX. § 23), we may allowably rejoice if it turn out that Luther's conduct was not quite so heinous as his enemies represent it, or as many even of his friends acknowledge it to have been.

Here we have a twofold enquiry; first, what was it that Luther did? and secondly, wherein did his sin lie? With regard to the first question, after the specimens we have seen of the hostile Reviewer's felicity in garbling his quotations, we want something fuller and more precise than his statement, which on its face bears the marks of being made up, like an advocate's, of the most offensive matter he could pick out. As to the second question, it is notorious that the subjective character, or sinfulness, of an act is something different, often very different, from its objective character, or criminality. The latter is measured by an outward, the former by an inward standard. The criminality of an act we determine by its repugnance to right reason as expressing itself in

public law ; while its sinfulness is determined by its repugnance to that voice of reason which utters itself as law in the conscience of the agent. These two characters of the act may often be nearly coincident ; but in weighing the moral worth or pravity of the agent, it is requisite to distinguish between them ; for often they will differ widely : and this is especially necessary in estimating the acts of former ages ; which we are apt to try, not by their standard of right, but by our own.

Now in the hostile Review the sinfulness of Luther's act is plainly laid down as consisting in this, that it was "a skulking compromise of all profest principle," in which he "arrogated the power of the Keys to an extent never pretended to by any successor of St Peter," and "secretly authorized a dispensation of the moral law." The heinousness of this act is enhanced from its being done by one who "called himself an Evangelical," who had "renounced the Pope," and "proclaimed himself to the world as the apostle of a purified faith," and who did it "in name of the Gospel, trembling only at discovery." This is black enough : the arch Accuser himself could not well have shewn more ingenuity in wringing the uttermost drop of poison out of an act. If this analysis of it be at all correct, we must allow Luther to stand in the pillory, exposed to the pelting insults of his revilers, and must resign ourselves to the mysterious dispensation, whereby one of God's chosen instruments for the establishment of Evangelical Truth was allowed to fall, like David, down to the brink of hell.

Fortunately however the bringer of this heinous charge has himself retracted it, substituting another drawn up in a somewhat mitigated form. Some nine years after the publication of the attack on Luther in *the Edinburgh Review*, during the heat of the divisions in the Scotch



Church, Sir William Hamilton of Preston publisht a Pamphlet, which has already been mentioned, calling upon the Ministers of the Convocation, "not to be Schismatics, not to be Martyrs, by mistake." Herein, with the view of warning them of the mischiefs of an ill-directed enthusiasm, and to inculcate the importance of calmness and moderation and mildness, of which his own writings, as they shew no spark of enthusiasm, must needs exhibit an exemplary pattern, he tells them that Luther and Melanchthon, whom in the course of the preceding nine years he has discovered to be "great and good" men, notwithstanding the foul wickedness he had previously laid to their charge, were led by their overwrought zeal to preach the most abominable doctrines. Among other things, he says, "Polygamy awaited only the permission of the civil ruler to be promulgated as an article of the Reformation; and had this permission not been significantly refused (whilst, at the same time, the epidemic in Wittemberg was homœopathically alleviated, at least, by the similar but more violent access in Munster), it would not have been the fault of the fathers of the Reformation if Christian liberty has remained less ample than Mahomedan license. As it was, polygamy was never abandoned by either Luther or Melanchthon as a religious speculation; both, in more than a single instance, accorded the formal sanction of their authority to its practice — by those who were above the law; and had the civil prudence of the imprudent Henry VIII. not restrained him, sensual despot as he was, from carrying their spontaneous counsel into effect, a plurality of wives might now have been a privilege as religiously contended for in England as in Turkey."

On this passage for the present I will merely remark that "the epidemic in Wittemberg" began in the autumn

of 1521, and was allayed, as we have seen above, by Luther's return in the month of March 1522, and that "the similar but more violent access in Munster," whereby, according to the Reviewer, it was "homœopathically alleviated," began in the autumn of 1533, more than eleven years after the other had been subdued. This, I believe, is a solitary instance in the history of the world, in which coming events have cast their shadow so long before, with a power of healing like that exercised by St Peter's. Verily, Mr Ward for once is quite right: Sir W. Hamilton's authority is a sufficient voucher for the accuracy of all his statements, more especially in matters connected with the Reformation.

However, at all events, Sir W. Hamilton is a great logician; and so he bethought himself that his new attack upon Luther was in direct contradiction to his former one in the Review; for that, if Luther held polygamy "as a religious speculation," and would have "promulgated it as an article of the Reformation," provided he could have obtained "the permission of the civil ruler," he cannot have been "compromising all profest principle," when he gave his assent to the Landgrave's double marriage. Accordingly, when a sufficient time had elapsed for a master in logic to work through the process for detecting this contradiction, in a postscript to the third edition of Sir W. Hamilton's Pamphlet, he made this benign admission in behalf of Luther and Melancthon. "So far was there from being any disgraceful compromise of principle in the sanction accorded by them to the bigamy of the Landgrave of Hesse, they only, in that case, carried their speculative doctrine (held, by the way, also by Milton) into practice; although the prudence they had by that time acquired, rendered them, on worldly grounds, averse from their sanction being

made publicly known. I am the more anxious to correct this general mistake touching the motives of these illustrious men, because I was myself, on a former occasion, led to join in the injustice: (*Edinb. Rev.* vol. LX. p. 226.)”

Thus the violent attack on Luther in the Review is homœopathically alleviated some nine years afterward by a scarcely less violent one in the Pamphlet. For the case is not much mended. If Luther really held the doctrine of polygamy, and desired to introduce the practice, his anxiety to keep the matter secret, “on worldly grounds,” through “the prudence he had by this time acquired,” leaves a strong taint of cowardly meanness on his character, in addition to the shame he deserves for holding and inculcating a principle so adverse to the purity of the Gospel, and to the moral wellbeing of mankind. So that this is a sorry apology for Luther. After Alecto has half sucked out his blood, she tosses him to Megaera to strangle him. Let us see whether a careful examination of the documents which remain will not yield something better than this homœopathic alleviation. At all events, as these two contradictory statements destroy each other, there is a chance that a more favorable representation may emerge from their mutual fratricide.

Here it will be necessary to insert the answer to the Landgrave’s application at length: else we cannot judge of its real purport and purpose. “Since your princely Grace has through Master Bucer laid before us a certain longstanding trouble of your conscience,—although it is difficult for us to answer it in such haste, we would not let Bucer ride off without a letter. And first, we are heartily rejoiced and thank God that he has helpt your Grace out of your dangerous sickness; and we pray that

He will strengthen and preserve your Grace in soul and body to His praise. For, as your Grace sees, the poor miserable Church of Christ is small and forsaken, and verily needs pious lords and princes; as we doubt not God will preserve some, although every kind of temptation befall. With regard to the question, of which Master Bucer spoke with us, firstly, this is our opinion. Your Grace knows and understands this yourself, that it is a very different thing to make a general law, and in a particular case to use a dispensation, out of weighty reasons, and yet according to divine permission; for against God no dispensation has force. Now we cannot advise that it be openly introduced, and thus made a law, that each be allowed to have more than one wife. But should anything of this get into print, your Grace may conceive that this would be understood and adopted as a general law, whence much scandal and trouble would ensue. Therefore this is by no means to be adopted; and we pray your Grace to consider how grievous it would be, if it were charged upon any one that he had introduced this law in the German nation, whence endless trouble in all marriages might be feared. As to what may be said against this, that what is right before God should be allowed altogether, this is true in a measure. If God has commanded it, or it is a necessary thing, this is true; but if it is not commanded, nor necessary, other circumstances should be taken into account. Thus with regard to this question: God instituted marriage that it should be the union of two persons alone, and not of more, unless nature had been corrupted. This is the meaning of the saying, *They two shall be one flesh*. And this at first was so retained. But Lamech introduced the example of having more than one wife at once, which is recorded of him in Scripture as an innovation contrary

to the first rule. Thenceforward it became customary among the unbelievers, till at length Abraham and his descendants took more than one wife. And it is true that afterward this was allowed in the law of Moses, as the text says, Deut. xxi. 15, *If a man have two wives, &c.* For God gave way somewhat to the weakness of nature. But since it was according to the first beginning and the creation, that a man should not have more than one wife, this law is praiseworthy, and has thus been adopted in the Church: nor should another law be made and set up against it. For Christ repeats this saying in Matt. xix. 5, *And they twain shall be one flesh*, and reminds us how marriage was to be at first, antecedently to man's infirmity. That in certain cases however a dispensation may be used,—as if a person taken captive in a forein land should marry there, and on gaining his freedom should bring his wife with him,—or if long continued sickness should supply a cause, as has been held at times with regard to lepers,—if in such cases a man takes another wife with the counsel of his Pastor, not to introduce a law, but as a matter of necessity, such a man we could not condemn. Since then it is one thing to introduce a law, and another to use a dispensation, we humbly entreat your Grace to consider, first, that care should in every way be taken that this matter be not brought publicly before the world, as a law which everybody may follow. Next, since it is to be no law, but merely a dispensation, let your Grace also consider the scandal, namely, that the enemies of the Gospel would cry out, that we are like the Anabaptists, who take several wives at once, and that the Evangelicals seek the liberty of having as many wives as they please, according to the practice in Turkey. Again, what Princes do, gets abroad much further than what is done by

private persons. Again, if private persons hear of such an example in their lords, they desire that the like should be allowed to them; as we see how easily a practice spreads. Again, your Grace has an unruly nobility, many of whom, as in all countries, on account of the great revenues which they derive from the Chapters, are violently opposed to the Gospel. Thus we know ourselves that very unfriendly speeches have been heard from divers young squires. Now how such squires and the country-folks will behave toward your Grace in this matter, if a public proceeding be adopted, may easily be conceived. Again, your Grace, through God's grace, has a very illustrious name, even among foreign kings and potentates, and is feared on account thereof, which credit would be impaired hereby. Seeing then that so many scandals are combined, we humbly entreat your Grace to consider this matter well and diligently. This however is also true, that we by all means entreat and exhort your Grace to avoid fornication and adultery; and in truth we have long had great sorrow from hearing that your Grace is laden with such distress, which may be visited with punishments from God and other dangers; and we entreat your Grace not to esteem such matters out of wedlock a light sin, as the world tosses such things to the wind, and despises them. But God has often fearfully punished unchastity: for it is recorded as a cause of the Deluge, that the rulers practised adultery. Again, the punishment of David is a solemn example: and Paul often says, *God is not mocked: adulterers shall not enter into the kingdom of God.* For faith must be followed by obedience, so that one must not act against one's conscience, nor against God's commandment. *If our conscience condemn us not, then have we confidence toward God: and if through the Spirit we mortify the deeds of the body, we shall live; but*

*if we live after the flesh*, that is, against our conscience, *we shall die*. This we say, because it is to be considered that God will not trifle with such sins, as many people now grow bold to entertain such heathenish thoughts. And we have heard with pleasure that your Grace has seriously mourned on account thereof, and feels sorrow and repentance for them. These great and weighty questions press for your Grace's attention, pertaining to the whole world. Moreover your Grace is of a slender and far from a strong constitution, and sleeps little; wherefore your Grace should reasonably spare your body, as many others are forced to do. And we read of the illustrious Prince Scanderbeg, who wrought many noble deeds against the two Turkish emperors, Amurath and Mahomet, and protected and preserved Greece as long as he lived. He, they say, specially exhorted his soldiers to chastity, and said that nothing takes away a brave man's spirit like unchastity. Again, even if your Grace had another wife, and did not seriously resist the evil practice and inclination, it would not avail your Grace. It behoves man in his outward walk to bridle his members, as Paul says: *Yield your members as instruments of righteousness*. Therefore let your Grace, in consideration of all these causes, the offense, the other cares and labours, and the weakness of body, weigh this matter well. Be also pleased to consider that God has given your Grace fair young Princes and Princesses with this Consort; and be content with her, as many others must have patience under their marriage, to avoid offense. For that we should excite or urge your Grace to an offensive innovation, is far from our mind. For your country and others might reproach us on account thereof, which would be intolerable to us; because we are commanded in God's word to regulate marriage and all

human matters according to their first Divine institution, and, so far as possible, to keep them therein, and to avert whatever may offend any one. Such too is now the way of the world, that people like to throw all the blame upon the preachers, if anything unpleasant fall out; and men's hearts, among high and low, are unsteady: and all sorts of things are to be feared. But if your Grace do not quit your unchaste life,—or that you write that this is not possible,—we would rather that your Grace stood in better case before God, and lived with a good conscience, for your Grace's happiness, and the good of your country and people. If however your Grace should at length resolve to take another wife, we think that this should be kept secret, as was said above of the dispensation; namely, that your Grace, and the Lady, with some confidential persons, should know your Grace's mind and conscience through confession. From this no particular rumour or scandal would arise; for it is not unusual for princes to have concubines; and although all the people would not know what the circumstances were, the intelligent would be able to guess them, and would be better pleased with such a quiet way of life, than with adultery and other wild and licentious courses. Nor are we to heed everything that people say, provided our consciences stand right. Thus far, and this we deem right. For that which is permitted concerning marriage in the law of Moses, is not forbidden in the Gospel, which does not change the rule of outward life, but brings in eternal righteousness and eternal life, and kindles a true obedience to God, and would set our corrupt nature straight again. Thus your Grace has not only our testimony in case of necessity, but also our advice, which we beseech your Grace to weigh, as an illustrious, wise, Christian Prince; and we pray that God may lead and



direct your Grace to His praise and to your Grace's happiness."

In translating this document, — the concluding paragraph of which is omitted, as not bearing on our immediate question,—I have followed the text given by Bretschneider in the recent valuable edition of Melancthon, vol. III. 856. The Reviewer seems to have taken his extracts from the Latin translation printed by Bossuet, as an appendix to the 6th book of the *Histoire des Variations*. When we compare them with the whole body from which they are torn, they who admire ingenuity, in whatsoever cause it may be displayed, will be struck with the dexterity shewn in garbling the opinion of the divines, so as to render it as offensive as possible. The main part of it, wherein they perform their duty of spiritual advisers honestly and faithfully, telling the Landgrave of the evils likely to arise from his conduct, and of the Divine wrath which he was provoking by his sinful life, is wholly left out; so that it seems as if they had had no thought of their pastoral responsibility, but readily consented to do just what the Landgrave wisht, and were solely deterred by fear of the shame it might bring on themselves and on their cause. Readers familiar with Luther's writings may indeed complain that he has spoken with so little of his ordinary force on this occasion. The style however of the opinion clearly shews that it was not written by him, but by Melancthon, who usually drew up the papers wherein they had to express their joint thoughts; because Luther felt, as he says in his letter to the Elector, approving of the manner in which the Confession of Augsburg had been drawn up, he "could not tread so softly and gently." Besides we learn from Bretschneider that the original document in the Hessian Archives is in Melancthon's handwriting.

Moreover, when we examine the whole opinion connectedly, we are compelled to reject the excuse, which Sir W. Hamilton so kindly proposes, in order to rescue Luther from the fangs of the Edinburgh Reviewer. For from first to last it is plain that the license, which the divines declare themselves unable to condemn, is meant by them to be regarded as a dispensation, and not as authorizing or sanctioning polygamy: and this is the main reason why they are so earnest in requiring that the second marriage, if entered upon, should be kept secret, lest it should be looked upon as the introduction of a general practice. Polygamy, as a general practice, they altogether condemn; because they conceive that our Lord's words in the passage referred to reestablish the primary, paradisiacal institution of monogamy. At the same time, while they see that polygamy, though contrary to the original institution, is sanctioned in the Old Testament, both by the practice of the Patriarchs, and by the express recognition of it in the book of Deuteronomy, they do not find any passage in the New Testament directly and absolutely forbidding it. Here we should bear in mind what their rule, especially Luther's, was. When the word of God seemed to him clear and express, then everything else was to bow to it: heaven and earth might pass away, but no tittle of what God had said. On the other hand, where no express Scripture could be produced, he held that all human laws and ordinances, and everything enjoined by man's understanding on considerations of expediency, however wide that expediency might be, is so far flexible and variable, that it may be made to bend to imperious circumstances in particular cases (BM).

Thus the document itself forces us to decline Sir W. Hamilton's plea, that Luther was merely giving his

sanction in a single instance to that which he desired at heart to establish generally, the patriarchal practice of polygamy. Still many may be apt to believe that, when a writer of any character makes so broad and positive an assertion, he must have some good ground for it; and this credulity may not have been altogether overthrown by the evidence we have seen touching our present witness. The German Reformers may have been shuffling, and have been glad to allow of bigamy as an exception in this case, with the view of introducing it gradually as a custom. Men so desperately wicked, as Sir W. Hamilton makes them out to be, even while he calls them "great and good" and "illustrious," would not stick at any fraud. But in the course of the painful controversy which arose when the Landgrave's double marriage became notorious, Bucer was unhappily misled into publishing a pamphlet in defense of polygamy, under the assumed name of Hulderic Neobulus; by which Luther was so incensed that he resolved to reply to it. Among Melancthon's letters are two to the Landgrave, one dated the 5th of April 1542, the other the 28th of March 1543, from which it appears that the Landgrave had been alarmed by the report of Luther's purpose. Melancthon tells him that Luther had intended to write, but had desisted in consequence of an earnest request from the good Elector, John Frederic, who was very loth that anything should be done to prolong these vexatious and scandalous discussions.

Still, though Luther did not answer Bucer's pamphlet at length, he could not be restrained from pronouncing his judgement on it, in words marked with even more than his usual vehemence, and which shew that the Landgrave had good reason to dread the outpouring of his indignation. Whether Luther himself published them, does not

appear certain; but they are manifestly genuine: they are alluded to in Melancthon's second letter to the Landgrave, and are given by Seckendorf (Lib. III. p. 281), in the course of an excellent and conclusive discussion on the whole affair. "*He who desires my judgement upon this book, let him hear. Thus says Dr Martin Luther on this book of Neobulus: He who follows this rogue and book, and thereupon takes more than one wife, and means that this should be a matter of right, may the devil bless his bath in the bottom of hell! Amen. This, God be praised! I well know how to maintain; and though it snowed pure Neobulos, Nebulos, Hulderics, along with pure devils, a whole year through, people shall not make me a right out of this. This I will prevent. Much less shall they make me a right, that a man may separate himself from his wife rightfully, when she has not already separated herself by open adultery, which this rogue would also like to teach.*" Moreover the fragment of Luther's projected reply to Neobulus has been printed by Walch, Vol. XXI. 1577—1585. Herein he says, in answer to an argument drawn from the example of the Patriarchs and of the Jewish kings, "We have already shewn in a number of books that the Law of Moses does not concern us, and is no longer law, and that we are not to look at the examples in the history of the saints, much less of the kings, but at God's commandments, and at their faith." He proceeds to give divers reasons in proof that, even among the Jews, polygamy was never sanctioned as a general institution, but was merely a *Verhängniss*, a dispensation, allowed in certain cases under peculiar circumstances (BN).

After such a volcanic hyper-Lutheran outburst, Sir W. Hamilton himself will hardly dare to reassert, that "polygamy was never abandoned by Luther as a religious speculation:" and surely it is very unlikely that he who

condemned an apology for polygamy with this unmeasured indignation, should have been conscious of having ever maintained the doctrine he thus reprobated. Nevertheless the virulence of renegades is proverbial; and Sir W. Hamilton, in the above-mentioned Postscript to the third edition of his Pamphlet, after saying that his statements concerning Luther and Melanchthon had excited much notice, adds: "I cannot here enter on an articulate manifestation of the correctness of these statements; but I now say, what I may take a more suitable opportunity of proving, that there is nothing there advanced not critically accurate. In particular, I may add, in reference to the sources, 1. that I do not found merely or principally upon passages known to Bossuet, Bayle, &c.; and, through them, to persons of ordinary information. These, I admit, would not justify *all* I have asserted in regard to the character of the doctrine *preached* by Luther. 2. I do not found my statement of the general opinion of Luther and Melanchthon in favour of polygamy, on their special allowance of a second wife to Philip the Magnanimous, or on any expressions contained in their Consilium on that occasion. On the contrary, that Consilium, and the circumstances under which it was given, may be, indeed always have been, adduced to show that in the case of the Landgrave they made a sacrifice of eternal principle to temporary expedience. The reverse of this I am able to prove, in a chronological series of testimonies by them to the religious legality of polygamy, as a general institution, consecutively downwards from their earliest commentaries on the Scriptures and other purely abstract treatises."

This was publisht in 1843; but the "articulate manifestation" here spoken of has not, so far as I have been able to learn, yet made its appearance. Probably it

never will; there being no materials out of which to compile it; though, after the specimens we have seen of the Reviewer's talent for misrepresentation, one cannot feel sure that he will not extort evidence in favour of polygamy out of words which were used with the purpose of condemning it. In a trustworthy writer such professions would infer that he had a substantial body of authorities in reserve to back his statements: but though Sir W. Hamilton makes a parade of an extensive and intimate acquaintance with the German Reformers, we have discovered little hitherto except indications of ignorance of them. Nor can we suppress all feeling of surprise, when we find him speaking somewhat slightly of those who derive their knowledge from Bossuet, Bayle, &c., as "persons of ordinary information," seeing how he has been convicted of having drawn his whole knowledge of Luther's errors in *Speculative Theology* from a single page of Bossuet, which he has copied with a servile and slovenly adherence to its blunders, though without any acknowledgement, and that too immediately after professing to give Luther's opinions "in his own words literally translated." Besides it is pretty clear that what the Reviewer has alledged against Luther under the head of *Practical Theology*, is in like manner taken from Bossuet, without further examination, as well as without acknowledgement.

After such an exhibition of the extent of the Reviewer's information, be it "ordinary" or extraordinary, concerning Luther, we may allowably suspect that his "chronological series of testimonies by the two Reformers to the religious legality of polygamy, as a general institution, consecutively downwards from their earliest commentaries on the Scriptures and other purely abstract treatises," if he were to bring it forward, would dwindle

down to an equality with one of those infinite series, the amount of which is summed up by zero; such being the fertile imagination which our author shares with a renowned knight of earlier times, that he has only to utter the magical word, and a score of buckram men spring up, in defiance of the ancient maxim, that out of nothing nothing can come. Indeed there is an expression in the sentence just quoted, which, unless I misunderstand it, involves a fair portion of ignorance, and, if one were not dealing with a master in logic, one might also add, confusion. The "chronological series of testimonies," we are told, is to be gathered, "*consecutively downwards from their earliest commentaries on the Scriptures.*" Now the only pertinent sense of these words is if we suppose that, by what the author calls their "earliest commentaries," he meant *their Commentaries on the earliest Books of the Scriptures*, and that he was thinking especially of Luther's Commentary on the Book of Genesis. For in this he is naturally led to speak on the original institution of marriage, on the first introduction of polygamy, and on its practice by the Patriarchs. But the *Commentary on Genesis*, as everybody acquainted with Luther's writings is aware, is not one of his earliest, but one of his latest works. Indeed it was the chief work of the last ten years of his life. The lectures, out of which it is made up, were begun in 1536, and were not concluded till the 17th of November 1545, just three months before his death, and end with that touching passage: "This is the dear book of Genesis. Our Lord God grant that others after me may handle it better. I can do no more; I am weak; pray to God for me, that He may give me a good, happy last hour." On the other hand Luther's "earliest commentaries" are on the Epistle to the Galatians, and on the first twentytwo Psalms;

Melanchthon's, on the Epistle to the Romans, and the Gospel of St John; and it is very unlikely that these should contain any paradoxes about polygamy.

That Sir W. Hamilton's "articulate manifestation" will remain for ever inarticulate, I am led to conclude, in the first place, because Luther's numerous enemies, who, though slow to learn from him, and blind to all his wisdom and goodness, have been lynx-eyed in detecting whatever might be used in kindling odium against him, have never been able to make out a charge of his having recommended polygamy. Besides, as more than once before, I feel warranted in replying that the accusation brought against Luther is false, because his opinion on the subject was often exprest, and effectually disproves it. I restrict my assertion to Luther, not being sufficiently acquainted with the writings of Melanchthon to speak with equal confidence of him; and I have no wish to encroach on the prerogative of Luther's enemies of pronouncing peremptory judgement on matters of which they are ignorant. Not however that I conceive there is the slightest ground for believing that the accusation against Melanchthon could be substantiated a whit more than against Luther.

What Luther's view with regard to polygamy was, we learn from several explicit passages in his writings; for instance from the following remarks on Sarah's giving Hagar to Abraham to be his wife (*Comment. in Gen. xvi. 3*). "Moreover from this act we are not to set up an example, as though it were allowable for us to do the same thing. For the circumstances are to be considered. No promise of a seed has been made to us, such as was made to Abraham; and however barren your marriage may be, no danger will arise from thence, albeit God will that all your offspring should perish. Whereas Abraham



not only had the promise of a seed ; but it was plain that Sarah was barren. These circumstances do not apply to your case. Therefore this singular act of this married couple is by no means to be strained into an example, especially under the New Testament. For the Old Testament permitted polygamy, even for the sake of children ; and there is a law of Moses (Deut. xxii. 29), that, if a man has corrupted a maid, he shall retain her as his wife. But these ceremonial or legal ordinances have ceased : and the case of Abraham is very different from that mentioned by Moses." Again the same principles are inculcated in the Commentary on xxx. 1, with reference to Jacob's four wives. " A man must not say, *Jacob did this, therefore I too may do it* : as is related of Munzer exhorting the peasants, that, after the example of Joshua and Samson, they should slay the princes. But remember thou, that thou must abide by this rule (1 Cor. vii. 2), *Let each man have his wife*.—Therefore these things are recorded, not as examples, but that we should abstain from imitating the example. We may admire, but not imitate them. For there are some things which we may imitate, others which we may admire. Hope, believe, call upon God, like Leah ; but do not marry four wives, like Jacob. For this belongs solely to Jacob, and to those whom God willed to be exempted from the general rule. Let us exercise ourselves in the faith, the patience, the hope, set before us in the Patriarchs ; and let us abstain from those heroic examples."

In the Commentary on Deuteronomy, an earlier work, published in 1525, it is remarked in several places that polygamy was allowed to the Jews, with the sanction of the Law ; but I have found no expressions which can be construed to imply that a similar licence is in any respect conceded as rightful to Christians. That Luther's

opinions at this period coincided with those which he maintained afterward, appears from his letter to Metzsch, written in December 1526. "To your first question, whether a man may have more than one woman to wife, my answer is this. Unbelievers may do what they please; but Christian freedom is to be regulated according to love; so that everything should be determined with a view to our neighbour's good, where no necessity or sin against faith or conscience prevents us. Now however every one seeks that freedom, which will serve and profit himself, without regard to his neighbour's benefit or edification; although St Paul says, *All things are lawful to me, but all things are not expedient: Only use not your liberty for an occasion to the flesh.*—Again, though the ancients had many wives, Christians are not to act after such an example; because there is no necessity, nor edification, nor special word of God, commanding this; and such great scandal and trouble might come from it. Therefore do not esteem the Christian as more free, unless there be some command of God with regard to such freedom." So again in the following March he writes to Clemens Ursinus, in a letter full of that wisdom of faith and love, which is the only true prudence: "Polygamy, which was conceded of old to the Jews and Heathens, cannot be approved of rightfully nor enterprised with a safe conscience among Christians, unless in a case of extreme necessity, as where one party is separated by the leprosy or a like cause. Therefore you must say to the carnal, that, if they wish to be Christians, they must cultivate faith, and curb the flesh, not loosen its reins: if they choose to be Heathens, they may do what they like, at their peril."

This too is the line of argument which he takes in a previous course of Sermons on the Book of Genesis,

publish'd in 1527, where, in speaking of the polygamy of Abraham and Jacob, he vindicates them from the censure of the Manicheans and other disparagers of marriage. At the same time he declares again and again that their example is not to be regarded as a precedent, which we may follow by adopting polygamy as an institution, though it may be deemed a sanction for having recourse to such a remedy in extreme cases. When the Landgrave appealed to certain expressions in those Sermons as justifying his conduct, Luther replied, "My sermon on Genesis will no way help the Landgrave. For on divers occasions, both before and since, I have taught that the Mosaic law was not to be reestablish'd, although it may allowably be made use of as an example, secretly in a case of necessity, or even publicly, if the magistrate so ordain. Therefore, although I should give a secret counsel to a troubled conscience in a case of necessity, that it should act according to the law or example of Moses, I should not establish an open law or example, but should answer as a confessor, who does nothing publicly, but in private, according to the need of consciences." See Seckendorf, III. p. 280; who also gives a letter from the Elector to the Landgrave, explaining Luther's previous expressions in the same manner. "It is one thing to write and teach what in this or that case is not contrary to God and to Scripture: it is another thing to venture on and defend an act contrary to public law and to universal custom.—When Luther writes that he does not recommend bigamy, he indicates thereby that he is unwilling that it should be introduced publicly; and the purpose of that sermon was mainly to defend the Patriarchs from various censures of the commentators, not to excite Christians to the same licence."

The same principles guided both Luther and Melancthon in the opinions they delivered with regard to Henry the Eighth's divorce. Here again the Pamphleteer shews that he is a full match for the Reviewer in the art of misrepresentation. "Had not the civil prudence (he says) of the imprudent Henry VIII restrained him from carrying their (Luther's and Melancthon's) spontaneous counsel into effect, a plurality of wives might now have been a privilege as religiously contended for in England as in Turkey." In the Postscript he adds that this statement is not founded "on the vague expressions contained in Luther's letter to Barnes," but on Melancthon's "*Consultatio de Digamia Regis Angliae.*" Yet, if Luther is to be charged, as the author charges him, with the guilt of this "spontaneous counsel," the evidence must be sought in what he himself advised, seeing that he delivered his opinion fully, and not in what Melancthon may have said in a document, where, by using the first person singular, he shews that he alone is responsible for it.

Now Luther's letter to Barnes, the agent sent to collect the opinions of the Protestant divines, is in so noble a spirit, one can hardly understand how any man with a heart in his bosom can have read it without admiration; and it shines forth especially, when contrasted with the paltry compromises of truth, which bribery and other sinister motives drew from so many Universities. He takes the true religious and philosophical ground, that the Levitical restrictions of consanguinity, which were contravened by express ordinances even among the Jews, are no way binding on Christians, except so far as they are re-enacted by the ecclesiastical and civil law of the land; that the authority which enacts such regulations may dispense with them; but that to dissolve a marriage

celebrated in mutual good faith, which had subsisted for so many years, and from which issue had sprung, was a direct violation of the Divine precept, which forbids divorce save in the case of adultery. "Be it, that the King sinned in marrying his deceased Brother's wife; yet it will be a much more atrocious and greater sin to repudiate her, and to dissolve their marriage so cruelly, that not only the King, but the Queen herself and the Princess will incur the perpetual disgrace of incest: when in fact there is no cause why he should brand them with this horrible crime, and, in addition thereto, dissolve his marriage. Which two huge sins are such, that no regard whatever should be paid to the lesser sin, especially one so long past, and already remitted, and in truth now no sin at all." Holding this opinion of the divorce, he deprecates it with all his energy. "I should wish—that my opinion might benefit both the King and the Queen, so that they may not be beguiled—by the sophists into so nefarious and wicked a divorce, by which they would incur a perpetual misery of conscience.—But if our adversaries have entirely got hold of the King, let our friends try with all their energy at least to save the Queen, so that she may never consent to the divorce, but may rather die than make her conscience guilty of such a crime before God, and that she may believe most firmly that she is the true, legitimate Queen of England, made and approved such by God Himself.—For if they cannot save the King,—which God forbid!—let them at least save the soul of the Queen, so that, if the divorce cannot be averted, she may bear this great evil of an exceeding injury as her cross, but may no way approve of it or consent to it. I, who can do nothing else, will lift up my prayer to God, that Christ may prevent the divorce,—or, if He will not prevent it, that He may at least give

a strong faith and a stedfast, undoubting conscience to the Queen, that she is and will continue to be the legitimate and true Queen of England, in spite of the gates of the world and of hell."

Such being the feelings with which Luther contemplated the divorce, it will not surprise us that he should have said, "Before I could approve of such a divorce, I would rather permit the King to marry another Queen, and to have two wives or Queens at once, after the example of the Kings and Patriarchs." There are two ancient copies indeed of the letter to Barnes, both of them publisht by De Wette; and among other differences between them, these last words do not occur in that which on the whole seems the most authentic. But I will not lay any stress on this objection. In the Landgrave's application it is stated that something of the sort had been said in the answer to Henry VIII: and though this might refer solely to Melanchthon's *Consilium*, yet, knowing what we do of Luther's opinion on the allowableness of bigamy in cases of extreme urgency, we may easily suppose him to have said thus much in this case, even if this mode of evading the difficulty had not already been mooted and talkt of by others (BO). But when, after reading Sir W. Hamilton's accusation, we turn to Luther's writings, and find that this is the sole ground for it, so far as Luther is concerned, what must be our indignation against such reckless slander!

The purport of Melanchthon's *Consilium*, which is drawn up with characteristic ability, is the very same. It is properly entitled, *De Divortio Henrici VIII.* not *De Digamia*: the latter title gives an erroneous impression of its object. Taking the same ground with Luther, though treading more gently, Melanchthon refutes the arguments alledged in favour of the divorce; and then

adds: "But what if the public good render a new marriage advisable for the sake of the succession, as is the case with the King of England, where the public benefit of the whole kingdom would be promoted by a new marriage? Here I answer, if the King desires to provide for the succession, how much better is it to do so without throwing any stigma on his previous marriage! And this may be done without peril to any one's conscience or reputation by a second marriage. For although I would not concede polygamy generally,—for I said above that we are not laying down laws,—yet in this case, for the great benefit of the kingdom, and, it may be also, for the sake of the King's conscience, I hold that the safest course for the King would be to marry a second wife, without casting off the first; because it is certain that polygamy is not prohibited by the Divine Law; nor is it a thing any way unprecedented. Abraham, David, and other holy men had a number of wives; whence it appears that polygamy is not contrary to the Divine Law. We read too of more recent instances. For the Emperor Valentinian enacted a law allowing of having two wives together, and himself married Justina, without casting off his prior wife Severa. The Popes too have formerly granted such permissions, as to one George, an Englishman." Thus Melanchthon's *Consilium* also is very far from sanctioning bigamy as a practice, but merely as an exception or dispensation, as he repeats, "*vel propter conscientiae periculum, vel propter regni periculum.*" In a letter to Bucer three months after (No 1016), he says, with reference to this opinion, "We cannot sanction the divorce. They who give a different opinion, terribly strain the Divine Law. We on the contrary in political matters would rather strain the authority of the magistrate, which assuredly is not

slight: and many things are justifiable on account of the authority of the magistrate, which otherwise are questionable. If the King were sufficiently instructed in this matter, his conscience might be satisfied, as it seems to me." Hence we see how Sir W. Hamilton's violence against the Reformers drives him to and fro from one error to another, without allowing him to stop at the resting-point of truth. Even his excuse of them is only a fresh accusation, and just as illfounded as the first.

But though we must reject the plea that the advice given to the Landgrave is an instance of the predilection which the Reformers on principle entertained for polygamy, the evidence adduced abundantly proves that, in sanctioning a dispensation in what appeared to them a case of pressing need, they were not acting inconsistently, but in thorough consistency with the principles which they had avowed for years before. To us indeed the notion of such a dispensation will still be very offensive; but we must beware, as I have already remarkt, of transferring the moral views and feelings of our age to Luther's. The canon law admitted the necessity of dispensations, which in matrimonial cases were especially numerous. One of the main objects of the scholastic casuistry was to determine under what limitations they are admissible, as may be seen in our own authors in this branch of practical theology, such as Taylor; and the great importance of casuistry is beginning to be recognised anew by recent writers on ethics. The ignorant prater may cry, that Luther ought to have thrown all such things overboard, along with the other rubbish of Romanism. But it was never Luther's wont to throw things overboard in a lump. His calling, he felt, was to preach Christ, crucified for the sins of mankind, Christ, of whose righteousness we become partakers by faith.



Whatever in the institutions and practices of the Church was compatible with the exercise of this ministry, he did not assail, unless it was flagrantly immoral. The sale of dispensations, the multiplication of cases for dispensations in order to gain money by the sale of them, he regarded as criminal; and the abolition of such dispensations, where they have been abolished, the reprobation they lie under, are owing in no small measure to him. But the idea of Law which manifested itself to him, convinced him that positive laws can only partially express the requirements of the supreme Law of Love, for the sake of which they must at times bend: and when he consulted his one infallible authority, he found that his Heavenly Master's chief outward conflict during His earthly ministry was to assert the supremacy of the Law of Love, which the Pharisees were continually infringing, while they stickled pertinaciously for the slightest positive enactment.

Nor is it irrelevant to mention here, that the church at Erfurt, where Luther spent his youth in the convent, contains the monument of the Count of Gleichen, and of the two women said to have been his wives. The Count's story has afforded a subject for several works of fiction. Wordsworth, in his poem on *the Armenian Lady's Love*, represents the second lady as living with him in the relation of a sister. But the tradition was, that the Count, having been taken captive in the Holy Wars, gained his freedom by the help of his master's daughter, whom he married, and that, on his return to Europe, finding his former wife alive, he obtained a dispensation to live with them both. Whatever may be the historical value of this tradition, the frequent sight of the monument, and the story connected with it, could not but familiarize the mind with the notion of bigamy as having been allowed in a case of peculiar emergency: and there

seems to be a reference to it in that passage of Melancthon's opinion, where he speaks of a captive in a foreign land (BP).

With regard to the other case mentioned, that of bodily infirmity, it is manifest that, even if a license were ever allowable, the strictest care would be indispensable to avert the grossest abuses. That such allegations were at times made in confession, probably in mitigation of penances for fornication, we may infer from the way in which Luther speaks on the subject in two of the Marriage-Sermons mentioned above, those of 1522 and 1525; where, touching on the grounds of divorce, he says: "But how is it if a person has a sick partner unfitted for conjugal duties? may he not take another? On his life, no. But serve God in thy sick partner, and nurse her: think that God sends thee a holy thing into thine house in her, that thou mayst gain heaven. Blessed and twice blessed art thou, if thou recognisest this gift and grace, and waitest on thy sick wife for God's sake. Sayst thou, it is dangerous to live thus? No; for if thou wilt faithfully wait on thy sick wife, and recognise that God has sent her to thee, and beseech Him to preserve thee, let Him take care of the rest: assuredly He will give thee grace, that thou shalt not have more to bear than thou canst bear. He is much too faithful to deprive thee of thy wife by sickness, and not also to take away the wantonness of thy flesh, if thou dost indeed wait on her dutifully." It may be that this had been maintained to be a valid ground of separation, among the other extravagances at Wittenberg while Luther was in the Wartburg. The peculiar case of leprosy however is mentioned as a valid ground for a dispensation in the letter to Clemens Ursinus quoted above in p. 250. In like manner, when consulted by Amsdorf on a matrimonial

case, Luther writes, in December 1528, "I much wish that this were settled and determined by the Government, that, when one party in a marriage is a leper, the other shall be free, saving the right of alimony and the promise for life. I, in a case of conscience, should declare that such persons are free, seeing that by the Law of Moses a leper is civilly dead, and ordered to be separated from the congregation. But now, if we were to lay down the same rule, who would carry it into effect? who would uphold it, when our Government thinks otherwise? Therefore, if he will marry at his peril, he may marry, I hold, conscientiously. But we promise him no protection or defense. *We grant a secret right (jus occultum concedimus)*: let him look where he can obtain a public right; since that does not lie in my power." Here, in the case of certain unknown persons, we find Luther allowing of a secret dispensation, *jus occultum*, the very thing deemed a mark of conscious guilt in that of the Landgrave, whose position naturally led Melancthon to urge the point more prominently. At the same time the Landgrave's office as a sovereign would be deemed by the Reformers a ground for special indulgence, as we have just seen in Melancthon's apology for his counsel to Henry the Eighth; not however from any base personal motive, as the Pamphleteer would insinuate; but from divers palpable peculiarities both in his private and public relations, and above all because the instances of polygamy recorded without censure in the Old Testament occur mainly in the lives of the Patriarchs and the Kings.

The Reviewer indeed asserts of the Reformers, that, in their conduct on this occasion, though "renouncing the Pope, they arrogate the power of the Keys to an extent never pretended to by any successor of St Peter." This however is only another instance of his unthinking

rashness. He who reads through Melanchthon's Opinion, as quoted above, will perceive that they arrogate nothing: they do not assume any right of granting a dispensation: but when their counsel is sought, when they are appealed to as spiritual advisers, when a case of conscience is laid before them, what can they do but give such counsel as the emergency seems to them to require? They were consulted as confessors; and as confessors they returned their answer. Will any one say that they ought to have declined giving an answer, for fear of the shame they might incur by it? He who would recommend such cowardly conduct, must be utterly incapable of understanding Luther's heroic faith and love, which would never shrink from any shame to be incurred by endeavouring to relieve the conscience of a brother. Moreover, as it is plain on the face of the document that the authors of it were not arrogating any power to themselves, so do we know from other evidence that Luther deeply regretted the necessity, which the condition of the German Church imposed on him, of entertaining and deciding matrimonial causes, and that he was anxious to remove this burthen from the shoulders of the clergy, by the establishment of appropriate tribunals for the investigation of such cases in the consistories, to the end that the ministers of Christ might not be needlessly distracted and hindered in their great work of preaching the Gospel. His feelings on this point are express in the following passage of his *Tabletalk*, which I translate from the German, c. XLIII. § 97, because the old English version often misrenders the original, and frequently omits whole sentences, even such as are requisite to bring out the full meaning of the context. "When Dr Martin Luther was askt, what the ministers were to do, and how they should behave with regard to matrimonial causes, whether they

might get rid of such vexation and trouble, he said: I advise by all means that we do not take such a yoke and burthen upon us; first, because we have enough of other things to do in our office; secondly, because marriage does not pertain to the Church, but is out of it, a temporal, worldly thing; wherefore these questions belong to the magistrate; thirdly, because such cases are innumerable, very high, wide, and deep, and occasion great offense, which would tend to the shame and dishonour of the Gospel. For I know how often in these matters we with our counsel have been put to shame, when we have allowed secret contracts, to prevent great evils, on condition that they should be kept secret, so that they might not become precedents for others to follow. But people deal unfriendly-wise with us, draw us into these miserable affairs; and, when they turn out ill, the fault must all be ours. Therefore we will leave these matters to the civil magistrate and the jurists, who will know how to give account of them, and, if they decide them well, will be better thought of. The ministers should merely counsel the conscience out of God's word, where need is: but as to disputes, we will let the jurists and consistories fight them out and settle them. Dr Christian Beyer, the Saxon Chancellor, wanted to impose on us divines, that we should hear, examine, and weigh matrimonial causes, and should refer them to the judgement of the jurists, who were then to pronounce. This I would not do. On the contrary they ought to hear, and to await judgement from us; although Master Philip advised me and Master Cellarius that we should serve the poor distracted Churches in these cases for a season (BQ)."

A further question may still be askt, whether, even allowing that Luther acted in conformity to his own opinion, that a second marriage might be entered into in

a case of extreme urgency, without a sinful violation of the Divine law, the reasons in the Landgrave's case were adequate. This however is a question on which we have not sufficient data for pronouncing. We have the Landgrave's application for advice indeed, which he sent by Bucer to the Wittenberg divines; and this, I may remark, as printed by Bretschneider (III. 851—856) from the Palatine Manuscript, does not contain the offensive declaration ascribed to him by the Reviewer, that "he did not wish to abstain from his adultery." Not however that these words were fabricated by the Reviewer: he found them in Bossuet's version, where they occur thrice over; and Bossuet naturally lays great stress on them. The copy too published by Arcuarius (Beger) in 1679, from which Bossuet's version is taken, has some expressions which might easily be understood to imply such an assertion, but which, if they are genuine, must needs bear a different meaning (BR); since the ground which the Landgrave assigns for his application, was his earnest desire to relinquish his sinful practices: and he was a man who had several fine qualities in his character, though his life, like that of many illustrious princes and captains, was not in accordance with the demands of Christian purity. Among the published documents, — for some still remaining have never been printed, though there would seem to be no sufficient reason for still suppressing them, — we also have the Landgravine Christina's consent to her husband's taking a second wife. But, in addition to the written argument, the Landgrave also sent a confession, to be delivered orally by Bucer to the Wittenberg divines; and of this we only know, from divers allusions, that it contained matters unfit for any ear but those of a confessor. Therefore we will not attempt to pry into them. We may safely trust that he,

the strength of whose faith never allowed him to fear man on any other occasion, would not be swayed by the fear of man into sinning against his conscience on this. In a beautiful letter written in the following month of June, 1540, to Melanchthon, who was grievously oppressed by the scandal occasioned, when the Landgrave, in opposition to their counsel, let his second marriage be known, Luther thus reminds him of the principles which had guided them in their opinion. "You know it was told us in that matter, that it was a case of extreme necessity, to which a law does not apply, or which at least requires a modification of it. Wherefore I beseech you for Christ's sake, be of a calm and quiet mind; and let them whose concern it is do something, and bear their own burthens, and not throw the whole weight on us, whom they know to be candid and faithful, and whom they cannot charge with any crime, except compassion, or a too indulgent facility."

In this time of trouble Luther's heroic faith shines forth still more brightly from its contrast with Melanchthon's weakness. The latter was quite crushed, and brought to the very verge of death. "No words can explain to you (he says to Camerarius in a letter of Sept. 1, 1540), what horrible pangs I have suffered, which sometimes revive. I perceived that our teacher was in an agony of mind; but he repressed his grief, lest he should increase mine; and he tried to raise me up with the greatest magnanimity, not only by comforting me, but often by reproving me severely. Unless he had come to me, I should have died." Luther on the other hand feels strong as ever from his unshaken trust in his Heavenly Supporter. "Why are we killing ourselves to no purpose (he says in the letter just quoted to Melanchthon), and by our sadness disturbing our knowledge of Him who

is the Conqueror of every death and every sorrow? For He who overcame the devil, and judged the Prince of this world, did He not at the same time judge and overcome this scandal? For if this present scandal pass away, there will hereafter be other and perhaps greater crowds of scandals, which, if we live, we shall still overcome through the same Conqueror, and shall laugh at them. There is no evil, no power of hell, of which He did not say, and purpose to be understood as saying, *I have overcome the world: be of good cheer.*—Let Satan avaunt: he shall not make us mourn or despond: let us rejoice and exult in Christ the Lord: He will bring all our enemies to nought. We are not in David's condition, whose cause was far more desperate; yet he did not fall: nor shall this cause fall. Why then do you torment yourself? since our ultimate cause is sure to stand, that is, Christ's victory, although our formal and intermediate cause is somewhat disgraced by this scandal.—We, who love you sincerely, will pray for you diligently and effectually. Farewell in Christ; and be not fearful or anxious; cast all your care upon Him, who desires to be careful for us, and has commanded and requires us to believe this.—His word shall stand: *I have overcome the world; and ye shall live, because I live.* Again farewell; and be cheerful and calm, I beseech you, as we seek to be, yea, as our Lord commands us to be." This is the man whom the Reviewer audaciously charges with a "skulking compromise of all professed principle," and with violating the Gospel, "trembling only at discovery."

The reluctance to have the matter known, it is plain, was unmixt with any personal consideration in Luther; though it was otherwise with Melancthon, whose utter abashment on this occasion shews how thoroughly Luther understood his character, when he said to him years before,



*Pecca fortiter* (BS). It was just after this last letter of Luther's, that Melanchthon, as he tells Camerarius in the words just cited, was at the point of death, and was restored to life in an almost miraculous manner, as it seemed, through the intensely fervent prayers, and the energetic, friendly comfort, and friendly rebukes of Luther. When Luther, who had been sent for on account of Melanchthon's dangerous illness, arrived, he found, the historian tells us, "that his eyes were sunk, his senses gone, his speech stopt, his hearing closed, his face fallen in and hollow, and, as Luther said, *facies erat Hippocratica*. He knew nobody, ate and drank nothing. When Luther saw him thus disfigured, he was frightened above measure, and said to his companions, *God forfend! how has the devil defaced this Organon!* He then turned forthwith to the window, and prayed fervently to God. Then, said Luther, *Our Lord God could not but hear me; for I threw my sack before His door, and wearied His ears with all His promises of hearing prayers, which I could repeat out of Holy Writ; so that He could not but hear me, if I were ever to trust in His promises.* Hereupon he graspt Philip by the hand: *Bono animo esto, Philippe; non morieris. Although God has reason to slay, yet He willeth not the death of a sinner, but that he should be converted and live. He has pleasure in life, not in death. If God called and received the very greatest sinners that ever were upon earth, Adam and Eve, again into favour, much less will He reject thee, my Philip, or let thee perish in sin and despair. Therefore give no place to the spirit of sorrow, and be not thine own murderer; but trust in the Lord, who can slay and make alive again, can wound and bind up, can smite and heal again.* For Luther well knew the burthen of his heart and conscience. Being thus taken hold of and adrest, Philip began to draw breath again,

but could not say anything for a good while. Then he turned his face straight upon Luther, and began to beg him for God's sake not to detain him any longer,—that he was now on a good journey,—that he should let him go,—that nothing better could befall him. *By no means, Philip*, said Luther; *thou must serve our Lord God yet longer*. Thus Philip by degrees became more cheerful, and let Luther order him something to eat; and Luther brought it himself to him; but Philip refused it. Then Luther forced him with these threats, saying: *Hark Philip, thou must eat, or I excommunicate thee*. With these words he was overcome, so that he ate a very little: and thus by degrees he gained strength again." See the account cited by Bretschneider in his edition of Melancthon, iv. p. xvii. I enter into these details of Luther's conduct connected with this affair, because it has often been represented as utterly disgraceful, and destructive of his moral character; whereas on this, as on every other occasion, the best vindication of him is the truth. The more one knows of him, the grander he becomes, the more too he wins not merely reverence, but love.

Hence we may perceive that the reasons which made the Reformers insist so strongly upon secrecy, as an indispensable condition, were those which they themselves give out, first, lest the act should be regarded as a precedent, and secondly, the scandal which its publication was sure to occasion. Yet this by no means implies that the act itself was wrong. Jeremy Taylor, in his *Rule of Conscience* (B. II. C. II. R. 3), speaking on a cognate matter, says, of an act which he deems permissible, that, "if that which is not of good report be done, and offered to the report of all them who can condemn the folly and impurity, but cannot judge of the necessity or the cause, the fact, by becoming scandalous, is criminal." In fact

the same rule holds with regard to all those acts which marriage sanctifies, but which, if exposed to public view, would bestialize human nature (BT). This is the ground which Luther himself takes, in a letter to the Landgrave written in July 1540, parts of which have been published by Bretschneider in the *Zeitschrift für die historische Theologie*, II. i. 286—288, and are reprinted by Marheineke in his *History of the German Reformation*, IV. pp. 31—34. “I have received your princely Grace’s letter, which in some measure, methinks, has been written in an irritated mind, such as I am not conscious of having deserved. For it seems to me that your Grace regards this affair, as though we had acted for our own sakes, and not for your Grace’s faithful, loyal service, to save your Grace from future distress. Therefore I will here declare to your Grace from the bottom of my heart, it is not for my own sake that I entreat and warn you so earnestly against the publication of the opinion. Your Grace should be fully convinced of this, and not fancy that it is for my sake. Even if all the devils were resolved to publish the counsel, I should know, through God’s grace, how to make answer, so that they shall have no hold upon me. For I have the advantage that your Grace, and all the devils themselves, must testify and confess, first, that it is a secret counsel; next, that I entreated with all earnestness that it might not be published; thirdly, if it come to the worst, yet I am sure that it is not published through me. So long as I have these three arguments, I would not advise the devil himself to set my pen stirring. God will help me. Through God’s grace I know how to distinguish what may be conceded out of grace in a stress of conscience before God, and what, without this necessity before God, is not right in our outward conduct upon earth; and I should be sorry that your Grace

should enter into a pen-combat with me. Your Grace has enough of other things to do; and so have I. But this is the state of the case, that, since we are of the same Confession, I cannot and will not, so far as lies in my power, let your Grace fall into danger and distress; and I acknowledge myself bound as a Christian to give my neighbour my best counsel and service. For, though your Grace publish the opinion, it does not affect me; but your Grace's objects are not gained and accomplished thereby: only your Grace will drag down a heavier load on your own neck, so that we shall not be able henceforward to help your Grace again, however gladly we might do and wish it. For this your Grace will not be able to effect, that the world shall recognise this your Grace's secret marriage as an open marriage, even though many hundred Luthers and Philips and others declared it so. People will still say, Luthers and Philips have no power to establish anything against public and wholesome laws, although they are bound to give secret advice under a pressure of conscience."

In the preceding April Luther had written to the Elector, that he had burnt the Landgrave's letter, in order that the matter might remain secret, begging him also to keep it secret, and expressing a wish that, since the Landgrave deemed it so important to his soul's health, God might prosper his act. It no way distressed him that the excellent John Frederic should know what had happened. What pained him was, that it should become notorious to those who would not have the information requisite for understanding the peculiar nature of the case; and this information he would not consent to give. In June 1540, on hearing that the Landgrave meant to publish his marriage, Luther expressed his strong disapproval in a letter to Eberhard von der Tann, and added:

“I shall keep what the Landgrave disclosed to me in the way of confession through Bucer, entirely secret, even to my own shame. It is better, people should say, Luther has played the fool (for much wiser men than I have played the fool; and the saying is, a wise man does not commit a small folly), than that I should publish the reasons which induced me to comply with the Landgrave: for this would bring him much greater shame, and make the scandal far worse.”

Such then is the amount of Luther's sin, or rather error,—for sin I dare not call it,—in this affair, in which the voice of the world, ever ready to believe evil of great and good men, has so severely condemned him, without investigation of the facts; although the motives imputed to him are wholly repugnant to those which governed his conduct through life. He did not compromise any profest principle, as the Reviewer accuses him of doing: he did not inculcate polygamy, as the Pamphleteer charges him with doing. But inasmuch as he could not discover any direct, absolute prohibition of polygamy in the New Testament, while it was practised by the Patriarchs, and recognised in the Law, he did not deem himself warranted in condemning it absolutely, when there appeared in special cases to be a strong necessity, either with a view to some great national object, or for the relief of a troubled conscience. Here it behoves us to bear in mind on the one hand, what importance Luther attached, as all his writings witness, to this high ministerial office of relieving troubled consciences: and it may mitigate our condemnation of his error,—which after all was an error on the right side, its purpose being to substitute a hallowed union for unhallowed license,—if we remember that Gerson had said openly a century before, expressing the common opinion of his age, that it was better for a

priest to be guilty of fornication than to marry. Such was the moral degradation of the Church under the Egyptian bondage of ordinances, that even so wise and good a man could deem it expedient to sacrifice the sacred principles of right and purity, the sense of duty, and the peace of the soul, for the sake of upholding the arbitrary enactment of a tyrannical hierarchy. Indeed the clamour which has been raised against Luther for this one act by the Romish polemics, is perhaps, among all cases of the beam crying out against the mote, the grossest and the most hypocritical (BU).

Nor should we forget what difficulties have in all ages compast the settlement of special matrimonial cases. They may perhaps be less now in England than in other countries, notwithstanding the grievous scandals which attend them even here: and there is always a prejudice inclining men to suppose that their own condition is the normal one for the whole human race. But if we compare the laws of marriage which prevail in the various branches of Christendom, and know anything of their moral effects as manifested in family life, we shall perceive how hard it is to lay down any one inviolable rule. What the obscurity and uncertainty of the law was in Luther's time, we may estimate from the conflicting answers which were returned to the questions mooted with reference to Henry the Eighth's divorce. On the other hand we should try to realize what the Bible was to Luther, the source of all wisdom, the treasurehouse of all truth, the primordial code of all law, the store-room from which, with the help of the Spirit, he was to bring forth every needful weapon to fight against and to overcome the world and the devil,—how, if the Bible had been put in the one scale, and all the books of all the great thinkers of the Heathen and Christian world had been piled up in

the other, they would not have availed in his judgement to sway the balance so much as a hair's breadth. It was not much the practice of his age,—least of all was it Luther's,—to estimate the lawfulness and propriety of an act by reference to its general consequences. He did indeed bethink himself of the evil that would ensue, if the dispensation were regarded as a precedent; and therefore did he insist on its being kept secret. But he did not duly consider how impossible it was that such a step taken by a man of so impetuous a character should be kept secret,—nor how terrible the evils would be if every pastor were to deem himself authorized to give similar counsel,—nor how perilous it is to take the covering of secrecy for any acts, except such as are sanctioned by the laws of God and man, while the moral feeling of society throws a veil over them. Perhaps he acted overhastily in a matter of such difficulty and moment: for in a letter of the 9th of December 1539, Melanchthon speaks of Bucer as just arrived; and the answer is dated on the 12th. But however severely we may blame Luther for these errors of judgement, for his allowing himself to be influenced in such a matter by *misericordia* and *humanissima facilitas*, still, when the secret is disclosed, when the scandal gets wind, how does the heroic grandeur of his character, the might of his invincible faith rise out of the trial! The rain descended, and the floods came, and the winds blew, and beat upon his house: but it stood fast, because it was founded upon a Rock. And so, God willing, it shall still, in despite of all his blustering revilers and undermining detractors (bv).

Nay, what man of right mind would not infinitely rather bear the burthen of all Luther's wrong on this occasion, than that of the unblushing falsehood, the trampling upon truth, the abject prostration of the

conscience implied in Bossuet's sentence upon it? "Tout ce que la Réforme avoit de plus renommé en Allemagne consentit à cette iniquité: Dieu les livroit visiblement au sens réprouvé; et ceux qui crioient contre les abus, pour rendre l'Eglise odieuse, *en commettent de plus étranges et en plus grand nombre* dès les premiers temps de leur Réforme, *qu'ils n'en ont pu ramasser ou inventer dans la suite de tant de siècles, où ils reprochent à l'Eglise sa corruption.*" *Ou inventer!* With what a wanton defiance of truth are these words thrown in! When a lie is of infinite magnitude, no matter how much more one stuffs into it. In reading Bossuet's fierce invective on occasion of the Landgrave's double marriage,—the first volley of it in the *Histoire des Variations*, the second more furious still in the Fourth *Avertissement* in answer to Jurieu, and the third in the reply to Basnage,—if we call to mind what was the state of the French court during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and what at so many periods in the preceding eight centuries had been the moral condition of Rome, it would almost seem as though a preacher had come out of Sodom to rail against Abraham for taking Hagar to his bed. With good reason might Seckendorf reply (Lib. III. p. 277), that the French writers on this question "prudentius cautiusque fecissent, si camerinam hanc non movissent: habent enim domi, si tanta lubido est Principum mores in censuram vocare, unde magna compleant volumina; nec minora de dispensatione Pontificum vel sacerdotum, qua flagitia non arcana solum, sed et publica, vel concedere vel dissimulare solent ex causis quas Deo et conscientiae minime probabunt."

Indeed, if anything were surprising among the numberless *παράλογα* of literature, one should marvel at the inordinate reputation which the *Histoire des Variations* has acquired, not merely with the members of a Church glad



to make the most of any prop for a rotten cause, but among Protestants of learning and discernment. One main source of its celebrity may lie in that spirit of detraction which exercises such a baneful power in all classes of mankind, ever since Cain slew his brother on account of his righteousness, — in the eagerness with which all listen to evil-speaking and slander, finding little diminution of their pleasure though it be strongly seasoned with lying, — in that want of sympathy with heroic and enthusiastic spirits, which is so prevalent among men of the world, and the great body of men of letters, and their consequent satisfaction at seeing what towers beyond their ken cast down to the ground. Able as the *Histoire des Variations* doubtless is, if regarded as the statement and pleading of an unprincipled and unscrupulous advocate, it is anything but a great work. For no work can be great, unless it be written with a paramount love of truth. This is the moral element of all genius; and without it the finest talents are worth little more than a conjuror's sleight of hand. Bossuet in this book never seems even to have set himself the problem of speaking the truth, as a thing to be desired and aimed at. He pretends to seat himself in the chair of judgement, but without a thought of doing justice to the persons he summons before him. He does not examine to ascertain whether they are guilty or not. His mind is made up beforehand that they are guilty; and his only care is to scrape together whatever may seem to prove this, that he may have a specious plea for condemning them. Never once, I believe, from the first page to the last, did he try heartily to make out what the real fact was (BW). He is determined to say all possible evil of the Reformers, to shew that they went wrong at every step, in every deed, in every word, and in every thought,

to prove that they are all darkness, with scarcely a gleam of light. Hence his representation of Luther is no more like him, than an image made up of the black lines in a spectrum would be like the sun. Bossuet picks out all the bad he can find, and leaves out all the good: but, as even this procedure would poorly serve his purpose, the main part of his picture consists of sentences torn from their context, which by some forcible wrench, some process of garbling, by being deprived of certain limiting or counterbalancing clauses, by being made positive instead of hypothetical, or through some of the other tricks, of which we have seen such sad instances in these pages, are rendered very offensive. With regard to the Landgrave's marriage, his treatment of Luther is more like the ferocity of a tiger, tearing his prey limb from limb, and gloating over it before he devours it, than the spirit which becomes a Christian bishop.

Let me give one instance of the mode in which he perverts the truth. It may serve as a sample of the whole work. In the Latin translation of the Landgrave's brief, which Bossuet gives as an appendix to his sixth Book, he is represented as saying, "*Quidquid me jusserint quod christianum et rectum sit, sive monasteriorum bona, seu alia concernat, ibi me promptum reperient.*" In the Palatine Manuscript, as published by Bretschneider, there is nothing answering to these words, though an equivalent German sentence is found in the text given by Arcuarius. Hence, if Bretschneider's conjecture be correct, we may conclude that Bucer omitted this passage from a fear that Luther and Melancthon might regard it with jealousy, as an attempt to bias their decision by the introduction of extraneous motives. Still the meaning of the passage in the Latin version is quite plain: the Landgrave promises that whatever they may require, consistently with

the principles of Christianity and justice, whether it relate to the goods of the monasteries or to other matters, they shall find him ready to comply with their wishes. Now no one acquainted with the history of the times, who was not blinded by ill-will, would be obtuse enough to misunderstand that the Landgrave engaged hereby to take care that the property of the dissolved monasteries should be applied, as the Reformers wisht, to religious purposes. Luther was well aware from the first that there were a number of rapacious persons, princes and nobles, who would be eager to seize on the property of the dissolved monasteries. Indeed the work of pillage had already been begun in some provinces which retained their allegiance to Rome, as it was in England about the same time, though with a better object, by Wolsey. In August 1523, when publishing the Rules for the Public Chest at Leissnig, Luther in the Preface expresses his fears that the property of the monasteries would be seized by greedy plunderers, and urges that, after ample provision has been made for the present inmates, it should be employed in works of charity. In November 1526 he wrote a pressing letter to the Elector John, recommending that it should be devoted mainly to the objects of supplying ministers and schools, and, if there were any surplus, to other charitable uses. Again in a letter to Spalatin, of January 1527, he says: "*Seria sunt valde de rapina monasteriorum; et crede, macerat res ista me vehementer. Ego scriptis egi jamdudum quod petis. Hoc non contentus irrupi, dum hic erat Princeps, invitis omnibus etiam in cubile Principis, ut solum convenirem super hac re.*" The Landgrave too had himself written to Luther on the subject in 1526; and it was very natural that he should recur to it in 1539; more especially as it must doubtless have been a matter of discussion

at some of the conferences held in the preceding three years (BX).

In Bossuet's French translation however the passage assumes a totally different meaning: "De mon côté, je ferai tout ce qu'ils m'ordonneront, selon la religion et la raison; *soit qu'ils me demandent les biens des monastères, soit qu'ils desirent d'autres choses.*" When the words are rendered thus, they sound as if the Landgrave meant to offer the Reformers a bribe, a share in the pillage of the monasteries. He who knows anything of them, or even of the Landgrave, will indeed recoil from such a thought. To bribe Luther to give an opinion! One might as reasonably think of bribing the sun to shine tomorrow, by promising him a good breakfast. But such is Bossuet's sordid spirit, and such was the spirit of the persons he was familiar with, he makes the meaning, which he has put into the words by his own mistranslation, the ground of a most spiteful, but ill-aimed sneer. "On voit comme il insinue adroitement les raisons dont il savoit, lui qui les connoissoit si intimement, qu'ils pouvoient être touchés." One would have thought that any man with ordinary delicacy of mind would have been ashamed of casting out such an imputation,—that he would have lookt again and again to ascertain whether it could really be true. But Bossuet's coarseness leads him to repeat the charge more scurrilously in his Reply to Jurieu: "Le prince—pour ne rien oublier, et gagner ces ames vénales par les intérêts les plus bas, leur propose de leur accorder pour prix de leur iniquité tout ce qu'ils lui demanderoient; *soit que ce fut les biens des monastères, ou d'autres choses semblables.*" Here the falsifier has introduced a fresh word, "*semblables,*" into his own translation, to strengthen his perversion of the original. Again in his Reply to Basnage he spits out more of the same venom, while refuting a feeble

excuse, that the Reformers had been compelled to yield. “ On leur promet des monastères à piller : que la Réforme en rougisse : le landgrave, *l'homme du monde qui avoit le plus conversé avec ces Réformateurs, et qui les connoissoit le mieux* (this clause is foisted in as a superfetation of falsehood), les gagne par ces promesses : et voilà toute la violence qu'il leur fait.” If any one is to blush, it is the Church that sets up such an advocate: the advocate himself must be incapable of doing so (BY).

For this malignant calumny, be it observed, there is no sort of ground, except in his own mistranslation. If he had lookt a second time with open eyes at the Latin, he must have perceived that the Landgrave was speaking of the employment of the property for public, not for private ends: the very word *jusserint* implies this; much more the expressions, *quod Christianum et rectum sit*. Indeed Bossuet could not have gone wrong, unless he had set out with the persuasion that the Reformers and their princes were a set of rogues and liars, and with a determination to prove them so. He who metes such measure to his brethren, and to men far greater and holier than himself, has no claim to indulgence; and for this reason I have allowed myself to express the indignation which such conduct deserves. The imputation of sordid motives to our adversaries is one of the paltriest tricks of controversy, which no rightminded man will avail himself of, without conclusive evidence that it is justified by the general life and character of the person against whom it is brought. But Bossuet, while he was engaged in his History, must have examined a considerable part of the documents which shew what Luther was and did. He quotes his letters, whenever he fancies they supply him with materials for slander. Where, in what act, in what word, did he find anything to warrant him in suspecting that

Luther would have belied his conscience for a bribe? nay, that he was desirous of the riches of this world? Nay, he must have met with abundant evidence that Luther was utterly careless about it, that, so far from seeking, he shunned it.

To purify these pages, which have been defiled by Bossuet's insinuations, let me here insert a prayer, which Luther offered up when he was believed to be dying, in July 1527. Bugenhagen, who records it, says: "The Will which he drew up and gave to his wife, then with child, and to his infant son, was as follows: *My most dear God, I thank Thee from my heart that Thou hast willed that I should be poor and a beggar upon earth; therefore I can leave neither house nor fields, estates, money, or property, to my wife and child after me. As Thou hast given them to me, so I restore them to Thee again. Thou rich, faithful God, feed them, teach them, preserve them, as Thou hast hitherto fed, taught, and preserved me, O Father of the orphans and Judge of the widows.*" (Walch, XXI. 163.)

The following letter to the Elector John, in August 1529, may serve as one proof out of a multitude that this was not merely a feeling awakened by the solemn anticipation that earth and its gifts were passing away, but that it abode with him in the same strength amid the temptations of active life. "I have long delayed to thank your Electoral Grace for the clothes and gown your Grace has sent and given to me. But I will humbly beg your Grace not to believe those who say that I am in want. I have unhappily more, especially from your Grace, than I can reconcile to my conscience. As a minister too, it does not behove me to have any superfluity; nor do I desire it. Therefore, when I see your Grace's overkind and gracious favour, I am straightway afraid; for I would not willingly be found here in this

life among those to whom Christ says, *Wo to you that are rich ! for ye have received your consolation.* Moreover, to speak of this world's matters, I would not willingly be burthensome to your Grace, knowing that your Grace has so many calls for giving, that your Grace can scarcely have anything over to maintain your own rank ; for too much bursts the bag. Therefore, although it would not beseem me to wear the liver-coloured cloth, yet, that I may be thankful to your Grace, I will wear the black coat in honour of your Grace, though it is much too costly for me ; and were it not your Grace's gift, I could never wear such a coat. I beg therefore that your Grace will wait till I myself complain and ask, so that, through this overreadiness on your Grace's part, I may not be shamed out of asking for others, who are much worthier of such favours. For your Grace, without this, does too much for me. Christ will repay it graciously and richly : this I pray from my heart." Yet Luther's largest income is said to have been two hundred florins, about twenty pounds, a year (BZ).

Such is the man whom Bossuet calls "*venal*," whom he charges with selling his soul for a bribe. This is indeed a peculiarly flagrant example : but he who will take the trouble of examining the statements in the *Histoire des Variations*, will find a number of passages where the truth is distorted by similar misrepresentations ; and I doubt whether he will find a single instance of candour in the whole book. It is full time that a work, which has been exalted so far beyond its worth for a century and a half, should be cast down to its proper place (CA).

I have dwelt thus long on this matter of the Landgrave's marriage, because Luther's conduct on this occasion is commonly supposed to be the one great blot in his life, and has been deemed indefensible even by

many of his friends. Having endeavoured to set this matter in a right light, to shew what he actually did, and by what motives he was determined, I may hasten to the close of this Vindication. Some of Sir W. Hamilton's charges indeed, and very heinous ones, are still unfuted. "Luther and Melanchthon (he says), great and good as they both were, would, had they been permitted by the wisdom of the world to carry their theological speculations into practice, have introduced a state of things, which every Christian—will now confess, would not only have turned the Reformation into a curse, but have subverted all that is most sacred by moral and religious law. Among other points of Papal discipline, the zeal of Luther was raised against ecclesiastical celibacy and monastic vows; and whither did it carry him? Not content to reason against the institution within natural limits and on legitimate grounds, his fervour led him to deny explicitly, and in every relation, the existence of chastity as a physical impossibility; led him publicly to preach (and who ever preacht with the energy of Luther!) incontinence, adultery, incest even, as not only allowable, but, if practist under the prudential regulations which he himself lays down, unobjectionable, and even praiseworthy. The epidemic spread; a fearful dissolution of manners throughout the sphere of the Reformer's influence, was for a season the natural result. The ardour of the boisterous Luther infected, among others, even the ascetic and timorous Melanchthon." These words are followed by the passage quoted above in p. 233 about Polygamy.

Now, after the cross-examination to which Sir W. Hamilton has been subjected, even Mr Ward will hardly assert any longer that "his name is a sufficient voucher" for the accuracy of anything that he may say. Will Sir



W. Hamilton himself assert that it is? Will he vouch for the accuracy of his own quotations? of his own statements? His own! We have seen that many of them are not his own,—that, with all his ostentatious pretensions to a familiarity with Luther's writings, he has borrowed extracts, without acknowledgement, from Bossuet, or from some other of Luther's violent enemies, and has not even attempted to ascertain their correctness. In like manner, I believe, the charges brought against Luther in the passage just quoted are not the result of Sir W. Hamilton's own researches: I believe that they are taken in the main from such books as the *Histoire des Variations*, and that too without examination. But, from whatever source they may be drawn, on whatever ground or quicksand they may be erected, I see not why I should hesitate to assert that, so far as they bear upon Luther, they are, one and all, utterly false. If Sir W. Hamilton has not hitherto published the second part of his Address to the Scotch Church, in which he calls upon its members, *Be not Schismatics, be not Martyrs by mistake*, he might perhaps employ his time more profitably both for himself and for the noble company of authors, were he to substitute a pamphlet, illustrated by copious examples out of his own experience, to deter men from retailing the falsehoods they find in others; and the pamphlet might fairly be entitled, *Be not Calumniators, be not Slanderers by mistake*. For such facts his name might safely be regarded as a sufficient voucher; and thus he might regain his lost laurels: while Mr Ward might adorn an appendix to his *Ideal* with long extracts for his own edification, and that of other Romanizers; unless indeed he be of opinion that it pertains to the essence of an Ideal to keep at a respectful distance from the truth.

At all events I trust I may now assume that Luther's

character does not need to be vindicated from such heinous charges, brought forward thus vaguely, and without a tittle of evidence, by such an accuser. A couple of remarks may suffice to dispose of them.

In the first place the whole passage implies a total misconception of Luther's character, and of the influence he exercised, whether generally on his countrymen, or on Melancthon personally. We have seen how far beyond him Melancthon went in his counsel to Henry the Eighth. We have seen how Luther from the Wartburg wrote to repress his friend's ardour for precipitate innovations. Several times too in the course of these pages we have been led to remark how averse Luther was to the hasty and violent change of any outward institution,—how he desired that the Reformation of Christianity should advance, like its original establishment, not by the forcible assault and subversion of anything previously existing, but by the winning and transformation of men's minds through the power of Divine truth brought home to them by the operation of the Spirit. Mackintosh, when speaking of the Reformation, in his *History of England* (II. 147), has observed that Luther's conduct, at the time of the insurrection of the peasants, "was unexceptionable;" and that "such disorders are incident to the greatest and most beneficial movements of the human mind." They are the almost inseparable accompaniments of such a movement; but it would be sheer confusion to hold its authors responsible for them (CB).

One of the chief merits of Ranke's History is his having set these parts of Luther's character in their true light, so clearly and incontrovertibly, that the empty talk about his violent conduct, which may probably have arisen primarily from the vehemence of his language, and which has been greatly fostered by Bossuet's caricature,

will ere long be exploded among the intelligent, as much so as the Livian declamation against the Roman plebeians. In the former extracts from Ranke we found representations of Luther's salutary and tranquillizing working in the earlier part of his public career. At a later period in his History, when the Reformed Churches had already assumed a certain consistency, in the Introduction to the seventh Book, he inserts the following remarks, which may stand here to set their foot on Sir W. Hamilton's misrepresentations. "The Reformers, even in religion, with regard both to ceremonies and to doctrine, notwithstanding their departure from the ordinances of the hierarchy, still kept as close to whatever was traditional, as seemed reconcilable with the original records of their faith, to which they went back. Around them destructive tendencies, which had long been working underground, and were now suddenly set free by the mighty convulsion, came forth in a form peculiarly fascinating for the age, from the confusion of religion with politics, and threatened the civilized world with a universal dissolution and revolution. The Reformers had sufficient calmness and self-possession to resist these tendencies from the very first moment. Throughout we see Luther directing his weapons on both sides,—against the Papacy, which sought to reconquer the world then struggling for its emancipation,—and against the sects of many names, which sprang up beside him, assailing Church and State together. In the region of the spirit, in the province of intellectual conviction, the Protestants contributed the most to their subjugation. Not that they cautiously weighed in each particular case what was practicable, and what not. It was rather their own essential character, that led them to this conduct. They were thoroughly convinced of the correctness of that view of the Scriptures,

which lay at the foundation of the theology of the Latin Church: they merely desired to remove those arbitrary decisions and ordinances of the Hierarchy, which were repugnant thereto: and how could Luther, to whom the confounding of the spiritual with the temporal element was one of the things most hateful in the Papacy, allow a like confusion to gain ground on the opposite side? In so doing he would have given up himself. In this very respect does a mind truly called to take an active part in the development of the world manifest that its internal nature and the secret necessity of things concur. The great Reformer, if we may use an expression of our days, was one of the greatest Conservatives that ever lived."

In the next place, to touch on the more specific charges in the last extract from Sir W. Hamilton's Pamphlet,—the first, that Luther "denied explicitly, and in every relation, the existence of chastity as a physical impossibility," may easily be proved to be utterly false by the citation of passages in which he "explicitly" asserts the contrary. For instance, in the Sermon *On Married Life*, preached in 1522, he begins with speaking on Matthew xix. 12, and, coming to the third class of men there mentioned, says, "these are the high, rich spirits, whose passions are bridled in by God's grace,—who say,—*I will beget children in the Kingdom of Heaven, that is, spiritual children in the Gospel.*" In the latter part of the same Sermon, after speaking of the benefits of marriage, he adds, "Hereby I do not mean to reject virginity, nor to entice people from it to a married life. Let each continue in the state which suits him, and which he feels to be appointed for him by God." The same thing is said in nearly the same words in the Sermons on Genesis published in 1527. In the later Commentary on Genesis ii. 22, we

find the words, *Non autem nego, quin aliqui sint qui sine conjugio possint caste vivere*; words which might seem expressly chosen to give a flat contradiction to Sir W. Hamilton's assertion. A sentence might perhaps be pickt out here or there, which, when taken alone, may appear to assert the contrary; but if we look at it in its original place, we shall find something in the context to limit it (cc).

Sir W. Hamilton may contend that the passages which I have quoted come from writings subsequent to the disturbances at Wittenberg, and that he was speaking of writings anterior, inasmuch as he ascribes these disturbances to their influence. But we have seen above that his knowledge concerning the chronology of the German Reformation is no less accurate than on every other matter pertaining to it. In fact this itself is a fresh proof that he is dealing out his words at random: for in the Marriage Sermon of 1519, the only one prior to those disturbances, Luther, as has already been stated in p. 157, was still under the Romish prejudices in favour of celibacy. On the other hand it is quite true that Luther did often most earnestly contend that vows of celibacy, imposed on any except those who by a peculiarity of physical or moral constitution were qualified for observing them, were contrary to Nature, and to God's holy ordinance, so contrary, that Nature would infallibly assert her rights, and rise up against them: and of this he had the most appalling evidence in the practice of concubinage, which seems to have been very common among the clergy, except where far worse profligacy prevailed in its stead. When we find official statements that among fifty priests scarcely one was not a notorious fornicator,—that, among a hundred priests in Bavaria, it had been ascertained upon enquiry, scarcely three or four did not live in open

concubinage, or in secret or open marriage (cd), — how could a righteous man dwelling among them do otherwise than vex his righteous soul with the filthy conversation of the wicked? How could he do otherwise than protest with all the fervour of holy indignation against the unhallowed imposture which was breathing its pestilential vapours into every nook and corner of the Church?

The other charges, that Luther “publicly preacht incontinence, adultery, incest even, as not only allowable, but, if practist under the prudential regulations which he himself lays down, unobjectionable, and even praiseworthy,” cannot be refuted in the same summary manner. I might cite a number of passages against incontinence from his writings: I might shew that he often exprest a wish that adultery were punisht capitally. But I will not waste words upon such accusations proceeding from a witness whose testimony has been proved again and again to be utterly worthless. When a dear friend, whose faith and righteousness have been approved during a long life, under many severe trials, is said to have committed unheard of enormities, without any specification of when, where, how, or what, one is fully warranted in replying that the assertions cannot possibly be true. Therefore I will merely defy Sir W. Hamilton to bring forward evidence in support of these atrocious charges. Should he attempt to do so, and adduce any passages beyond those which have been satisfactorily explained by Harless in the seventh Volume of his Journal, I shall deem myself bound to use my best endeavours to set them on a right footing. At the same time let me remark, that I trust he will not have the assurance to quote certain sayings, which explicitly refer solely to cases of impotence, as substantiating his allegations. Should he shrink from this test, finding that he cannot stand it, what can a generous,

nay, what can an honest man do in his place, but come forward with an open recantation and a humble acknowledgement of the wrong he has done to one of the noblest pillars of Christianity, one of the greatest benefactors of mankind (CE)?

Herewith I will wind up this Vindication of Luther, which has grown to a bulk far beyond what I originally contemplated. But the question of Luther's character is intimately connected with the miserable controversies which are now disturbing our Church: and though the decision of those controversies ought to turn on wholly different points, the enemies of Protestant truth have always felt they were gaining an advantage, if they could, by whatsoever artifices, detract from the fame of its first and greatest champion. Hence it seemed desirable, not merely for the sake of historical justice, but with a view to checking and dispelling the delusions which have been so busily propagated of late years concerning the Reformation and its authors, that the charges brought against Luther, such at least as come from assailants of any mark, should be carefully scrutinized, and that their groundlessness should be thoroughly exposed. To do thus much appeared to be due, not only to Luther, but also to our Church, which is so deeply indebted to him, and which will have to rue the day, should she ever cease to revere him. If in doing it I have been too prolix, I must plead that love is wont to be garrulous. How then can it be otherwise, when it has such an object, and sees him so scandalously traduced? Must it not do what it can to replace him on his rightful throne? That my vindication of him has not been entirely unsuccessful, I may trust without much presumption. Several of the charges have been clearly shewn to rest on no foundation whatever, others to be grossly exaggerated. Indeed to

some readers it may seem that they were too futile, too monstrous, to need so elaborate a refutation. Such an objection would be welcome as a token that I have not failed in my aim. At the same time let me remark that the persons against whom I have been contending, are not men of no name, gabblers and railers out of the rabble of literature, but most of them among our most eminent writers of the day; so that it might have been deemed a rash venture to encounter them, but for the recollection that even Patroclus became a match for the foremost heroes, when he went out to the battle in the armour of Achilles. That armour will assuredly enable us still to gain many a victory over Romanists and Romanizers.

Of late years however Luther's enemies have been on the advance in England. Frivolous and fallacious as the charges here examined have been proved to be, they have been caught up eagerly and repeated by many; and it is impossible to estimate by how many they have been swallowed readily, as flattering their previous antipathies,—or how many more must have deemed, albeit reluctantly, that what was so confidently asserted, and remained without contradiction, could not but be true. Nor have they been repeated merely by such writers as Mr Marshall, who, in his *Notes on the Episcopal Polity* (p. 387), appeals to Mr Hallam as an authority for pronouncing Lutheranism to be the parent of Anabaptism, an assertion the total incorrectness of which we have seen above. For this is just of a piece with the rest of a book, which would almost seem to have been made up out of the sweepings of a public library, interlarded with those of a reading-room, quoting all manner of books of all ages, bygone libels, and the ephemerals of the day, and retailing gossip, anecdotes, arguments, statements at third or fourth hand, and by bitter adversaries, without any critical



discrimination; its object being the laudable one of proving that, wherever the episcopal form of government has not been retained, Churches have sunk into "nurseries of heresy and unbelief." A writer who can charge Calvin with "a vast number of sayings which savour almost of infidelity" on the unexamined assertions of the Jesuit Maldonatus (p. 406),\* has surrendered his understanding

\* A dozen passages of Maldonat's Commentary on St Matthew are referred to as vouchers for this assertion; and it is added that "a host of such evil comments is noticed by the same writer in his remarks upon the other Gospels." Now what purpose of edification, of judgement, or even of the barest information, can be served by persons telling us that Pelagius accused Augustin, or that Augustin, in a score or five score of passages, accused Pelagius of heinous errors? If it be necessary that we should know the errors and faults of great and holy men, and if such knowledge may in some cases be profitable to us in the way of caution and warning, this can only be when we understand what the error was, and how they were led into it. Let us not build up our judgements on the husks and dregs of the invectives of former generations. Hardly any man that ever lived has spoken the truth of his opponents, has treated them with justice, much less with charity. Why then do we not leave these untruths, these injustices, these uncharitablenesses, to moulder and rot with the other earthly particles of those who uttered them? Blessed must Maldonat's portion be, if he has been allowed to embrace Calvin among the Communion of Saints, and to receive his forgiveness for having sinned against him more than seventy times seven. Let us not revive and prolong the carnal animosities of those who may now be at one in the unity of their common Lord. In the list of passages referred to by Mr Marshall, there is only one where he enables us to judge what the saying imputed to Calvin, "which savours almost of infidelity," was. "In Maldonat's Note on Matth. xxvii. 46 (he tells us), Calvin is quoted as referring our Lord's exclamation on the Cross to 'despair,'—a sentiment, as Maldonat justly says, almost too shocking to be repeated, even for the sake of admonition." Maldonat's words are, "Occludendae hoc loco aures sunt haereticorum blasphemiae, quorum magister Calvinus desperationis vocem hanc fuisse dicit, impium

so blindly to blind guides, that I have not thought it requisite to take notice of his allegations against Luther. But Sir W. Hamilton's reputation, however undeserved, for accuracy has gained credence for his statements among

errorem impio etiam errore confirmans, oportuisse Christum, in quem ira Dei hominibus debita effundebatur, omnes damnatorum experiri poenas, inter quas una est nullam sperare salutem." Now what does Calvin really say? Let us turn to his admirable Commentary. "Certe hic praecipuus fuit conflictus, et omnibus aliis tormentis durior, quod in suis angustiis adeo levatus non est Patris auxilio vel favore, ut se quodammodo alienum sentiret. Neque enim corpus solum in pretium nostrae cum Deo reconciliationis obtulit, sed in anima etiam pertulit debitas nobis poenas: atque ita vere factus est *Vir dolorum*, sicut Jesaias loquitur (LIII. 3). Et vero nimis insulsi sunt, qui, hac redemptionis parte posthabita, tantum in externo carnis supplicio insistunt: nam, ut pro nobis satisfaceret Christus, reum ad Dei tribunal sisti oportuit. Nihil autem magis horribile quam Deum sentire judicem cujus ira mortes omnes superat. Ergo cum species tentationis Christo objecta est, quasi Deo adverso jam esset exitio devotus, *horrore correptus est, quo centies cuncti mortales fuissent absorpti, ipse autem mirifica Spiritus virtute victor emersit*. Nec vero fecte vel theatrice conqueritur se a Patre relictum.—Sed absurdum videtur, Christo elapsam esse desperationis vocem. Solutio facilis est, *quanquam sensus carnis exitium apprehenderet, fixam tamen stetisse fidem in ejus corde, qua Deum praesentem intuitus est, de cujus absentia conqueritur*. Diximus alibi, quomodo Deitas locum cesserit carnis infirmitati, quatenus salutis nostrae interfuit, ut omnes Redemptoris partes Christus impleret. Discrimen etiam notavimus inter naturae sensum et fidei notitiam: quare nihil obstat quominus Dei alienationem mente conceperit Christus, prout sensus communis dictabat, et simul fide retinuerit Deum sibi esse propitium. Quod satis clare patet ex duobus querimoniae membris. *Nam antequam tentationem exprimat, praefatur se ad Deum confugere tanquam Deum suum, atque ita clypeo fidei fortiter repellit illam, quae se ex opposito ingerebat, derelictionis speciem. Denique in hoc diro cruciatu illaesa fuit ejus fides, ut se relictum esse deplorans, propinquo tamen Dei auxilio confideret*. Quisquis autem reputat, hac lege susceptam fuisse a Christo mediatoris

men of a different order. Thus it was probably on the strength of those statements that Mr Newman, in his Sermon on *The Theory of Developments*, took upon himself to say that "Protestantism has at various times unexpectedly develope into an allowance or vindication of polygamy" (p. 321). He has since shewn with what singular ingenuity he can develop anything out of anything; and philosophy as well as experience teaches us how close is the conjunction between opposites. But while there is a latent principle of unity between opposites, notwithstanding their apparent remoteness, on the other hand there is often an outward proximity between contraries, such as is implied, for instance, when the Prince of Peace declared that He *came to bring a sword*. Such is the proximity which is often found in this world between those two contraries, Freedom and Licentiousness. When Freedom would manifest and establish itself, the world brings forth Licentiousness to ape it, and to usurp its place. Hence, whenever there has been any freedom of speculation, licentiousness has dogged its heels, and barked in its train. Thus it may have happened that some Protestant writers at various times may have pleaded in favour of polygamy: this however is no more imputable to Protestantism than all the immoral paradoxes broacht by writers in Romish countries are to the Church of Rome. Assuredly too we may reply that to the Reformation, and in no small measure to Luther, do we owe the true development, ut reatum nostrum tam in anima quam in corpore subiret non mirabitur illi certamen fuisse cum mortis doloribus, quasi De irato in labyrinthum malorum projectus foret." This is a sample of the trustworthiness of Maldonat's statements as to the opinions of the Reformers. The only way in which such books as the *Notes of the Episcopal Polity* could do any good, would be if the author himself were to gather all the copies, and make a holocaust of them to Truth. This fire might purify him for better works hereafter.

lopment of the sanctity of marriage and of family life, the conviction that it is not a state essentially partaking of impurity, any more than virginity, that in the sight of God it is equally acceptable, equally pure. The notorious differences which prevail with regard to the sanctity of the marriage-tie between Romish and Protestant countries, is the completest answer to the imputation that Protestantism has any affinity with polygamy. The whole tone too of our literature, except during that dark period after the Restoration when Romish principles were gaining ground, shews a reverence for marriage, which is comparatively rare in the light literature of Romish countries. With us, except during that period, the adulterer has seldom been represented as an object of sympathy and admiration, or the injured husband as an object of ridicule and contempt. How different is the literature of France, and of Italy! But to return to our subject: that the *Christian Remembrancer* should hail Sir W. Hamilton's pamphlet with delight, might be expected. In the ignorance of our Romanizers concerning the theology of Germany, and the German Reformation, they snap at whatever promises to pamper their desire of decrying them. Still one would hardly have thought that even they would have called that pamphlet "valuable for the exposition of Lutheranism which it contains" (Vol. ix. p. 603): when in fact it contains nothing about *Lutheranism*, but merely the passages quoted above, ascribing certain extravagances to Luther and Melancthon individually, which, even if they were true, would no more affect *Lutheranism*, than the errors and sins of Christians affect the Creeds of the Church. It is however a matter of surprise and regret that the learned and candid writer of the Article on Mr Ward's book in the *Quarterly Review* should refer to the "recent and remarkable pamphlet of Sir W. Hamilton,"

citing his monstrous charges against the German Reformers, without even intimating a suspicion that they might perhaps be untrue. When falsehood is thus rampant, and spreading thus rapidly, it is high time to arrest its progress, and to hurl it back into its native abyss.

To some readers it may seem that I have spoken with exaggerated admiration of Luther. No man ever lived whose whole heart and soul and life have been laid bare as his have been to the eyes of mankind. Open as the sky, bold and fearless as the storm, he gave utterance to all his feelings, all his thoughts: he knew nothing of reserve: and the impression he produced on his hearers and friends was such, that they were anxious to treasure up every word that dropt from his pen or from his lips. No man therefore has ever been exposed to so severe a trial: perhaps no man was ever placed in such difficult circumstances, or assailed by such manifold temptations. And how has he come out of the trial? Through the power of faith, under the guardian care of his Heavenly Master, he was enabled to stand through life, and still he stands, and will continue to stand, firmly rooted in the love of all who really know him. A writer quoted by Harless (VII. 2) has well said, "I have continually been more and more edified, elevated, and strengthened by this man of steel, this sterling soul, in whom certain features of the Christian character are manifested in their fullest perfection. His image, I confess, was for some years obscured before my eyes. I fixt them exclusively on the ebullitions of his powerful nature, unsubdued as yet by the Spirit of the Lord. But when, on a renewed study of his works, the holy faith and energy of his thoroughly German character, the truth of his whole being, his wonderful childliness and simplicity, revealed themselves to my sight in their glory, then I could not but turn to him with entire, pure love,

and exclaim, *His weaknesses are only so great, because his virtues are so great.*"

None of God's servants was ever more earnest in disclaiming all honour to himself. "Neque enim, (he says in the Preface to his Commentary on Genesis, in 1544,) ego is sum de quo dici possit, *fecit*; neque is de quo dicere possis, *faciebat*. In ultimo consisto ordine, qui vix dicere audet, *volui facere*. Et utinam essem dignus in hoc ordine ultimo ultimus esse." In like manner, when publishing a collection of his Theses, in 1545, not a year before his death, he says, he allows them to be published, "Ne me extollat magnitudo causae, et successus in ea divinitus mihi datus. Nam in his palam ostenditur mea ignominia, id est, infirmitas et ignorantia, quae me in principio coegerunt rem tentare cum summo tremore et pavore—Vides hic, si licet saltem hoc gloriari, ex quanta infirmitate me Dominus provexerit in virtutem, ex quanta ignorantia in scientiam, ex quanto tremore in fortitudinem.—Summa, nos nihil sumus, Christus solus est omnia, qui si avertat faciem suam, nos perimus, et Satan triumphat, etiam si S. Petri et Pauli essemus." Therefore in him has the divine law been fulfilled, that he who loses his life shall find it.

## NOTE A : page 4.

THE following remarks on Luther are taken from the first section of a treatise on German Protestantism, by Hemdes-hagen, which has recently been exciting a good deal of interest in Germany. They give one of the truest pictures I have ever seen of Luther and of his work :—

“When Our Lord was going about in the towns and villages of His home, according to the flesh, and was teaching in the schools, and preaching the gospel of the kingdom, and healing all manner of diseases, and all manner of sicknesses among the people, then He saw the people, and He had compassion upon them; for they were famished, and scattered like sheep that have no shepherd. Priests, Pharisees, and Scribes, had led the people in the way of error, had cheated them of the highest blessings of life, and made them subservient to their will. And yet the people was not there either for the sake of the Priests, nor of the Pharisees, nor yet of the Scribes, but for its own sake, and for God’s sake, who had created even the least after His image, and had called them to His fellowship. Therefore the Saviour Himself called this a sign of the appearance of the kingdom of God, that the Gospel was preacht to the poor. He declared that the poor in spirit are blessed; He called the weary and heavy laden to him; and He gave thanks to the Father, that He had revealed to babes what He had hidden from the wise.

“It was a seed of this Evangelical spirit, turning with self-devoting love to the poor forsaken people, that found the good ground in an honest German heart, and from which the tree of our Reformation grew less mightily. Our Luther, out of a melancholy monk, had become a young doctor, fervent, and rejoicing in the Scriptures, well versed in his Augustin, Aquinas, Occam, Jaulre, and Gersom, familiar with all the subtle

theological and philosophical controversies of his day, was already spoken of honourably in wider circles as a good, clever thinker, as a victorious assailer of the supremacy of Aristotle; took a lively interest in the struggles of the Humanitarians against the ancient barbarism, was esteemed by the most celebrated champions of the freedom of science, was exalted by the approbation of his sovereign, of his colleagues, of the students that flocked to his lectures,—in a word, was advancing with rapid steps to the highest honours of literary renown. We take pleasure in this position of Luther, and in his success, not as though he had received the impulses to his subsequent work from thence, but because they did not spoil him for it; because, in spite of them, when the time came, he did not let them divert him from it. His academical chair had not raised him beyond the wants and the yearnings of the common people; in the service of science, the aims, the ideas, after which the monk had striven, had not receded or turned pale. In the splendour of his new career, in the light of his brighter knowledge, those who were still destitute of that knowledge had not become strange or indifferent to him; no self-aggrandizing desire for literary glory had bound his fresh, free, strong spirit, under its yoke. The poor miner's boy, who once went singing for his bread from house to house, had preserved a great, large, true heart for his people. It was no learned vanity, any more than the vulgar jealousy of his order, nor was it any other merely speculative interest, however noble, that drove Luther into the course of a Reformer. Luther became a Reformer, because in his confessional he had learned to know the spiritual necessities of the people; because he had compassion on the poor people, even as the Saviour had compassion upon them. It was a hearty pity for the simple and ignorant whom he, too, saw given up to the Priests and Pharisees and Scribes, and cheated of the highest blessings of life; it was a deep, manly sorrow over the mistaken road of salvation, along which the poor misled multitude were wandering, whereby Luther was inspirited to his



first half-timid attempts; whereby, as he advanced, he was strengthened to steadfast perseverance, whereby at length he was raised and arrayed as the mighty champion of Evangelical freedom. Luther had rusht deep into the gulf of moral corruption, which was diffused among the lay commonalty, by the Romish doctrine of justification by works. He knew from the liveliest experience the miserable condition to which the sincerest souls, the devoutest spirits, are reduced by this doctrine. He had found an escape from himself out of this tribulation, a path leading securely to the peace of the soul with God, in the righteousness of faith. Therefore he could not, and would not, keep silence at that which was going on around him. The princes and priests, indeed, the learned and educated, did not need, for the most part, that he should teach them the meaning of indulgences, but the common uneducated people urgently demanded his help. This people, Luther esteemed as standing exactly on the same level—as requiring, just like all other classes, to be led to the light of a purer knowledge of salvation; he neither deemed himself too high, or the multitude too low, to devote his services to them. In this state of mind, he boldly and powerfully tore down the wall of separation which had been built up in the course of centuries, between the clergy and the laity; the mass of the laity, who hitherto had only been considered as a helpless body, to be moulded by the priests at pleasure, and to be interceded for by the church before God, he roused, by the doctrine of repentance and of justification by faith, and gave them a living principle of spiritual independence and personality, supplying them with inexhaustible materials for contemplation in the scriptural ideas of sin and of Divine grace, and thus, out of the despised objects of an arbitrary sway, he fashioned a living organized congregation of Christians, who had become free through their faith in their Redeemer.”

Thus Luther's reformation reverted to the same moral basis, to that warm personal love for the people from which,

in the first age of Christianity, the preaching of the Gospel had proceeded. Again, as before, the lifeless tools of the hierarchy were to be converted into free moral persons. Again, as before, the love for the people rested upon the true moral estimate of the worth of the very meanest. This is the characteristic of the Reformation as an act of the German mind; this is the pledge of its continuance, whereby it has far outlasted, and, in the extent of its operation, exceeded, whatever has taken place in other countries more or less akin to it.

We should be guilty of great injustice if we refused to recognize the features of a proportionately deeper Christian knowledge, of a freer spirit, of a livelier moral earnestness in the leaders and spokesmen of that reformation of the Church, both in its head and members, which was an object of so many desires during the fifteenth century. It is known how highly Luther prized Gerson; but what duration could a reformation promise itself which, in its real essence, merely aimed at placing the claims of the lower ecclesiastical aristocracy in a correcter balance with those of the higher? What notions of the essence of the Christian life had councils which, on the one hand, did indeed depose popes, but on the other, proclaimed prohibitions of the Scriptures, confirmed sacramental privileges, and burnt the champions of the people against the hierarchy? In like manner, the House of Valois had indeed deserved thanks for bringing forward the *tiers-etât* in its contest against the Court of Rome. In the edict of Bourges, France established an important principle for the whole of Christian Europe, long before the other nations. But the idea of the people is wider and more comprehensive than that of the *tiers-etât*, and the act of awakening the consciousness of an individual conscience, of a spiritual personality, of the rights of a personal inherited and inalienable priesthood in those whose consciences men, hitherto under subjection, surrendered to the guidance of strangers, is of greater importance than that of granting political rights to the *tiers-etât*. This grant, not being accompanied by that awaken-

ing of a moral and religious self consciousness, by that inward emancipation which, at the same time, is an inward discipline, did not, therefore, prevent Francis I., half a century afterwards, from squandering away the ecclesiastical liberties of his country, which had been obtained by the councils, to the Pope, thus establishing that system of French policy, which has continued to this day, according to which, the knowledge and conscience of the people are of no account with the grandeur and unity of the monarchy. Or, if we turn to the national efforts of the French and Bohemians, the emancipation of their specific race from the oppression of the oecumenical Church, was indeed both justifying and ennobling. But as these national efforts were rendered subservient in France to the interests of the absolute monarchy, in Bohemia to a kind of Jewish exclusive nationality, and were stronger in their hatred of foreign influences than in their love for what was domestic, they were destitute of that true moral basis on which Luther's intense love, as well as his frequent severe reprehension of his mad, wild Germans, rested. Luther, by his personal conduct, and by placing us at the head of a spiritual revolution in the world, contributed greatly to produce that mixture of cosmopolism with patriotism which prevails amongst us to this day; and if, at times, the former element has acquired a dangerous preponderance amongst us over the latter, this disease of ours has not been so injurious to the general developement of our nation, as the confusion and immaturity of the Hussite movement, in many respects so valuable to the Bohemians; while on the other hand, from the indestructible germs of a free moral consciousness, it is not so incurable as the vain self-exaltation of our neighbours across the Rhine.

As to the efforts for the improvement of taste, for a partial or complete emancipation of science, we fully recognise what was good, right, stirring and preparatory for the Reformation therein. We can appreciate that purification of the air which had been effected by the doubts of the authority of the

Church, excited long before the publication of Luther's Theses, and already widely diffused. We deny not, that the more or less clearly apprehended principle of the uncontrolled movement of thought was already lying in the atmosphere of the sixteenth century, and thus was among the impelling causes of the Reformation; but we do deny that it was the primary and dominant among those causes, still more that it was the only one. It is not the way of that class of men of letters, such as the revivers of the classical languages, art and philosophy men, to apply with zeal to practical aims. Rarely does any desire of acting immediately upon life arise in such circles; still more rarely a spirit which ventures upon a bold defiance of that which is established. Entirely devoted to the fascination of following and searching out dim intimations of knowledge, of ingeniously detecting long-concealed and deeply-inwrought errors, of continually bringing forward new treasures out of the mines of the past, of spreading out the riches thus acquired agreeably, of placing them in a clever artistical form before their compeers, and thus ever gathering fresh laurels for their own heads, the men of letters were indeed essentially opposed to the traditional institutions and notions, had risen intellectually beyond them, and were fond of turning the point of their spear against them, but nevertheless had nothing in them to effect a real Reformation; for the science of science is much less a sincere science of truth, than a science of one's own mind, a self gratification, a delight in one's own literary personality, and its occupations the finest, most specious form of selfishness. Now this self complacent devotion to learned musings, this indulgence in the pleasures of literary pursuits, requires a quiet, secure, comfortable, outward state of things. Hence the tendency of the men of letters was far from attempting to attack any powerful established authority, unless it was assured of having its retreat covered by another no less powerful. The leaning for support not merely on secular, but also on spiritual potentates, on Popes, Cardinals, Bishops, and other prelates, of whom none

was willing to go beyond the limits of self irony, or to allow the results of the new civilization to produce any practical effect upon himself, is a pervading feature in their history. Their evidence, therefore, is full of anticipatory regards for authority. The circle of their intellectual movements seldom extends with any vehemence, at least, not openly, into spheres which require forbearance, and are able to enforce it. Their struggle with antiquated barbarism was no serious battle for life and death with a deep-rooted pernicious evil, but was much more a satirical tilt, a jovial sport of youthful wantonness with the comic elements of the pedantic obsolete past; and even where the contest seemed to burn more violently, we must distinguish between the irritation of literary sensitiveness, and the expressions of a moral feeling, outraged by the violation of truth. Thus, the fine, free spirit of this kind of culture was not united even in its gravest and worthiest representatives with that bold, dauntless courage, to which alone it is granted to bring about the great work of a Reformation.

## NOTE B: p. 9.

I am speaking here of Mr Hallam's second edition. In the third he has inserted a couple of passages taken from my Note. Of these I shall have to speak in another Note.

## NOTE C: p. 13.

Stephen, p. 355, and remarks thereon.

## NOTE D: p. 15.

Hume, iv. p. 35; Voltaire, xiii. p. 328; Audin, i. 139. Mosheim does not even allude to it. See Maclane's Note. Niebuhr.

## NOTE E: p. 16.

Lutheri Opera, ii 259 a.

NOTE F: p. 20.

Audin, i. p. 72.

NOTE G: p. 22.

Luther Briefe, ii. p. 8; iii. 10, 21, 62, 439.

NOTE H: p. 29.

This question recurs in p. 869. See Stephen, p. 325, 346.

NOTE I: p. 33.

What is the real difference with regard to Justification? Has Mr Hallam ever examined the Articles to ascertain this? Compare Newman, Justification, p. 11.

NOTE J: p. 38.

Luther's Letters, iii. 211, 215, 258; iv. 103. He avoided the common fault of preaching to the people about the vices of their superiors. Coleridge, Remains, iv. 34. Tischreden, i. 49.

NOTE K: p. 41.

Note to p. 682.

NOTE L: p. 46.

Dialogue between Luther and Melancthon. Briefe, iii. 315; v. 96, 147. Tabletalk, p. 209-10.

NOTE M: p. 46.

Luther's controversy with Agricola, Opera, i. p. 517.

NOTE N: p. 55.

Coleridge, Remains, iv. 21, 23, 24, 27, 64.

## NOTE O : p. 59.

Mr H. has corrected this error. Would that he had in like manner corrected the far more important ones! See Opera. in Genesim, i. p. viii.

## NOTE P : p. 66.

Coleridge. Jeremy Taylor.

## NOTE Q : p. 70.

Jürgens, i. p. 451, fol.

## NOTE R : p. 72.

Jürgens, iii. 18; and passages quoted there.

## NOTE S : p. 72.

Answer to Hallam's Note.

## NOTE T : p. 80.

Luther's opinion of the Fathers: Genesis i. 8, 152, 153; xxii. p. 184. Tischreden, 68.

## NOTE U : p. 85.

Note in p. 712.

## NOTE V : p. 86.

Laurence's Lecture.

## NOTE W : p. 88.

Tischreden, 69. Luther on Genesis, Letters, Preface to his works; Admiration of Melanchthon.

NOTE X: p. 88.

On Newman's view of Faith.

NOTE Y: p. 91.

Note in p. 717.

NOTE Z: p. 91.

Note and references in p. 718.

NOTE AA: p. 92.

Passage of Mory on Romish Missions.

NOTE AB: p. 92.

References in p. 719.

NOTE AC: p. 100.

On Newman's Lectures since.

NOTE AD: p. 112.

Extract from Nitzsch.

NOTE AE: p. 115.

Baur Symbolik, p. 144.

NOTE AF: p. 123.

Opera, i. 16.

NOTE AG: p. 128.

Passages of Shakspeare.

NOTE AH: p. 128.

Similar declarations of Luther's.



NOTE AI : p. 130.

Jeremy Taylor, xi. 410. Sewell.

NOTE AJ : p. 135.

Moehler, &amp;c.

NOTE AK : p. 144.

Confessio Augustana, p. 33, 35, 36, 37.

NOTE AL : p. 146.

Extracts from Luther.

NOTE AM : p. 148.

Ficinus. Gersen.

NOTE AN p. 149.

Extracts from Luther.

NOTE AO : p. 159.

Hallam. Audin.

NOTE AP : p. 162.

Hallam. Stephen, &amp;c.

NOTE AQ : p. 166.

Luther. Coleridge.

NOTE AR : p. 172.

On Moehler.

NOTE AS : p. 174.

Religiones, Field.

NOTE AT : p. 177.

Chemnitz. Luther. Field.

NOTE AU : p. 182.

Coleridge. Mill.

NOTE AV : p. 185.

Mill.

NOTE AW : p. 187.

Mill, &amp;c.

NOTE AX : p. 188.

Hallam.

NOTE AY : p. 190.

Hallam. Baur. Luther. Waddington.

NOTE AZ : p. 192.

Mill.

NOTE BA : p. 194.

Numerical exaggeration.

NOTE BB : p. 196.

On Schelling.

NOTE BC : p. 196.

Mill.

NOTE BD : p. 198.

Chillingworth.

NOTE BE : p. 200.

Mill.

- NOTE BF : p. 211.  
Coleridge, &c.
- NOTE BG : p. 217.  
Epistle of St James.
- NOTE BH : p. 218.  
Tabletalk.
- NOTE BI : p. 220.  
Book of Esther.
- NOTE BJ : p. 221.  
Esdras.
- NOTE BK : p. 225.  
Jonah.
- NOTE BL : p. 229.  
Briefe, &c.
- NOTE BM : p. 242.  
Luther. Olshausen. Augusti.
- NOTE BN : p. 244.  
Luther.
- NOTE BO : p. 254.  
Luther.
- NOTE BP : p. 258.
- NOTE BQ : p. 261.
- NOTE BR : p. 262.  
Note in p. 851.

Mill.	NOTE BS : p. 265.
Mill.	NOTE BT : p. 267.
	NOTE BU : p. 270.
	NOTE BV : p. 271.
	NOTE BW : p. 273.
	NOTE BX : p. 276.
Mill.	NOTE BY : p. 277.
	NOTE BZ : p. 279.
	NOTE CA : p. 279.
	NOTE CB : p. 282.
	NOTE CC : p. 285.
	NOTE CD : p. 286.
	NOTE CE : p. 287.







